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This dissertation, with a standpoint o f disentangling China’s diplomacy “ inside- 
out,” explores the Chinese state-society relationship in domestic-foreign-policy 
interaction. With its analytic focus resting on the collective memory o f national 
humiliation in modem Chinese history and the derived national identity, this project 
delves into the linkage between the ideational impetus o f the diplomatic decision-making 
o f the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the way that the authoritarian regime claims 
its internal and external legitimacy.
In the state legitimation, collective memory and national identity are 
instrumentalized to enact the moral justification o f the CCP’s political authority and to 
justify China’s persistent quest to regain a rightful place in the international arena. In the 
belief system o f Chinese foreign policy ideas, these historical institutions shape the 
conception o f  the state interests and the goals o f  national foreign policy. The normative 
and purposive meanings and the affective dimension o f these ideational factors have 
given ground to the ethical agenda o f China’s diplomacy. The CCP’s policy calculation 
in its external legitimation can go against the moral standards by which domestic 
audience assesses its diplomatic performance. In the interrogation o f the discrepancy 
between the state’s foreign policy behavior and the CCP’s role playing claimed for its
memory-based legitimacy, the “scripts” o f Chinese diplomatic drama derived from 
historical institutions have empowered the agency o f the Chinese populace to contend 
with the authoritarian state.
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C H APTER I 
N A T IO N A L  ID EN TITY  A N D  CO LLECTIVE M EM O RY: ID EA TIO N A L  
V A R IA B L E S OF CH INESE FOREIGN PO LICY A N A L Y S IS
/ Foreign/  policy is the extension o f  China's 
domestic policies,
—Q‘an Qichen, former Chinese Foreign Minister'
As scholars, we devote our lives to the creation, 
refinement, and application o f  ideas. I f  we really 
thought ideas were irrelevant, our lives as social 
scientists woidd be meaningless. Our exploration o f  
the impact o f  ideas on foreign policy is also a 
search for personal meaning and relevance in our
own lives.
—Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane2
Understanding the intricate process o f a government’s foreign policy making is a 
challenging undertaking, especially in a country like China where the information 
pertaining to this “black box” is often asymmetrically distributed between the state and 
society. Prior to the era o f reform and opening-up to the outside world, inquires into and 
public participation in the foreign affairs of the People’s Republic o f China (PRC) were 
deemed as crossing the “red line” in Chinese politics, inasmuch as the formulation and 
implementation o f  foreign policy were the prerogative o f the leadership o f the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). Today’s China is no longer cloistered behind the Bamboo 
Curtain. Although “foreign relations “remain the most sensitive and tightly controlled
' B eijing R eview , January 15-21. 1990.
2 Judith G oldstein and Robert O. K eohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy: A n Analytical Framework," in Ideas 
a n d  F oreign  Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, a n d  P o litica l Change, ed. Judith G oldstein and Robert O. 
Keohane (Ithaca, N Y : Cornell University Press. 1993), 30.
2
area o f  Chinese governance,”3 the domestic environment o f Beijing’s diplomatic 
decision-making is taking on a new face. Amidst the socioeconomic transformation that 
is occurring at a breakneck pace, the totalitarian state has transformed itself into a 
“resilient” authoritarian regime working in a transnational society.4 The relentless forces 
o f  modernization and globalization have unleashed a myriad o f non-state actors. 
Operating as a loose conglomerate outside the inner circle o f  the foreign policy 
establishment, newly-emerging players on China’s diplomatic stage, such as nationalist 
activists and commercialized media, have repeatedly engendered popular mobilizations 
that are not fully coordinated or meticulously planned by the authoritarian state. The 
PRC state is increasingly porous to these societal actors that have acquired the liberty o f  
partaking in foreign policy making. This palpable tendency o f China’s diplomacy begs 
an obvious question; In an autocratic state where public opinion is traditionally viewed 
as an insignificant factor in the diplomatic decision-making process, how does the policy 
calculation at the top level have to wrestle with those impromptu forces arising from the 
bottom? There must be variables in the interlacing o f  domestic and international politics 
that drive the foreign policy behavior o f  the Chinese state and the CCP’s diplomatic 
decision-making. Charting out how these dynamics play out in the domestic-foreign- 
policy interaction, or the linkage politics o f  Chinese foreign affairs, is indispensable to a 
panoramic view o f China’s diplomacy.
In contemporary world politics, the need to understand China’s emergence on the 
global stage, which has challenged the conventional wisdom o f  international politics, has
3 Jisi W ang. "International R elations Theory and the Study o f  C hinese Foreign Policy: A  C hinese  
Perspective," in C hinese F oreign  P o licy : Theory a n d  P ra c tic e , ed. Thom as W . R obinson and David  
Sham baugh (O xford. UK  & N e w  York, N Y ; Clarendon Press and O xford U niversity Press. 1994), 483, 
em phasis in original.
4 Andrew J. Nathan. "Authoritarian R esilience." J ou rn a l o f  D em o cra cy  14. no. 1 (2003): 6.
3
never been more pressing. Despite the explosive growth o f scholarly inquiries, media
coverage, and public and policy debates about China’s ever expanding foreign relations,
many Western observers consciously or unconsciously base their arguments on China’s
stunning economic strides and rapid military modernization and the impact o f its foreign
policy behavior on the regional balance o f power. As a common theme in the literature
on China’s rise is its inevitability, Westerners tend to get carried away with provocative
book titles such as The New Chinese Empire and When China Rules the World.5 Opting
for the hegemonic dominance o f  an ascendant power as a simple explanation for a more
self-confident and nationalist China, these bestsellers miss the domestic factors that are
crucial to the formation o f the preferences and objectives o f  the diplomatic policymakers
in Beijing, or in a broader sense, the internal social determinants o f  the Chinese state’s
diplomatic interest and behavior. Without a systemic exploration o f these purportedly
“epiphenomenal” factors that are granted the status o f “unexplained variance” and hence
are sidestepped in the prevailing scholarly accounts o f  international relations (IR),6
China’s diplomacy will remain a puzzle o f  complexity and contradictions. As Susan
Shirk, former Deputy Assistant Secretary o f  State, astutely argues, the central challenge
in interpreting the implications o f China’s behavior on the world stage is not the
assessment o f  its material strength, but a thorough understanding o f  its intentions:
The question o f  whether China is a threat to other countries cannot be 
answered just by projecting China’s abilities— its growth rates, 
technological advances, or military spending— into the future as many 
forecasters do. Strength is only one part o f the question. Intentions—
5 See R oss Terrill, The N ew  C hinese Em pire: A n d  What It M eans f o r  the U n tied  S ta tes  (N ew  York, N Y : 
B asic B ooks, 2009); Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The E n d o f  the W estern W orld  a n d  the 
B irth o f  a  N ew G lo b a l O rder  (N ew  York, N Y : Penguin B ooks, 2009).
6 G oldstein and K eohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework," 4 and fr. 4.
how China chooses to use its power— make the difference between peace
and war.7
As a prerequisite to deciphering China’s intentions, one needs to trace the origin, 
content, and nature o f  the ideas held by its foreign policy makers and the audience for
their diplomatic performance. Decoding Chinese foreign policy beliefs relies on the 
unpacking o f the mix o f sociopolitical dynamics underlying Beijing’s bent for self- 
assertion, which is plainly visible in the twists and turns that Chinese foreign relations 
have endured since the global financial crisis broke out in 2008. Among other diplomatic 
deadlocks currently experienced by the PRC, the face-off between Beijing and Tokyo in 
the East China Sea is thrusting the two historically adversarial actors ever closer toward a 
point o f military conflict. As the decades-long territorial dispute intensifies, the 
combustible relations between these two East Asian powers haunted by war memories 
makes this a propitious time to examine the causal pathway in which domestic ideational 
factors shape their foreign policies.
With this orientation, the dissertation will provide a sociological, culture-based 
explanation o f China’s diplomacy. The empirical focus o f this project is the impact of 
nationalism on the international behavior o f the Chinese state, which has become ever 
more pronounced if it is examined in the domestic-foreign-policy interaction. In 
exploring this thematic issue, analytic emphasis is put on the indigenous social-cultural 
predispositions in the enterprise o f Chinese nationalism and the institutional processes, 
whereby the causal effects o f these dynamics lead to the formulation o f the goals and 
choices o f the PRC’s foreign policy. Moving away from the theoretical approach and 
analytic lens adopted by most o f  the current research, this dissertation attempts to dissect
7 Susan L. Shirk. China, F ragile S uperpow er: H ow  China's In ternal P o litic s  C o u ld  D era il Its P eacefu l R ise  
(O xford and N ew  York: O xford University Press, 2 0 0 7 ), 10.
5
collective memory and national identity, two historical institutions underlying Beijing’s 
foreign policy decision-making, and to chart out the mechanism by which the ethical 
agenda o f the CCP’s diplomatic performance is tethered to the regime legitimacy o f the 
authoritarian state. Explicating the interaction between the actor o f  the PRC’s diplomacy 
and its audience invites us to take a renewed look at the state-society relationship o f a 
nondemocratic polity, which has traditionally been absent in most, if not all, o f the 
scholarly literature on the linkage politics o f foreign affairs.
As an introduction to the dissertation project, this chapter aims to lay the 
conceptual groundwork and establish a theoretical framework for the analysis o f the 
ideational factors underpinning the CCP’s diplomatic decision-making and China’s
foreign policy behavior. It will outline the theme o f the study, offer an overview o f the 
relevant literature, and delineate the structure o f the dissertation. The first section o f the 
chapter presents the background and objectives o f this research, the major puzzles to be 
solved in this study, and the intellectual significance o f this project and its implications 
for the foreign policy analysis and the study o f Chinese politics. The elaboration o f the 
major limitations that hamper the existing research on the impact o f  Chinese nationalism 
on the PRC’s external behavior suggests prospective contributions that this dissertation 
would make to the current scholarship. The second section consists o f two parts o f 
literature review. The first part is a synopsis o f the IR theories that are related to the 
domestic politics o f foreign relations and the literature o f comparative politics concerning 
the relationship between state and society. In the second part, the review is narrowed 
down to the specific scholarly field o f memory study, as collective memory is selected as 
a key cultural cue in the realm o f identity politics to excavate the interlinking o f Chinese
domestic politics and foreign relations. The third section o f the chapter sketches out an 
overarching analytic framework and details two distinct lines o f inquiry that will be 
compared and contrasted in the examination o f the impacts o f nationalism on Chinese 
foreign policy making and the state’s external behavior. This section also proposes the 
research methods that are employed to answer the research questions. Following the 
outline o f the research design, the fourth section delineates the structure o f this 
dissertation and previews the major arguments o f the ensuing chapters.
RESEARCH BACKGROUND, PURPOSE, AND SIGNIFICANCE
It is hardly controversial that the foreign policy pathway that China is taking in 
the new- millennium has dramatically departed from those o f its past when it was 
marginalized to the periphery o f the international community. Following the abrupt end 
o f the Cold War. Beijing has defied enormous odds stacked against it on both the 
domestic and international fronts. While pockets o f  positive views regarding China can 
be found around the world, misgivings and uncertainties abound in the global community 
about how the awakening oriental dragon will behave and how it will deploy its 
newfound might in the so-called “China’s century.”8
One o f  the primary sources o f the apprehension over China’s foreign policy 
behavior is its incoherent and contradictory diplomatic profile. In the immediate 
aftermath o f the Tiananmen incident in 1989, the PRC found itself beleaguered in the 
presumably worst, albeit brief, diplomatic crisis that it had ever encountered in the post- 
Mao era. Ever since then, Beijing has been pursuing a “peaceful rise” (hepingjueqi)
8 "Special Report: China's Century." N ew sw eek  M ay 9, 2005. A lso  see  M ichael Elliott, "The C hinese  
Century," Time. January 22 , 2007.
strategy, an accommodationist stance aimed at forestalling an anti-Chinese encircling 
coalition. The Chinese government has devoted tremendous resources to improving and 
promoting its national image. Almost every two years, China’s quest to boost its 
popularity is marked by a well-publicized media event: the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the 
2010 Shanghai Exposition, the Miss World contest in 2012 in Ordos. Even though the 
PRC has been unremitting in its efforts to unleash its “charm offensive,”9 its other face is 
equally evident, which has puzzled, frustrated, and pained those who have worked hard to 
build a strategic relationship with China. Beijing’s truculent posture in defense o f the so- 
called “core national interests,” as fashioned in the historical maritime disputes in the 
South and East China Seas that has put the PRC at odds with its neighbors, and its 
muscular position showcased in the global economic downturn have taken the limelight 
away from its diplomatic achievements.10 Along with the waxing ambition o f the PRC 
state, the acerbic turn o f Beijing’s diplomacy has caused jitters in the international 
community, with some foreign officials and media coverage portending the imminence o f 
an “assertive and even arrogant” China, which does not bode well for peace and 
cooperation in the Asia Pacific.11
Putting aside its merits or demerits, this observation, to a large extent, is rooted in 
the roiling sense o f  anxiety that has been fed in many political capitals about Chinese 
nationalist hubris, which is perceived to be driving Beijing’s foreign policy in an 
inflexible direction. Since this dynamic became an explosive element o f Chinese foreign 
relations in the 1990s, the study o f Chinese nationalism has experienced a flurry o f
0 Joshua Kurlantzick, C harm  O ffensive: H ow China's Soft P ow er Is Transform ing the W orld  (N ew  Haven, 
C T : Y ale U niversity Press, 2007).
10 Suisheng Zhao, "China: A  Reluctant Global Power in the Search o f  Its R ightful Place,'1 in E m erging  
P ow er in  a  C om para tive P ersp ec tive  (N ew  York and London: B loom sbury, 2012), 101-30.
11 Hannah B eech, "Fierce and Friendly: China's T w o D iplom atic Faces," Time January 18, 2011.
8
scholarship. Although the literature that addresses the impacts o f nationalism on the 
PRC’s foreign policy behavior varies in focus and substance, a majority o f the scholarly 
work is, to one degree or another, aimed at solving this puzzle: “Is Chinese nationalism
threatening?” For most o f the research in the China watching community, the answer to 
the question seems to reflect an underlying assumption that Chinese nationalism, 
particularly the anti-foreign strain at the popular level, is aggressive, disruptive, and 
frightening.12 From the perspective o f domestic politics, this position reinforces the 
belief that popular nationalism is a destabilizing force o f  Chinese politics. This line of 
logic is, however, inconsistent with the empirical findings that Chinese urban citizens 
who have stronger nationalist feelings tend to be more supportive o f the CCP regime.13 
The positive correlation between the expressed nationalist sentiments and the Chinese 
populace’s attitudinal support o f the authoritarian state is overlooked by the current 
works on Chinese nationalism when sound alarm bells regarding popular nationalism.
Meanwhile, it should be noted, when China’s “peaceful rise” strategy or “charm 
offensive” is bogged down in squabbles with Japan— one o f the severe diplomatic tests 
faced by the newly anointed CCP leadership— popular nationalism is indeed a major 
concern in Beijing’s policy calculation. As has increasingly been shown in the past
See, e.g .. Shirk, China, F ragile Superpow er: H ow  C hina s  In tern al P o litics  C o u ld  D era il Its Peaceful 
Rise: Jessica Chen W eiss, "Autocratic S ignaling, M ass A udiences and N ationalist Protest in China." 
In ternational O rganiza tion  67, no. 1 (2013); P ow erfu l P a trio ts: N ation alist P ro test in C h in a 's F oreign  
R elations  (N ew  York, N Y : Oxford U niversity Press, 2014); Peter H ays G ries, China's N ew  N ationalism : 
Pride, P o litics, a n d  D ip lom acy  (B erkeley, CA: U niversity o f  California Press, 2004); "China’s 'New  
Thinking' on Japan," China Q u arterly  184(2005): 835-50; Suisheng Zhao, A N ation-S tate b y  C on stru ction : 
D ynam ics o f  M odern  C hinese N ationalism  (Stanford, CA: Stanford U niversity Press, 2004); "Foreign 
P olicy Im plications o f  C hinese Nationalism  Revisited: The Strident Turn," Jou rn al o f  C on tem porary  China  
22, no. 82 (2013): 535-53; Erica Strecker D ow n s and Phillip C. Saunders, "Legitim acy and the Lim its o f  
Nationalism : China and the D iaoyu  Islands," In ternational Secu rity  23, no. 3 (1998-1999): 114-26; A llens  
W hiting, China Eyes J a p a n  (Berkeley, CA: University o f  C alifornia Press, 1989): David Shambaugh. 
"Containment or Engagem ent o f  China? C alculating B eijing's Response," In ternational S ecurity  21, no. 2 
(1996): 180-209.
11 Jie Chen, P opu lar P o litica l S u pport in  U rban C hina  (W ashington, D.C. and Stanford, California: 
W oodrow  W ilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, 2004), 31, 106-08.
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decade, the internal force o f nationalist sentiments does strengthen the need for the 
regime to cater to the most mobilized, restive, and engaged segment o f  the Chinese 
populace. But this reality and the underlying assumption o f  the current scholarship on 
Chinese nationalism give rise to a paradox: In. an autocratic political system lacking the 
mechanisms that would allow the translation o f the will o f the citizens into government 
policies, how can state leaders be compelled by popular nationalist demand to alter the 
course o f their foreign policy?
To unravel this puzzle and the discrepancy between the empirical findings o f the 
Chinese popular political support and the underlying assumption o f the mainstream
scholarship o f Chinese nationalism, students of Chinese foreign policy need to delve into 
the normative content o f  Beijing’s foreign policy making and uncover the linkage 
between the ideational impetus o f the PRC’s diplomacy and the basis on which the 
authoritarian state claims its regime legitimacy. Without examining the causal effects o f 
the idiosyncratic ideational factors in the conception o f the goals o f Chinese foreign 
policies and the interaction between the policymakers and the audience for China’s 
diplomacy, a fuller explanatory account o f the CCP’s ultra-sensitiveness to the domestic 
popular nationalism and the convergence between the state-sponsored nationalism and 
popular nationalism cannot be reached.
To achieve this fuller account is the intent o f  this dissertation. It does so by 
putting at the center stage o f this project the historical sources and social foundation of 
the belief system o f Chinese foreign policy, where the PRC state’s diplomatic goals are 
defined and its international behavior is reasoned. This normative paradigm is allied to a 
causal process in which the foreign policy beliefs held by the Chinese elites and masses
are translated to the CCP’s conduct o f foreign affairs. Along this line o f reasoning, 
theoretical assertions on the PRC’s abrasive diplomacy would be vacuous if  they are not 
coherently situated in such an ideational framework ingrained in the indigenous cultural 
environment and Chinese cognitive system. Scrutinizing this contextual element in the 
linkage politics o f Chinese foreign relations requires what Paul Cohen calls the “ insider 
cultural knowledge” that is “hidden ... in a Chinese cultural milieu.” 14 Acquiring such 
subtle background knowledge, which is difficult for Western scholars, is sorely needed to 
dig out the historical and cultural roots o f the PRC’s diplomacy. In an attempt to join the 
intellectual effort to redress the impoverished understanding o f  the social-cultural 
underpinnings o f China’s foreign policy behavior,15 this study gives higher priority than 
Western-centric scholarship to the cultural and historical context o f the PRC’s diplomacy, 
in which the ideational factors shaping the CCP’s foreign policy making are formed and 
transformed.
What, then, are the ideational factors in Chinese culture— or to be more specific, 
Chinese political culture— that are most significant in motivating Beijing’s diplomatic 
decision-making and that thus need to be on the radar screen monitoring the PRC’s 
foreign policy behavior? Let us first borrow Sonia Alvarez, Evelina Dagnino, and Arturo 
Escobar’s definition o f political culture: the “particular social construction in every 
society o f  what counts as ‘political.’ In this way, [it] is the domain o f practices and 
institutions, carved out o f the totality o f social reality, that historically comes to be
11 Paul A. C ohen, Speaking to H istory: Thu S tory  o f  K in g  G uojian  in T w en tieth -C en tu ry China  (Berkeley, 
CA: U niversity o f  California Press, 2009). 232 -33 .
15 For an exem plary o f  this intellectual effort, see Zheng W ang, N ever F o rg e t N a tio n a l H um iliation: 
H isto r ica l M em ory in Chinese P o litics a n d  F oreign  R ela tion s (N ew  York, N Y : C olum bia U niversity Press. 
2 0 1 2 ).
considered as properly political.”16 In the realm o f Chinese political culture, a 
historically-informed ideational factor that is constructed in the social practice o f foreign 
relations is national identity.11 With regard to its formation, IR scholar Yaacov 
Vertzberger offers an enlightening clue in his elaboration o f the cultural effects on 
foreign policy making: “At the core o f  culture, in most cases, are broad and general 
beliefs and attitudes about one’s own nation, about other nations, and about the 
relationships that actually obtain or that should obtain between the se lf  and other actors in 
the international arena.”18 The relationship between the national “se lf’ and the foreign 
“other” is a distinctive social-cultural environment, where the Chinese “way o f being” in 
the international society and the modal character o f its nationhood is constructed. This 
historical experience leaves an imprint on a nation’s identity. An empathetic and 
interpretive understanding o f the way that the Chinese “se lf’ perceives itself and 
reaffirms its desired values in the social interaction with the foreign “other” can help us 
comprehend the historical and contextual process o f China’s foreign policy making, in 
which the ideational constructs “hidden” in the Chinese political culture define the 
national interests. To this end, tracing the causal chain— wherein the substantive appeal 
and normative significance o f national identity are connected to the goals o f the national
16 Sonia E. A lvarez, Evelina D agnino, and Arturo Escobar, "Introduction: The Cultural and the Political in 
Latin Am erican Social M ovem ents," in C ultures o f  P o litics, P o litic s  o f  Cultures: R e-V ision ing  Latin  
A m erican S ocia l M ovem en ts , ed. Sonia E. A lvarez, Evelina Dagnino, and Arturo Escobar (Boulder, CO: 
W estview  Press, 1998).
17 A llen  Carlson expounds the sim ilar argument. In his critique o f  the current scholarship, Carlson points 
out the obsession  with typology o f  Chinese nationalism  has created a confusing labyrinth o f  term inology  
and that many ty p e s” o f  nationalism s actually mean the sam e thing. To ensure the independent 
explanatory power o f  nationalism , Carlson recom m ends a conceptual m ove toward an analysis o f  national 
identity. See A llen Carlson, "A Flaw ed Persepctive: The Lim itations Inherent within the Study o f  Chinese  
Nationalism," N ations a n d  N ationalism  15, no. 1 (2009): 24-32.
18 Y aacov Y . I. Vertzberger, The W orld in Their M inds: Inform ation Processing, C ognition , a n d  P ercep tion  
in F oreign P o licy  (Stanford, CA: Stanford U niversity Press, 1990), 268. em phasis added.
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foreign policy, which in turn shape the state’s behavior and decision-making19— is a 
building block o f the holistic theoretical framework that this dissertation attempts to
establish. With such an analytical scaffold, one can ascertain the cognitive and affective 
dimensions o f Chinese nationalism and the social-cultural underpinnings o f  China’s 
discontent as represented in its foreign relations.
In accordance with the logic o f traditional rationalist accounts o f IR theory, which 
posits that the role o f identity and other cultural factors is subordinate to the causal force 
o f concrete conditions such as the military and economic capabilities o f  the state in 
driving national leaders’ diplomatic decision-making,20 the social-cultural variables in the 
realm o f domestic politics that complicate the picture o f Chinese foreign policy making is 
“window-dressing” for “hard” interests o f rational actors. This strain o f materialist 
outlook forecloses some valuable avenues for empirical research and theoretical insights 
that have the promise o f taking us away from somewhat myopic views o f the PRC’s 
diplomacy to those “deeper” social norms determining the national interest and state 
action. To amend this conceptual imbalance, this dissertation borrows the analytic lens 
o f political sociology in its investigation o f China’s foreign policy behavior. According 
to this alternative approach that views states as social rather than rational actors, the 
vision o f national leaders in their foreign policy making reflects the collectively-held 
beliefs that have “historically [come] to be considered as properly political” and have 
hence been ingrained in the Chinese mindset. In the cultural environment that serves as
19 This is an increasing focus o f  socio log ica l constructivism . See W illiam  A. Callahan. "History. Identity, 
and Security: Producing and C onsum ing N ationalism  in China," C ritica l A sian  S tu d ies  38, no. 2 (2006): 
184.
20 Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: A lternative Perspectives on National Security," in The Culture o f  
N ation a l Securityr. N orm s a n d  Identity in W orld  P o litic s , ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (N ew  York, N Y , 1996), 
26.
the “ lifeworld” upon which the state’s foreign policy behavior is construed,21 state 
leaders, in their policy choices, are obliged to fulfill the social needs defined by national 
identity and adhere to the ethical standards embedded in social convention. In the 
Chinese populace, these inter-subjective understandings o f how the state should behave 
in self-other interactions on the international scene are constituted in the national identity, 
thereby rendering some foreign policy actions socially acceptable but others unacceptable. 
As a primary objective o f this study, identifying these motivational elements o f Chinese 
national identity is a significant step to grasp the normative component o f the PRC’s 
foreign policy behavior.
In the excavation o f the impacts o f nationalism on Chinese foreign relations, 
another ideational construct that requires “insider cultural knowledge” is collective 
memory. This cultural foundation o f nationalism is the prime “raw material” through 
which national identity is embodied. As John Gills puts it in his illustration o f the co­
dependent relationship between the construction o f memory and collective identity,
The core meaning o f any individual or group identity, namely, a sense of 
sameness over time and space, is sustained by remembering; and what is 
remembered is defined by the assumed identity. We are constantly 
revising our memories to suit our current identities Memories help us 
make sense o f the world we live in.22
In essence, the collective commemoration o f the past o f a nation is a cultural 
conduit, which identifies the group boundary between the self and the other with a sense 
o f history and furnishes the national community with an ontological reference system for 
the present use. This process is summarized by Anthony Smith as the role nationalism
21 N eta C. Crawford, A rgum ent a n d  C hange in W orld P o litie s ’ Ethics, D eco lon iza tion , a n d  H um anitarian  
Intervention  (Cambridge, UK & N ew  York, N Y : Cambridge University Press, 2002), 59.
22 John R. G illis, C om m em orations: The P o litics o f  N a tion a l Identity  (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1996), 5.
plays in “rediscovering and reinterpreting the communal past in order to regenerate the 
community.”23 The three-layered discovery o f historic deposits, which all involve the 
construction o f collective memory and national identity, provides an illuminating lens to 
unlock the inner mystery o f the ideational foundation o f Chinese foreign policy behavior. 
By inspecting each o f these layers in the Chinese historical and cultural context, this 
dissertation aims to spell out an intellectual pathway to elucidate why nationalism is so 
central to the authoritarian regime and its foreign policy making.
An oft-cited puzzle about Chinese nationalism is why the contemporary Chinese 
can be so xenophobic— or in Chinese parlance, so patriotic—under an authoritarian 
regime. In cases where the CCP encounters diplomatic crises, particularly those related 
to historical grievance, why does the Beijing regime have a domestic populace pushing 
for a hard-nosed stance? Untangling the enigma accords importance to the relevance and 
importance o f  the Chinese public recollection, which is rediscovered by the CCP in its 
effort to sustain the memory-based legitimacy o f  the authoritarian regime. In a 
nationalist attempt to frame the perception and nurture the feelings about the nation, 
memory, given its interlinking with nation, is an instrumental symbol o f fusing national 
identity. Smith puts this point succinctly, “no memory, no identity; no identity, no 
nation.”24 As a micro foundation o f the state-building project, the public remembrance, 
which communicates the sense o f a shared destiny based on a common past,25 is always 
marshaled in the political claim-making o f the government to legitimize the regime.
Such popular mobilization is a political endeavor that the CCP has been actively engaged
24 A nthony D. Smith, "Gastronomy or G eology? The R ole o f  N ationalism  in the Reconstruction o f  
Nations," N ations a n d  N ationalism  1. no. 1 (1995): 19.
24 The Ethnic O rig in s o f  N ations  (O xford, UK: B asil B lackw ell, 1986), 383.
25 See, e.g ., Yael Zerubavel, R e co vere d  Roots: C o llec tive  M em ory a n d  the M aking o f  Israeli N ational 
T radition  (C hicago, IL: U niversity o f  C hicago Press, 1995).
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in, which links the moral justification o f the regime legitimacy to its diplomatic 
performance that is consciously judged by the Chinese populace. Due to the central role 
o f collective memory in China’s diplomacy, the CCP’s intentional reordering o f certain 
deposits o f  national history is crucially important in the interrogation o f the ideational 
motivation o f its foreign policy making.
A second group o f research questions pertinent to collective memory is how this 
ideational actor is reinterpreted to forge the national identity that can enhance the internal 
and external dimensions o f the PRC state’s legitimacy. To carve out this process in the 
linkage politics o f  Chinese foreign affairs, this research will unearth the content o f the 
Chinese collective memory that has become the focal point in the CCP’s regime 
legitimacy enhancement. If viewed as a communicative device for projecting nationalist 
discourse, collective memory can be seen an example o f what Anthony Giddens terms the 
“narrative o f the self: the story or stories by means o f which self-identity is reflexively 
understood, both by the individual concerned and by others.”26 In the narration o f the 
autobiographical narrative o f  the Chinese nation, several aspects o f  memory construction 
manifest the reflexive understanding o f its modern history that has made the ‘'nationalist 
aspirations o f the present appear authentic, natural and comprehensible.”27 The issues 
that will be addressed in the dissertation include: What is the fundamental plotting 
schema that connects seemingly discrete historical stories in a cause-ar.d-effect manner 
for the legitimation o f domestic and foreign policy? Within such narrative paradigms,
26 Anthony Giddens, M odernity a n d  Self-Identity: S e lf  a n d  Society  in  the L ate M odern  Age (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1991), 243 . In a sim ilar vein, som e cultural socio log ists v iew  the stories that 
social actors tell o f  them selves as “ontological narratives,’' w hich aie used to m ake sense o f  and to act on in 
their lives. See, e.g ., Margaret R. Som ers, "Deconstructing and Reconstructing C lass Formtion Theory," in 
R ew orking C lass, ed. John R. Hall (Ithica, N Y : Cornell University Press. 1997), 73 -105; G eorge Steinm etz. 
"R eflections on the Role o f  Social Narratives in  W orking-Class Foundation," S o c ia l Science H istory  16, no. 
3 (1992): 489-516 .
27 Smith, "Gastronomy or G eology? The R ole o f  N ationalism  in the Reconstruction o f  Nations," 16.
which historical events take precedence over others in the rich legacy o f collective 
memory? Who are the self and the other among the protagonists o f  these events? What
role identities are attributed to the adversarial actors and what are the implications o f the 
group categorization in the story-telling? The upshot o f  answering these questions that 
are germane to the reinterpretation o f national history is to account for the 
communicative process in which the rework o f collective memory o f modern Chinese 
history is subsumed to the CCP’s domestic and foreign policy agendas.
To ascertain the potential promise that collective memory holds in the analysis o f 
Chinese foreign policy, this dissertation also pays focused attention to the emotional 
appeal o f  collective memory in regenerating Chinese national community. The 
communication o f  memory, as noted by sociologist Eviatar Zerubavel, is often anchored 
in the symbolic representation o f  some past events that can readily incite the collective 
emotion o f pride, pain, or shame.28 In the articulation o f these dramatic events, meanings 
attached to a particular streak o f collective identity are instantiated in the self-other 
interactions and the perceptions o f  foreign relations are formed. While inspiring affective 
reaction o f group members, the emotional tropes o f memory, represented through such 
chosen symbols as national traumas and victories, cast an indelible shadow over a 
nation’s conception o f its interests and hence its foreign policy behavior. In the Chinese 
public remembrance, the traumatic memory o f foreign incursion and aggression in its 
modem history is central to regenerating the national community in emotionally-charged 
disputes with the foreign “other,” which deliver plausible historical analogies that 
energize necessary actions to achieve the social needs inherent in the collective identity.
28 Eviatar Zerubavel, "Social M em ories: Steps to a S ocio logy  o f  the Past," Q ualita tive S o c io lo g y  19, no. 3 
( 1996): 290.
As the emotional tag o f  national identity are forcefully translated to state action, grasping 
the conceptual and behavioral implications o f  the affective reaction o f the Chinese in­
group members that is animated in these incendiary events is a critical step to understand 
the impacts o f traumatic memory on the PRC’s foreign policy behavior. By looking at 
the interaction between the CCP’s diplomatic decision-makers and the Chinese populace, 
who has a set o f role expectation o f the Beijing regime in the drama staged on the foreign 
relations front, this research hopes to offer a robust inquiring basis to figure out whether 
national trauma is merely a means for the CCP to gamer public support for its foreign 
policy, or if it is in fact an independent variable driving actual policy choice.
The effort o f  testing how the ideational variables condition the policy options in 
the CCP’s diplomatic decision-making suggests a more balanced perspective in 
conceptualizing the state-society relationship under the authoritarian regime power, 
which is what this study aims to produce in its analysis o f the linkage politics o f Chinese 
foreign affairs. The conventional wisdom o f the foreign policy formulation in the 
nondemocratic setting, as will be elaborated later in the literature review, is located in the 
state-versus-society framework in which foreign policy is reduced to a product o f an 
arbitrary dictate from above. Since the state is viewed as a unitary actor that is 
autonomous from social forces, its foreign policy is more or less a coordinated strategy 
designed to cope with the external environment and reflects the particular views on 
national interests held by state leaders. Such a state-centric outlook becomes tenuous 
when one ponders how an authoritarian regime like the CCP is be so responsive to the 
opinion o f nationalist activists, whose emotional demands can diverge from the state 
leaders’ policy preference. However, if the state’s power is not equated with its
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autonomy from society but is treated as a political force working through society, the 
state-society dichotomy can be transformed into a symbiotic relationship in which the 
two sides are “mutually empowering.” Put another way, the autonomy o f the state is 
embedded in a given society. It is upon such an epistemological basis that this 
dissertation conducts the research on the ideational factors o f Chinese nationalism, an 
arena where the political claim-making of, and strategic interactions between, the CCP
leadership and domestic societal actors end up reshaping both the state and society in the 
domestic-foreign-policy interaction.
Situated in the recursive relationship between the state and society, the study o f
the production and consumption o f  collective memory provides a fresh visual angel to
look at the normative consensus reached between the nationalist ideologues and their
mass audience in the internal and external legitimation o f  the PRC state. Motivated by
this key issue in the linkage politics o f  Chinese foreign relations, the projection and
reception o f the historical narratives highlighting the Chinese nation’s trauma bridge the
popular demands inherent in the national identity with the state capacity to accomplish
the identity-informed interests on the world stage. In this regard, the dissection o f the
fulfillment o f  the CCP’s role expectation on the performance stage o f  the PRC’s
diplomacy represents an instructive route for empirical research on the conditions under
which the state-society synergy is more likely to occur in the foreign policy making
process, which has not yet been fully explained by students o f Chinese politics.
29 Joel S. M igdal, Athl Kohli, and V ivienne Shuc, "Introduction: D evelop ing a State-in-Society  
Perspective," in S tale P ow er a n d  S o c ia l Forces: D om ination  a n d  Transform ation in the Third W orld , ed 
Joel S. M igdal, Athl Kohli, and V ivienne Shue (N e w  York, N Y : Cam bridge U niversity Press, 1994), 1 -4. 
A lso  see Joel S M igdal, S ta te  in Society: S tu dyin g  D o w  Sta tes a n d  S o cie ties Transform  a n d  Constitu te  One 
A nother  (N ew  York, N Y . Cam bridge University Press, 2001); "The State in Society," in N ew D irections in 
C om para tive  P o litics , ed. Howard J. W iarda (Boulder, CO: W estview  Press, 2002); Xu W ang, "Mutual 
Em powerm ent o f  State and Society: Its Nature, C onditions, M echanism s, and L im its.” C om para tive  
P olitics  3 1, no. 2 (1999): 231 -49.
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Indubitably, the state does not always run in step with society on the foreign 
relations front. In addition to the positive linkage o f state and society in the enterprise o f 
Chinese nationalism, the survey o f the negative linkage yields informative insights on a 
peculiar form o f popular engagement with foreign policy making in an autocratic state, 
which can be further mutated into the popular contention in the realm o f domestic politics. 
Given that foreign policy making has traditionally been one o f the most centralized area 
o f policymaking in Chinese governance, the research on the transmission o f popular 
nationalist demand to the decision-making circle o f China’s diplomacy is conducive to 
the plausibility probe o f China’s political liberalization. Put in a broader scope, although 
political participation in China is often seen as sui generis in comparative politics, a 
quick glance around today’s world suggests that organizing collective actions in the 
political opportunity structure o f  nationalism is not a novel strategy o f savvy protesters to 
challenge the despotic power o f illiberal regimes. Due to the significance o f authoritarian
regimes in world politics and foreign policy analysis, empirical findings o f the ingenious 
ways o f  political liberation in the repressive political systems are profitable for the 
comparative study o f contentious politics and for an adequate appreciation o f the impact 
o f  public opinion in the foreign policy decision-making o f  nondemocratic states.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The correlation between the domestic imperatives and the external settings o f a 
state’s foreign policy making has been one o f  the defining research questions in foreign 
policy analysis.30 In the early 1960s, James Rosenau, perhaps more than anyone else,
30 A ccording to N eack et al. the literature on foreign policy analysis can be roughly divided into tw o  
categories o f  scholarship. The first one is often referred to as “com parative foreign policy (C FP).“ which is
2 0
drew the theoretical issue o f linkage politics '‘along the domestic-foreign frontier” to the 
attention o f political scientists.31 Since then, scholars anchored in various sub-branches 
o f IR have conducted their examinations o f  the internal-external linkage o f foreign affairs 
in diverse fashions.32 As Paul Huth points out in his diagnosis o f  the domestic 
determinants o f interstate territorial disputes, “the critical theoretical task confronting 
scholars in the field o f international politics is to develop generalizable propositions 
about state behavior based on the premise that foreign policy leaders are attentive to the 
incentives and constraints generated by both their domestic and international 
environment.”33 Most notably, the simultaneous impact o f  internal and external inputs on 
the foreign policy making is aptly labeled by Robert Putnam as a “two-level game,” 
wherein the interactions o f a government with its foreign counterparts are constrained by 
domestic constituents who may support or oppose the agreement being negotiated. As 
Putnam expounds in an iconic article on the linkage politics o f  a state' s foreign relations,
At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring
the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by
aim ed to "m ove aw ay from noncum ulative descriptive case studies and to construct a parsim onious 
explanation o f  what drives the foreign p o licy  behavior o f  states.” The second group is the oft-cited  
"foreign p olicy  analysis (FPA )."  featuring as "a broad set o f  approaches bound together by com m on focus 
on studying foreign p o licy  and acceptance o f  eclecticism  in theory bu ild ing .” Cited from Laura N eack , 
Jeanne A . K. H ey, and Patrick J. H aney, "Generational C hange in Foreign Policy Analysis," in F oreign  
P o licy  A n alysis: C on tin u ity  a n d  C hange in Its S eco n d  G en era tio n , ed. Laura N eack , Jeanne A . K. H ey, and 
Patrick J. H aney (E n glew ood  C liff, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995), 2-3 .
31 For tw o pioneer works o f  this them atic issue by R osenau, see  Jam es N . Rosenau, Linkage P olitics: 
E ssays on the C o n vergen ce o f  N ation al a n d  In ternational System s  (N ew  York: Free Press, 1969); A long  
the D om estic -F oreign  F rontier: E xplorin g  G overnance in a  Turbulent W orld  (Cam bridge and N e w  York: 
Cam bridge U niversity Press, 1997). A long with other political scientists, W olfram Hanrieder a lso  
em phasized the need o f  study o f  the linkage po litics o f  foreign p o licy . See W olfram  F. Hanrieder, 
"Compatibility and C onsensus: A  Proposal for the C onceptual L inkage o f  External and Internal 
D im ensions o f  Foreign Policy," A m erican  P o litic a l Science R eview  61 , no. 4  (1967): 97 1 -8 2 .
31 A m ong others, see  Christopher H ill, The C hanging  P o litic s  o f  F oreign  P o licy  (N ew  York: Palgrave 
M acM illan, 2003); V alerie M. H udson, F oreign  P o licy  A nalysis: C la ss ic  a n d  C on tem porary  Theory  
(Lanham , M D: R ow m an & Littlefield  Publishers, 2006); Laura N eack , Jeanne A. K. H ey, ana Patrick J. 
H aney, eds., F oreign  P o licy  A nalysis: C on tin u ity  a n d  C hange in Its S eco n d  G en era tion  (E nglew ood  C liffs, 
NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995).
33 Paul K. Huth, S ta n d in g  Your G round: T erritoria l D isp u tes a n d  In tern ational C onflict (Ann Arbor, M l: 
U niversity o f  M ichigan Press, 1996), 7.
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constructing coalitions among these groups. At the international level, 
national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy 
domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences o f foreign 
developments.34
This logic o f the interconnectedness o f domestic and international forces, 
however, is not universally shared within the literature o f foreign policy analysis. While 
great strides have been made in the studies o f foreign policy in scope and depth, the 
salient lack o f a “systematic, sustained and comparative inquiry,” explicitly identified by 
James Rosnau in the 1960s,35 remains in the arena o f national-international linkage. One 
o f  the primary reasons o f such intellectual fragility is that the dominant paradigms o f IR 
theory, particularly neorealism and neoliberalism, privilege the effects o f anarchic 
international structure on the instrumental rationality o f state behavior.36
Against this backdrop, among the three “images” o f international politics 
presented by Kenneth Waltz, attention is overwhelmingly given to the “third image”— the 
international system consisting o f state units that are functionally undifferentiated.37 As 
Waltz boldly posits, “A theory o f international politics ... can describe the range o f likely 
outcomes o f actions and interactions o f states within a given system and how the range of 
expectations varies as systems change.”38 Given that the external constraints stemming 
from the anarchic international structure are identified as the key variables in most 
foreign policy projects, suffice it to say that systemic theories are inadequate to probe the
34 Robert D . Putnam, "Diplom acy and D om estic Politics: The L ogic o f  T w o-L evel G am es,” In ternational 
O rganization  4 2 , no. 3 (1988): 434.
35 Rosenau, Linkage P olitics: E ssays on the C onvergence o f  N ation al a n d  In ternational System s, 2.
36 A m ong others, see Kenneth N . W altz, Theory o f  In ternational P o litics  (Reading, M A: A ddision-W esley , 
1979); David A . Baldw in, ed. N eorealism  a n d  N eo libera lism : The C on tem porary  D ebate  (N ew  Y ork, N Y : 
Colum bia University Press, 1993); Robert P ow ell. "Anarchy in International R elations Theory: The 
N eorealist-N eoliberal Debate," In ternational O rganization  48 , no. 2 (1994): 313-44; Robert O. Keohane, 
ed. N eorealism  a n d  Its C ritics  (N ew  York, N Y : Colum bia U niversity Press, 1986).
37 A ccording to W altz, the “first im age” o f  international politics is the human nature at the individual level, 
and die “second im age” is the structure o f  separate states. See Kenneth N . W altz, Man, the State, a n d  War 
A T heoretica l A nalysis  (N ew  York, N Y : C olum bia University Press, 1959).
38 Theory o f  In ternational P olitics , 71.
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complicated process o f the diplomatic decision-making process operating inside a 
country, which involves a bewildering variety o f internal inputs, and the outcomes o f 
specific behavior o f individual states that are assumed to react to similar systemic 
stimuli.39 This reveals why Waltz himself nullifies the utility o f his theory in 
“ [explaining] the particular policies o f states,” as he believes that “a theory of
international politics” cannot be confused with “a theory o f foreign policy.”40 Similarly,
in acknowledging the shared weakness that neorealist and neoliberal accounts are 
susceptible to in their interpretation o f  the behavior o f  the major global powers at the end 
o f the Cold War, Robert Keohane, a representative o f  neoliberalism, also writes that 
“ [more] research will have to be undertaken at the level o f  the state, rather than the 
international system.”41
A corollary o f such skewed inquiry in the study o f foreign policy behavior is the 
deliberate detachment o f the domestic sphere o f  politics. The ontological primacy given 
to the anarchic context o f unitary states lends support to a rationalist, or materialist, 
perspective o f states’ foreign relations. With a premium placed on the variation in the 
system-level constraints that are virtually faced by all the security-seeking state actors, 
their behavior is accordingly viewed as the decision-makers’ strategy to cope with the 
international environment. Shifts in the distribution o f power among states and their 
relative positions in the international system cause the change in their foreign policies. 
Insights flowing from the rationalist model typically bear the assumption that external 
restraints, which foreign policymakers can neglect only at the risk o f failure, directly
w Theory o f  In ternational P o litics . 122.
40 Theory o f  In ternational P o litic s , 121.
41 Robert O . Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist C hallenge after the Cold War," in N eorealism  
a n d  N eoliberalism : The C on tem porary  D eb a te , ed. D avid A. Baldw in (N ew  York. N Y : Colum bia  
U niversity Press, 1993), 295.
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shape the state behavior, and domestic normative environment and ideational motivation 
o f states’ diplomatic actions are therefore relegated to a minor role in the foreign policy 
analysis.42 To be more specific, this analytic bias has led to an overlpok o f the 
conception o f state interest, which is informed in the formation and transformation o f 
national identity that is constructed in the social interaction o f state actors, as well as 
individual perception and preference that are highly associated with the priority o f 
foreign policy making. To the extent that identity, ideology, and norms, among other 
ideational factors, are viewed as derivative o f the material variables o f national foreign 
policy and simply serve the instrumentality o f rational actors, these social-cultural 
elements o f a state’s diplomatic goal are conceived o f as relatively fixed and exogenous 
variables in the research traditions o f foreign policy analysis and thus are lack of 
independent explanatory power in fathoming the state’s conduct o f  its foreign policy.
That being said, a slew o f recent work by some IR scholars take a different tact in 
querying the role o f domestic variables, or in W altz’s typology, the second image of 
international politics, with the assumption that foreign policy results from the constant 
interaction o f internal and external forces. The most prominent strain o f this scholarship 
is neo-classical realism. This group o f scholars contend that, while the formulation and 
implementation o f foreign policy is primarily driven by a country’s relative material 
power in the anarchic international system, external settings have to be filtered through 
various actors o f internal politics— decision-makers’ perceptions, the ease o f mobilizing 
social resources, and state structures, to mention a few— before they can finally be
42 G oldstein and Keohane. "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An A nalytical Framework," A.- For exam ples o f  how  
the ideational factors is m arginalized in realist, and non-realist scholarship, see Stephen Krasr.er, D efending  
the N ational Interest: Raw M ateria ls  Investm ents an d  LIS. F oreign  P o licy  (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
U niversity Press, 1978). Kenneth A . O ye, ed. C oopera tion  under A n arch y  (Princeton. NJ: Princeton  
U niversity Press, 1986).
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translated to a state’s diplomatic behavior. Because state-level factors act as intervening 
variables between international structure and the dependent variable o f foreign policy 
output, understanding the relationship between power and policy requires an exhaustive 
scrutiny o f  both international and domestic contexts o f  the state’s foreign policy 
behavior.43
Unlike neoclassical realists’ adherence to the determinist logic centering the 
anarchic structure o f  the international system and the states’ material capability in 
shaping the contour o f foreign policy, another variant o f 1R scholarship, innenpolitik 
theories argue that internal elements place more imprints in foreign policy making.44 
Scholars in this camp suggest that it is the pressures within states, rather than those 
outside, that drive the diplomatic decision-making. Starting from the premise that 
societal interests have a stake in the foreign policy choice, this domestic politics approach 
views the priority setting o f international affairs as state leaders’ response to these 
interests. As the state’s diplomatic decision-making can be constrained, and perhaps 
even distorted, by societal interests and pressures, domestic considerations are seen by 
innenpolitik advocates to have greater gravity in the final choice o f foreign policy than do 
neo-classical realists.45 A quintessential notion o f  1R influenced by the basic tenet o f  the
43 For an in-depth d iscussion  o f  neoclassical realism see G ideon R ose, "N eoclassical R ealism  and Theories 
o f  Foreign Policy," W orld  P o litics  51, no. 1 (1998): 144-72 . R epresentative w orks o f  neoclassical realism  
include M ichael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and S teven  E. M iller, eds., The P erils  o f  Anarchy: 
C o n tem p o ra ry  R ea lism  a n d  In tern ational Secu rity  (Cam bridge, M A : M IT Press, 1995); Thom as J. 
C hristensen. U seful A dversaries: G ra n d  S tra tegy, D om estic  M obiliza tion , a n d  S ino-A m erican  C onflict 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton U niversity Press. 1996); Randall L. Schw eller, D ea d ly  Im balances: T ripo larity  
a n d  H itler's S tra teg y  o f  W orld  C on qu est (N ew  York, N Y : C olum bia U niversity Press, 1998); W illiam  
Curti W ohlforth, The E lusive Balance: P o w er a n d  P ercep tio n s D uring  the C o ld  W ar (Ithaca, N Y : C ornell 
U niversity Press. 1993); Fareed Zakaria, From  W ealth to  P ow er: The U nusual O rig ins o f  A m erica 's  W orld  
Role  (Princeton, NJ: Princeton U niversity Press, 1998).
44 For the notion o f  innenpolitik  theory, see R ose, "N eoclassical Realism  and Theories o f  Foreign Policy,"  
146-48.
45 The literature in this regard is substantial and diverse. S ee , e .g ., Richard R osecrancc and Arthur A. Stein. 
"Beyond R ealism : The Study o f  Grand Strategy," in The D om estic  B ases o f  G ra n d  S tra teg y  ed. Richard
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innenpolitik account is democratic peace. This thesis, in explaining why democracies do 
not fight each other, reasons that the domestic institutions discourage national leaders in 
democratic states from waging war against each other at the expense o f  human lives and 
public expenditure. Restrained by state structures, these leaders do not resort to military 
conflicts for political gains, but rather propagate democratic values that are conducive to 
peace among these states.
Implicit in the theory o f democratic peace is the assumption that autocracies enjoy 
a wider degree o f latitude than their democratic counterparts in dealing with foreign 
affairs, in that leaders o f nondemocratic regimes are relatively free to conduct foreign 
policy without internal constraints arising from below. National leaders o f  democracies 
have to face the threat o f  electoral punishment. When public opinions diverge from their 
policy preference, these leaders often claim that domestic “audience costs” tie their hands 
in international negotiations.47 By contrast, those attributes that facilitate the impact o f
R osecrance and Arthur A. Stein (Ithica, N Y : Cornell U niversity Press, 1993), 3 -21; Peter G ourevitch, 
P olitics in H a rd  Times: C om para tive  R espon ses to  In ternational E conom ic C rises  (Ithaca, N Y : Cornell 
U niversity Press, 1986); Benjam in O. Fordham, B uild ing  the C o ld  W ar C onsensus: The P o litica l E conom y  
o f  U.S. N a tio n a l Secu rity  P o licy  (Ann Arbor, MI: University o f  M ichigan Press, 1988); Etel Solingen, 
R eg ion a l O rders a t  Century's D awn: G lo b a l an d  D om estic  Influences on G ra n d  S tra teg y  (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton U niversity Press, 1998); Peter Trubowitz, D efin ing the N a tion a l Interest: C onflic t a n d  C hange in 
A m erican  f o r e ig n  P o licy  (C hicago, IL: U niversity o f  C hicago Press, 1998); Steven E. Lobell, The 
C hallenge o f  H egem ony: G ra n d  Strategy, Trade, a n d  D om estic  P o litics  (Ann Arbor, M l: University o f  
M ichigan Press, 2009); Jack Snyder, M yths o f  Em pire: D om estic  P o litics  a n d  In ternational Am bition  
(Ithaca, N Y : Cornell U niversity Press, 1991); Stephen Van Evera, C auses o f  War: P o w er a n d  the R oots o f  
C onflict (Ithaca, N Y : Cornell U niversity Press, 1999).
46 For som e o f  the leading scholarly works on dem ocratic peace thesis, see , e.g ., Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual 
Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1975)," in The E nlightenm ent, ed. D avid W illiam s (Cam bridge and N ew  
York: C am bridge U niversity Press, 1999), 377-98; M ichael W . D oyle, "Kant, Libera! L egacies, and 
Foreign A ffairs, Part 1,” P hilosoph y & P ub lic  A ffairs 12. no. 13 (1983): 205-35; "Kant, Liberal L egacies, 
and Foreign A ffairs, Part 2," P hilosoph y & P ublic  A ffairs 12, no. 4 (1983): 323-53; Ways o f  W ar a n d  Peace  
Realism, L iberalism , a n d  S ocia lism  (N ew  York, N Y : W .W . Norton, 1997).
47 See, e.g., James Fearon, "Dom estic Political A udiences and the Escalation o f  International D isputes,” 
A m erican  P o litica l Scien ce Review  88, no. 3 (1994): 577-92; James D. Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Poiicy  
Interests: T ying Hands Versus Sinking Costs," J ou rn al o f  C onflict R esolu tion  41 , no. 1 (1997): 68-90; 
Alastair Sm ith, "International Crises and D om estic Politics," A m erican P o litica l Scien ce  R eview  92 , no. 3 
(1998): 623-38; Kenneth A . Schultz, "Looking for A udience Costs," Journal o f  C onflict Resolution  45. no.
1 (2001): 32-60; Thom as C. Schelling, The S tra teg y  o f  C onflict (Cambridge, M A: Harvard U niversity
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domestic public opinion on the foreign policy making process— such as an autonomous 
media sector, decentralized state institutions, and above all, a meaningful electoral 
mechanism accorded to a democratically elected government— are largely absent in
autocratic settings.48 Under such circumstances, leaders can pursue those policy options
that go against articulated or anticipated public opinion without risking future retribution 
by voters.49 Given the assumption o f foreign policy making in autocratic settings as 
insulated from societal constraints, the linkage politics o f these states’ foreign relations 
has languished as the ‘‘residual category” in much o f the scholarly literature lying at the 
intersection o f international politics and comparative politics.
The prominent autonomy o f the state from pressures emanating from below and 
the undeserved treatment o f  societal forces in the diplomatic policymaking process 
readily fit into the analytic paradigm o f  statism in comparative politics. On the basis of 
the premise that the authority o f the state is the determining factor o f political life, 
analytical priority o f this approach is accorded to the nature and composition o f the state, 
as well as its functions and ability to withstand challenge from within and from the 
outside. In the one-way relationship between the state and society, the state, as the locus 
o f political power rather than the secondary variable derivative o f the society, is equipped
Press, 1960); Christopher F. G elpi and M ichael Griesdorf, "W inner or Losers? D em ocracies in 
International Crisis, 1918-94," A m erican  P o litica l Science R eview  95, no. 3 (2001): 633-47; H elen V. 
M ilner. Interests, Institutions, a n d  Inform ation: D om estic  P o litics a n d  In ternational R e la tion s  (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); Bahar L eventoglu and Ahm er Tarar, ''Prenegotiation Public 
C om m itm ent in D om estic and International Bargaining," A m erican P o litica l Science R eview  99 , no. 3 
(2005): 419 -33 .
4g A m ong others, see, Phillip J. Pow lick and Andrew Z. Katz, "Defining the A m erican Public 
O pinion/Foreign P olicy  Nexus," M ershon In ternational S tudies R eview  42 , no. I (1998): 29-61; D ouglas C. 
Foyle, "Public O pinion and Foreign Policy: Elite B e lie fs  as a M ediating Variable," In ternational S tudies  
Q u arterly  4 1 , no. 1 (1997): 141-69; Peter J. Katzenstein. "International R elations and D om estic  Structures: 
Foreign E conom ic P o lic ies o f  A dvanced Industrial States," In tern ational O rganiza tion  30, no. 1 (1976): I- 
45.
49 See Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Studying Substantive D em ocracy." PS: P o litica l 
Science a n d  P o litic s  21 .n o .  1 (1994): 12.
with the inherent power to reinforce societal convergence and deference.50 Since most 
policies are imposed on society from above, societal forces exert few , if  any, impacts on 
the policymaking o f  the state. Even in the cases w'here the interests o f the state and o f 
society conflict with each other, the collectivity o f  state officials are able to shape societal 
preferences, so as to align them with their own preferences that can be translated into 
“authoritative actions.”51 These statist arguments, which reflect the political situations 
under some authoritarian regimes featuring a strong state vis-a-vis a weak society, depict 
a unitary actor that has overwhelming power to effectively regulate, penetrate, and 
organize society.
Some other scholars in the statist school, who can be labeled as “neo-statist”
theorists, revise the state-centric vision mentioned above with a more nuanced approach 
that takes into consideration the state’s interaction with domestic and foreign society. 
Rather than dwelling on the debate about whether the state has an independent impact on 
society, Theda Skocpol, one o f the notable representatives o f “neo-statists,” underscores 
that a comprehensive gauge o f the role and significance o f the state cannot be achieved 
without plumbing both the domestic context and the international environment o f the 
state’s governance. While maintaining and manipulating domestic sociopolitical order, 
the state has to maneuver for survival and advantage in its foreign relations. It is in their 
domestic and international policy pursuits that the states’ autonomy and their capacities 
are embedded.52 Although states may be able to “formulate and pursue goals that are not
50 John D earlove, "Bringing the Constitution Back In: Political Science and the State," P o litica l S tudies  37, 
no. 4  (1989): 528.
51 Eric A . Nordlinger, On the A utonom y o f  the D em ocratic  S tate  (Cambridge, M A: Harvard University  
Press, 1981), 7-9.
52 Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies o f  A nalysis in Current Research," in B ringing the 
State Back !n, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich R ueschem eyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge and N ew  York: 
Cambridge University Press. 1985), 19, 8. For a representative work o f  the state’s  “em bedded autonom y,”
simply reflective o f the demands or interests o f social groups, classes, or society.”
Skocpol confesses, their conduct o f policy initiatives is constrained by various factors, 
domestic and international, that yield disproportionate impact on the state autonomy.53 As 
such, in the study o f “how states affect political and social processes through their 
policies and their patterned relationships with social groups,” Skocpol maintains, 
investigators should look “more microscopically at the ways in which the structures and 
activities o f  states unintentionally influence the formation o f groups and the political 
capacities, ideas, and demands o f  various sectors o f society.”54 Moving beyond the 
purely state-centric views, according to which states are far from being an integral part o f 
a larger whole, neo-statists have come to realize that the state is a weighty actor, but not a 
unitary or monolithic one, as state officials need to cooperate or contend with other actors 
in their “goal-oriented activities.”55 This approach is epitomized in the caution counseled 
by Skocpol and her colleagues in the concluding chapter o f  their edited volume Bringing 
the State Back In, a must read in the scholarship o f statism, that “[studying] state action 
should not entail either glorifying state power or overestimating its efficacy.”56
An important thematic issue that can serve as an appropriate annotation to the 
state-society interaction is collective memory, the production and consumption o f which 
can bring about both intended and unintended consequences to the state when it seeks to 
construct a supportive discursive environment o f its domestic and foreign policy
see  Peter B. Evans, E m b ed d ed  A utonom y: S ta te a n d  Industria l Transform ation  (Princeton. NJ: Princeton  
U niversity Press, 1995). Forrest Colburn offers a laudable rev iew  o f  tw o important w orks o f  the scholarship  
o f  statism . S ee Forrest D. Colburn, "Statism, Rationality, and State Centrism," C om para tive  P o litics  20 , no 
4 (1 9 8 8 ):  485-92 .
5J Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies o f  A n alysis in Current Research." 9 -20 .
54 "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies o f  A nalysis in Current Research," 3 ,2 1 .
55 "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies o f  A nalysis in Current Research," 2 !.
56 Peter E. Evans, D ietrich R ueschem eyer, and Theda Skocpol, "On the Road toward a M ore Adequate 
Understanding o f  the State," ibid.. ed. Peter E. Evans. D ietrich R ueschem eyer, and Theda Skocpol, 365 .
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initiatives A perusal o f the literature on collective memory reveals differing thematic 
focus in memory study, resulting from variegated theoretical lenses and analytic tools 
drawing on diverse disciplines,57 including sociology, political science, anthropology, 
psychology, and neuroscience. Due to the marked difference in terminology, interests, 
and methods in these fields, there has not yet been a coherent concept o f  memory that is 
widely accepted in distinctive research paradigms. Despite the fragmented scholarship, 
two caveats need to be addressed, which would be helpful for one to delve into the 
critical dimensions o f  memory that are highlighted in differing approaches.
At the basic conceptual level, it would be worthwhile to distinguish individual 
memory on the one hand and collective memory on the other. While the former refers to 
the recollection o f  events that are entirely made up o f personal experiences, the latter is 
exclusively contextualized in the social environment that affects the way people 
remember the past. Just as Maurice Halbwachs, whose seminal work on collective 
memory is generally credited with the foundation in this field, concisely puts it, “it is in 
society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, 
reorganize, and localize their memories.”58 Rather than the sum total o f  the recollections 
o f individuals who comprise a social group like a national community, collective memory 
provides the “social frameworks” in which individuals place their thoughts and engage in 
the act o f  remembrance.59 It is within these “clearly demonstrable long-term structures,”
57 For exam ple, see Andreas H uysssen , P resen t P asts: U rban P alim psests a n d  the P o litics o f  M em ory  
(Stanford, CA: Stanford U niversity Press, 2 0 0 3 ), 177. A m ong others, also see
58 M aurice H albw achs, On C o llec tive  M em ory, trans. L ew is A . C oser (C hicago and London: The 
University o f  C hicago Press, 1992), 38.
59 Ibid. For the com parison betw een the “individualist” and “co llectiv ist” versions o f  co llective  m em ory, 
see Jeffrey K. O liek, "C ollective M em ory: The T w o Cultures," S ocio lo g ica l Theory  17, no. 3 (1999): 337-  
45; Jan-W em er M uller, "Introduction: The Pow er o f  M em ory, the M em ory o f  Pow er and the Pow er over  
Memory," in M em ory a n d  P ow er in P ost-W a r Europe: S tudies in the P resen ce o f  the P a s t , ed. Jan-W emer 
M uller (Cambridge, UK: Cam bridge University Press, 2002), 3.
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which “are stubbornly imperious to the efforts o f  individuals to escape,” that members of 
a national in-group are endowed with the normative and affective underpinnings to 
interpret their national history, and that their perception and behavior toward the out­
groups are vigorously shaped.60
Another issue one needs to be aware o f is the fine line between memory and 
history. Collective memory, as observed by some historians, is less about the objective 
chronology o f the past than the public vision o f the history that is felt, thought, and 
interpreted in a given social entity. Historical events are often reduced to single­
dimensional pictures in memory construction, in which the complex and multifaceted 
historical process is prone to be reworked into a simplistic theme.61 The representation of 
collective memory thus often involves mythmaking through the story-telling o f the 
national history. Anne Ronning describes the mythical enactment of the past in her 
discussion o f the writing o f postcolonial history.
Memory is a collective myth shared by a group ... These memories are not 
personal, but inherited through storytelling with its concomitant distortion 
of detail. Memory and history are constructions o f  the past, though the 
factual elements o f mythology are often difficult to identify. Such myths, 
by a ‘glorification’ o f the past, contribute to linking past and present in the 
formation o f  a contemporary stance, and can have a therapeutic effect.62
60 Jeffrey K. O lick , The P o litics  o f  R egret: On C o llec tive  M em ory a n d  H isto r ica l R esp o n sib ility  (N ew  
York and London: R outledge. 2007), 28. A lso  see  Thom as Berger, "The Power o f  M em ory and M em ories 
o f  Power: The Cultural Parameters o f  German Foreign P olicy-M aking since 1945," in M em ory a n d  P o w er  
in P ost-W ar E urope: S tudies in the P resence o f  the P a s t , ed. Jan-W em er M uller (Cam bridge, UK: 
C am bridge University Press, 2 0 0 2 ), 80: Erica Resende and D ov ile  Budryte, "Introduction." in M em ory an d  
Traum a in In tern a tional R elations: Theories, C ases a n d  D e b a te s , ed. Erica R esende and D ov ile  Budryte 
(H oboken: T aylor and Francis, 2 014), 4,
61 See, e.g ., Pierre N ora, "Between M em ory and History: Les L ieux D e M em oire," R epresen ta tion s
26( 1989): 7-24; Peter N ovick , The H olocau st in A m erican  Life (B oston, M A: H oughton M ifflin  C om pany, 
1999). A nthropologist Pam ela Ballinger notes that academ ics with interests in co llective m emory "study 
the operation o f  m em ory, rather than produce an ‘objective' history o f  events . . . "  Pamela B allinger, 
H istory  in Exile: M em o ry  a n d  Identity a t the B orders o f  the Balkans (Princeton, NJ: Princeton U niversity  
Press, 2 0 0 3 ), 5.
62 A nne H olden R onning, "Som e R eflections on M yth, H istory and M em ory as Determ inants o f  Narrative," 
C oo /a b a h  3 (2009): 149.
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Applied to the case o f China, the distinction between memory and history is made
by Cohen in his path-breaking work on the Boxer Movement in China. In elucidating the
plural modes o f “knowing the past,” Cohen argues that the Boxer Movement, in addition
to being history-as-event, gave rise to a myth that connects the popular consciousness of
the past and present social agendas. As he contends,
The Boxers as event represented a particular reading o f the past, while 
the Boxer as myth represent an impressing o f the past into the service o f 
a particular reading o f  the present. Either way a dynamic interaction is 
set up between present and past, in which the past is continually being 
reshaped, either consciously or unconsciously, in accordance with the 
diverse and shifting preoccupations of people in the present.63
In the process o f transforming what happened in the past into what is actually
believed to have happened, the mythmaking endeavor helps to form a formulaic version 
o f historical events in the collective mentality, which ratifies the historiography endorsed 
by the mythologizers. “Once assertions about the past enter deeply into people’s minds 
(and hearts),” Cohen contends, “it is arguable that they acquire a truth o f  their own ....
At the very least such assertions are true statements about what people believe and 
therefore must occupy a central place in any history o f human consciousness.”64 The 
production and consumption o f collective memory is therefore conducted in a discursive 
setting, in which the agents of memory actively impinge upon the “objective” history as 
facts and reconstruct the history as experiences, so that people can use the history as myth 
in perceiving the relationship between the past and the present.65
63 Paul A . Cohen, H istory in Three K eys: The B oxers a s Event, Experience, a n d  M yth  (N ew  York. N Y : 
Colum bia University Press. 1997). xii, em phasis in original.
64 H istory in Three K eys: The Boxers a s  E vent, Experience, a n d  Myth  (New. York, N Y : C olum bia  
University Press, 1997). 212, em phasis in original.
05 For the literature on how  m emory overshadow s history, see, am ong others, K erwin Lee K lein, ''On the 
Em ergence o f  M em ory in H istorical Discourse," R epresen tations  69(2000): 127-50; Friedrich N ietzsche. 
On the U se a n d  A buse o f  H istory f o r  L ife  (S ioux Falls, SD: EZReads Publications, 2010); Steven Knapp, 
"Collectie M em ory and the Actual Past.” R epresen tations  26(1989): 123-49.
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Proceeding with the above issues concerning collective memory, one can
recognize three focused areas o f memory study: the nature o f collective memory, the
contingency o f memory, and the contestation over memory. Just as Elizabeth Jelin boils
down in her three-fold definition o f memories,
First, memories are to be understood as subjective processes anchored in 
experiences and in symbolic and materials markets. Second, memories are 
the object if  disputes, conflicts, and struggles .... Third, memories must be 
looked at historically ... which is to say that meanings attached to the past 
change over time and are part o f  larger, complex social and political 
scenarios.66
In terms o f the subjective nature o f collective memory, Jeffrey Olick strikes a 
cautionary note reminding us that “memory is a process and not a thing, a faculty rather 
than a place. Collective memory is something— or rather many things— we do, not 
something— or many things— we have."67 As indicated in the differentiation o f 
individual and collective memories mentioned above, collective memory can be seen as a 
process o f “existential fusion,” whereby the integration o f “our own personal biography 
with the history o f the groups or communities to which we belong” becomes “an 
indispensable part o f  our social identity.”68 In the transference o f individual to group 
identity, the emotional ingredients o f  the historical myths, such as shame and revenge, 
which are selectively exaggerated in the representation o f  history, often serve as the 
cognitive foundation to define who is the national “self,” who is the foreign “other”, what 
it means to be an in-group member, and who the group’s enemies are. It is in this
66 Elizabeth Jelin, S ta te  R e pression  a n d  the L abors o f  M em ory  (M inneapolis, M N: U niversity o f  M innesota, 
2 003). x v , em phasis in original.
67 Jeffrey K. O lick , "From C ollective  M em ory to S ocio logy  o f  M enm onic Practices and Products." in 
C u ltu ra l M em ory S tudies: An In tern a tion a l a n d  In terd isc ip lin a ry  H an dbook , ed. Astrid Erll and Ansgar  
N iinning (B erlin  and N ew  York: W alter de Gruvter, 2 0 0 8 ), 159.
68 Zerubavel. "Social M em ories: Steps to a S ocio logy  o f  the Past,” 290.
33
subjective process o f valorizing group membership that collective memory and national 
identity are intertwined and become the central forces o f nationalism.69
The function of collective memory in enhancing public allegiance and affiliation 
to the nation accounts for the statist manifestation in the domestic-foreign-policy 
interaction. Authoritarian leaders, as noted by Jack Snyder, tend to prompt nationalist 
myths when they are exposed to legitimacy crises and growing demand for political 
participation.70 While directing domestic grievance toward foreign entities, collective 
memory reifies the normative values ingrained in the national identity. In such cases, 
what the state leaders are doing is to employ public remembrance in an instrumental 
manner. In Jack Levy’s account, “ [they] ... select from historical experience those cases 
that provide the greatest support for their preexisting policy preferences that provide the 
greatest support for their preferred policies, whether they be driven by views o f the 
national interest or partisan political interests.”71 As a result, the unified and deferential 
society that is cohered around the shared national symbol “frees diplomatic decision­
makers to pursue the national interest autonomously o f domestic constraints.”72
Not only can collective memory enable foreign policy behavior o f the state, it is 
also capable o f constraining the autonomy o f the state’s decision-making, to the extent 
that societal actors can join the mythmaking efforts in interpreting the past. In this regard,
69 See, e.g ., Jack D avid  Eller, From C ulture to E thnicity to  Conflict: An A n th ro p o lo g ica l P erspective  on  
In ternational E thnic C onflict (Ann Arbor, MI: University o f  M ichigan Press, 1999); Smith, The Ethnic  
O rigins o f  N ations. For an exam ple o f  how  German co llective  m emory becom es central to an 
understanding o f  the forces o f  its nationalism , see Andrei S. M arkovits and Sim on R eich, The G erm an  
P red icam en t: M em ory a n d  P o w er in the N ew  E urope  (Ithaca, NY: Cornell U niversity Press, 1997).
70 Jack L. Snyder, From  Voting to  Violence: D em ocra tiza tion  a n d  N ation alist C onflict (N ew  York, N Y: 
Norton, 2000), 7.
71 Jack S. L evy, "Learning and Foreign P o lic y  S w eep ing a Conceptual M inefield  " In ternational 
O rganization  48 , no. 2 (1994): 282.
72 David Skidm ore and Valerie M. H udson, "Establishing the Limits o f  State Autonom y: C ontending  
A pproaches to the Study o f  State-Society R elations and Foreign Policy-M aking," in The L im its o f  S tate  
Autonom y: S o c ie ta l G roups a n d  F oreign  P o licy  F orm ulation , ed. David Skidm ore and Valerie M. Hudson  
(Boulder, CO: W estview  Press, 1993), 8.
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perhaps the most salient form memory can take^-which arouses what Roger Morgan 
calls the “public psyche’’ that runs deeper than public opinion in emotionally connecting 
the general populace to the national image presented on the foreign relations front— is
that o f  national trauma. This form o f collective memory, as Jeffrey Alexander defines, 
“occurs when members o f a collectivity fee! they have been subjected to a horrendous 
event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their 
memories forever and changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable 
ways.”74 The populace o f the victim states, under such circumstances, can become the 
memory agents. The desire to re-seize the power taken from their states and concern that 
the veracity o f the claims o f trauma will be questioned can work as a “symbolic power” 
in their political claim-making on the foreign relations front, which in turn, affects the 
legitimation o f the states’ foreign policy.75
The findings o f the study in traumatic memory reflect the other two aspects o f 
Jelin’s three-fold definition o f memory. While being a subjective process, collective 
memory is also a site o f  contestation, in which societal actors as memory agents can be 
empowered to constrain the autonomy o f  the state, whose effort in crafting the discursive 
environment o f its foreign policymaking is counterpointed by bottom-up forces. In 
elaborating the collective memory o f trauma, Jenny Edkins has forcefully argued,
The way in which [historical] events ... are remembered is fundamental to 
the production and reproduction o f centralized political power. However, 
memory is central not only to the production o f these forms o f power but 
also to their contestation: certain types o f memory, o f  catastrophic events,
73 Roger M organ, "Images, Identities, and Foreign Policy," G overnm ent an d  O pposition  36. no. 4 (2001): 
583. For an exam ple o f  m ost recent research on the co llective  m emory o f  national trauma, see Erica 
Resende and D ov ile  Budryte, eds.. M em ory a n d  Trauma in In ternational R elations: Theories, C ases a n d  
D eba tes  (H oboken: T aylor and Francis, 2013).
74 Jeffrey C. Alexander, "Toward a Theory o f  a Cultural Trauma," in C ultu ra l Traum a a n d  C o llec tive  
Identity , ed. Jeffrey C A lexander, et al. (B erkeley, CA: University o f  California Press, 2004), 1.
'5 M uller, "Introduction: The Power o f  M em ory, the M em ory o fP o w e r  and the Pow er over M emory." 25.
for example, provide specific openings for resistance to centralized 
political power.76
As such, the construction and consumption of memory, “always fragile and 
provisional,'’ is concomitant with social contestation and power struggles.77 As 
manifested in the “politics o f memory,” which is closely related to the power distribution 
in the “mnemonic communities,” the crucial issue o f attaching meanings to the past is not 
what is represented in the memory, but how the historical events are interpreted and 
perceived by the constructors and consumers o f memory, or simply put, “it is who wants 
whom to remember what, and why” that matters.78 Revolving around this question 
arising in the context-sensitive process o f memory construction, collective memory is
treated either as a dependent variable or an independent variable along with two primary 
strands o f perspectives o f how the memory works.
The presentist perspective, as articulated in the constructionist, interest-based, and 
pragmatist models of memory study, underscores the present sociopolitical purposes in 
searching for the “usable past.”79 Scholars employing this analytic approach, however 
extreme or understated, have a common analytic focus on the current situations in which 
collective memory, viewed as an independent variable, is intentionally and intensely 
constructed. The instrumentalist manipulation o f memory enables political actors to
76 Jenny Edkins, "Remembering R elationality: Trauma T im e and Politics: R eflections on the Relationship  
between Past and Present." in M emory, Trauma, a n d  W orld P o litics , ed. Duncan B ell (N ew  York, N Y : 
Palgrave M acm illan, 2010), 101.
77 Duncan B ell, "Introduction: V iolence and Memory," Millennium: Journal o f  In ternational S tudies 38, no. 
2 (2009): 351.
78 A lon Conftno, "Collective M em ory and Cultural History: Problems o f  Method," A m erican H istorical 
R eview  102, no. 5 (1997); 1393; Zerubavel, "Social M emories: Steps to a Socio logy  o f th e  Past," 289.
79 James V . W ertsch, Voices o f  C ollective R em em bering  (Cambridge and N ew  York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 40.
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80forge a past that is compatible with contemporary circumstances. On the other hand, as 
some scholars point out, “our current psychological state shapes our thinking about 
historical events in the same way that historical events shape our current thinking.”81 
Collective memory, with its inherent cultural values that can be animated through the 
representation o f its featuring symbols, supplies ethical standards and frames o f reference 
for the present. Unlike presentist advocates, scholars maintaining this cultural
perspective treat collective memory as an independent variable o f the political behavior 
conducted in the “mnemonic communities.” They do not believe that public 
remembrance is as malleable as presentist scholars would contend. According to them, 
collective memory is a stable cultural entity that does not need to be reified or objectified, 
and hence is subsumed within a specific cultural milieu that is constituted by common 
practices and representations.82 Such a “cultural system” that exists independently o f  the 
instrumental purposes o f memory construction is a reservoir o f  the moral sources o f  the 
present behavior.83 In this sense, the preference o f political actors and theit policy choice
80 See, e.g ., G eorge Herbert M ead, "The Nature o f  the Past," in E ssays in H onor o f  John D ew ey, ed. John 
C oss (N ew  York, N Y : Henry H olt &  Co, 1929), 2 35-42; Eric H obsbaw m  and Terrence Ranger, eds., The 
Invention o f  Tradition  (Cam bridge, UK: C am bridge U niversity Press, 1983); David R. M aines, N oreen M. 
Sugrue, and M ichael A. K atovich, "The S ocio log ica l Import o f  G. H. M ead's Theory o f  the Past," A m erican  
S o c io lo g ica l R eview  4 8 , no. 2 (1983): 161-73; John E. Bodnar, R em aking A m erica: P u b lic  M em ory, 
C om m em oration , a n d  P atrio tism  in the Twentieth C en tu ry  (Princeton, NJ: Princeton U niversity Press,
1992); H albw achs, On C o llec tive  M em ory, John R. G illis. C om m em orations: The P o litic s  o f  N ation al 
Identity  (Princeton, NJ: Princeton U niversity Press, 1994); D iane L. Barthel, H istoric  P reserva tion :  
C ollec tive  M em ory a n d  H isto r ica l Iden tity  (N ew  Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers U niversity Press, 1996), Eviatar 
Zerubavel, Time M aps: C o llec tive  M em ory a n d  the S o c ia l S hape o f  the P a st (C hicago. IT: University o f  
C hicago Press, 2003).
81 James W . Pennebaker and A m y G onzales, "M aking History: Social and P sychological P rocesses  
U nderlying C o llective Memory," in M em ory in M in d  a n d  C ulture, ed. Pascal B oyer and Jam es V. W ertsch  
(N ew  York, N Y : C olum bia U niversity Press, 2 0 0 9 ), 110.
82 Edward Shils, Tradition  (C hicago. 1L: C hicago U niversity Press, 1981), 1-62. 162-94; Peter L, Berger 
and Thom as Luckm ann, The S ocia l C onstruction  o f  R eality: A Treatise in the S o c io lo g y  o f  K n ow ledge  
(Garden City, N Y : D oubleday. 1966), 79-92.
81 For the illustration o f  the ''cultural system ," see Barry Schwartz, "M emory as a Cultural System :
Abraham L incoln  in W orld War Ii." A m erican  S o c io lo g ica l R eview  61, no. 5 (1996): 9 0 8 -2 7 . Regarding  
the scholarship with the cultural perspective in the m em ory study or the literature inform ing this 
perspective, see, e .g ., Edmund Burke, R eflections an the R evo lu tion  in France  (N ew  York, N Y : D oubleday.
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are historically conditioned in the normative paradigm stemming from the collective 
memory.
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK, DESIGN, AND METHODS
With an effort to interpret the social-cultural predispositions underlying the PRC’s 
often incomprehensible, sometimes even disturbing, external conduct, this dissertation 
seeks to amend the deficiency in the current scholarship that takes analytical precedence 
over the outcome o f Chinese foreign policy rather than the process o f the preference 
formation and policy choice. In an attempt to transcend the epistemological limits o f  the 
conventional approach o f looking at a state’s diplomatic behavior from outside, this study 
features a standpoint of disentangling the PRC’s diplomacy “inside-out.” The 
exploration o f the impacts o f popular nationalism in the linkage politics o f Chinese
foreign affairs is focused on how collective memory and national identity are constructed 
in the CCP’s domestic and foreign policy agendas; how they are ingrained in the 
cognitive system o f the Chinese populace; and how these historical institutions influence 
the perception and behavior o f  political actors. Scaling up to the analytical structure, 
addressing these thematic issues that have thus far not yet been fully attended, or only 
acknowledged obliquely, in the scholarship o f the Chinese domestic-foreign-policy 
interaction cries out for a clearly-defined framework. With such a theoretical scheme, 
one can flesh out more meaningfully the foreign policy ideas that are embedded in the
[1790] 1940); Em ile Durkheim, The E lem entary F orm s o f  R elig ious Life (N ew  York, N Y : The Free Press. 
[1915] 1965), Jaroslav Pelikan, The Vindication o f  Tradition  (N ew  H eaven, C'T: Y ale University Press, 
1984), M ichael Schudson, W atergate in A m erican M em ory. ■H ow  We Rem em ber, F orget, a n d  Reconstruct 
the P ast?  (N ew  York, N Y : B asic B ooks, 1992); "The Present in the Past Versus the Past in the Present," 
C om m unication  11, no. 2 (1989): 105-13; Jan Assm ann, R eligion a n d  C ultural M em ory: Ten Studies 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006); Y o se f Hayim Yerushalm i, Zakhor: Jew ish  H istory a n d  
Jew ish  M em ory  (Seattle, WA: University o f  W ashington Press, [1982] 1996).
enterprise o f Chinese nationalism and the way that these ideational variables prescribe 
and proscribe the CCP’s diplomatic decision-making and the PRC state’s foreign policy 
behavior.
A key nexus in the linkage politics o f a state’s foreign relations is regime 
legitimacy. National leaders in any state, be it democratic or autocratic, all take upon 
themselves the mission o f augmenting the legitimacy o f their regimes. As illustrated in 
Figure l(on page 40), the entry point o f  the current research consists o f  two dimensions. 
Internally, the legitimacy o f  the PRC state depends on the popular support for the 
incumbent regime o f the CCP leadership. Externally, the international status acquired by 
the PRC state also bestows upon the CCP the legitimacy it needs to secure its existence. 
These two aspects o f regime legitimacy are highly related to the collective memory o f 
foreign invasion and subjugation in the modem Chinese history. During the so-called 
“century o f national humiliation” (bainian guochi), which started with the Opium War 
(1839-42) and lasted until 1949 when the PRC state was founded, China was forced to be 
a semi-colony inflicted by foreign aggression and subjugation. The role-playing nature 
o f the Communist state, as manifested in its agency o f leading the Chinese people in 
wiping off national humiliation, is a commemorative resource for reifying the moral 
foundation o f the CCP’s internal legitimacy. On the other hand, the PRC state's status 
aspiration also subscribes to the vengeance motif o f  the traumatic memory. To what 
extent China’s status aspiration is fulfdled in the conduct o f  the PRC’s diplomacy is a 
major sign o f the CCP’s external legitimacy.
Scrutinizing how the collective memory o f national trauma is recovered and 
reinterpreted in the regeneration o f the Chinese national community is a critical step to
comprehend the way that regime legitimacy modes and drives the formulation o f the 
CCP’s foreign policy. This research puts the analytic focus o f  the political endeavor o f 
the CCP in enhancing its regime legitimacy on the cultural representation o f  the traumatic 
memory in the regime’s national-building project. As a communicative technique in the 
state’s historical mythmaking, collective memory is narrated through the representation 
o f the selected symbol o f national trauma that is inherent in the public remembrance.
This constant theme o f the nationwide patriotic education campaign, staged by the 
Chinese propaganda state from the early 1990s onward, is examined with an analytic lens 
o f political communication. To be more specific, the study o f the construction o f  Chinese
collective memory centers on the master historical account highlighting the historical 
trauma suffered by the nation. Canvassing how the victimization discourse is framed in 
the internal and external legitimation o f the state will bring a heuristic understanding of 
the pragmatic function o f the CCP’s strategic narratives, which, in the form o f the master 
historical accounts, is projected to mobilize popular support for an authoritarian regime 
and to justify the regime’s pursuit o f a global status that is commensurate with China’s 
historical glory.
As mentioned above, collective memory is reflected in the autobiographical 
narratives o f  a nation’s self-identity. The interpretive analysis o f  traumatic memory 
provides an important guideline for the investigation o f Chinese national identity, which 
comprises the belief system where the Chinese foreign policy ideas are formed and the 
PRC’s diplomatic behavior is reasoned. In this dissertation, the content o f Chinese 
national identity is composed o f  two aspects o f meanings and social values. The 
normative meaning o f the national identity, as instantiated in the traumatic memory o f
national dismemberment and territorial concession, is sublimated as the “principled 
beliefs” in sovereign whole and territorial integrity,84 an ethical standard that Chinese 
foreign policymakers must continuously uphold. The purposive aspect o f national 
identity derived from the national trauma has also been institutionalized as a social norm, 
which leads to the goal-orientation of national foreign policy.
Apart from these two veins o f meanings, Chinese national identity has its 
affective dimension, which has made the state-projected master historical account 
appealing to the collective emotion o f  the in-group members. According to the role 
theory in the 1R scholarship, a state’s external behavior is influenced by both its own role 
conception and the status prescribed by the foreign “other.”85 Since the interactive 
environment o f  the international society is not within the firm control o f the “self,” the 
disparity between Chinese national conception and the role prescription o f an 
authoritarian state traditionally held by the “other,” particularly those reining powers in 
the hierarchical international system, calls into question the purposive elements o f  
Chinese national identity. In the antagonistic intergroup interactions, the sabotage o f the 
China’s tenacious struggle for a deserved international power status by the foreign 
“other” readily animates an inveterate collective emotion, which shapes the in-group 
members’ perception and behavior o f in their interaction vis-a-vis the foreign out-groups. 
The emotional representation o f  national identity, coupled with its normative and 
purposive content, constitutes the belief system o f  Chinese foreign policy ideas, where 
the priorities and preferences in the diplomatic decision-making process are formed and 
translated to the state’s external behavior.
84 G oldstein  and K eohane, "Ideas and Foreign P olicy: A n A nalytical Framework," 9.
85 K. J. Flolsti, "National R ole C onceptions in the Study o f  Foreign Policy," In ternational S tudies Q u arterly  
14, no. 3 (1970): 240 -43 .
Returning to the entry point o f the research program, the CCP’s regime legitimacy 
is highly related to the PRC’s external behavior. The normative and purposive meanings 
o f Chinese national identity as well as its affective dimension have given ground to the 
ethical agenda o f Beijing’s foreign policy making and the criterion with which the 
Chinese populace assesses the CCP’s conduct o f  foreign affairs. The incompliance o f the 
regime’s diplomatic performance, as judged by the domestic audience, to its role identity 
as the defender o f  national pride and interests threatens to erode its internal legitimacy. 
Since China’s status aspiration is contingent upon the role prescription o f  the foreign 
“other,” reworking the PRC’s national image is often needed to secure a positive external 
environment that is conducive to its domestic socioeconomic development. But this 
agenda o f  external legitimation requires a mode o f policy calculation that can go against 
the moral standards o f  China’s diplomacy. It is such internal-external conflicts, caused 
by the distinctive orientations of the CCP’s regime-legitimation project, that have given 
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Located in the intersection o f comparative politics and international politics, this 
dissertation includes two major lines o f inquiry. The first analytic mode is rational 
choice approach, according to which ideas can be instrumentalized by strategic actors to 
further self-interested agendas.86 Along this line o f reasoning, collective memory and 
national identity, two ideational elements in the enterprise o f Chinese nationalism, are the 
intervening variables between the CCP’s rationality in shoring up the internal and 
external legitimacy o f the authoritarian state and the desired outcome o f the regime’s 
domestic and foreign policies.
To explain how the CCP plays the nationalist gallery in seeking the loyalty and 
support o f the Chinese populace and enacting the moral foundation of the PRC’s social 
mobility in the international society, the construction o f  collective memory and national 
identity is investigated from the analytical angle o f the social pragmatics o f strategic 
narratives, a communicative device exploited in the CCP’s historical mythmaking. 
Because history is filtered through the interpretation and reinterpretation, in projecting 
the strategic narrative revolving around historical representation, it is essential that the 
social meanings and values o f the nation’s past be distilled from collective identity and be 
reaffirmed in the public recollection. Standing in the shoes o f rational choice approach, 
the scrutiny o f  the CCP’s internal and external regime legitimation is focused on the 
formation, projection, and reception o f the master commemorative account. Looking at 
the symbolic representation o f  the traumatic symbol in these historical narratives, where 
the blow dealt to the Chinese nation is defined, the victimizers are identified, 
responsibility is attributed, and preventive actions are prescribed, one can see clearly how
86 For an exam ple o f  how  political actors adopt and construct identities to serve their individual purposes, 
see David D. Latin, Identity in F orm ation: The R ussian-Speaking P opulations in th e  near A b ro a d  (Ithaca, 
N Y : Cornell University Press, 1998).
the source o f national humiliation and the goals o f a traumatized community are oriented 
toward the role identity o f the CCP regime as the crucial agent o f  advancing national 
interests. The in-depth analysis o f  the narrative framing, which positions the CCP at the 
center o f  the nation-state dyad, reveals the way that collective memory and national 
identity are marshaled as a reliable resource, which promises a narrative edge in 
connecting the authoritarian state and its domestic populace and presenting the moral 
credential for the PRC’s long-awaited international status.
Meanwhile, it should be noted, the communicative techniques o f the state’s 
historical mythmaking do not fully account for the rhetoric potency o f the CCP regime’s 
morale role and the narrated moral identity o f the PRC state, which have proved to be 
well resonated within the domestic audience o f  the CCP’s strategic narratives. If 
collective memory and national identity are simply the functional devices for the rational 
actor to legitimize certain political agendas, it would be difficult to explain why the 
CCP’s diplomatic decision-making is amenable to the popular assessment. In fact, these 
endogenous variables o f  China’s diplomacy, as advocates o f the cultural perspective in 
memory study will agree, must have their own inherent power that is not at the full 
discretion o f the CCP’s instrumentalist manipulation. As the preexisting parts o f the 
Chinese political landscape, collective memory and national identity have taken on a life 
o f  their own and exerted a continuing influence in the domestic-foreign-policy 
interaction.
To fill the lacunae o f rational choice approach, historical institutionalist analysis 
is an alternative analytic pathway taken in this dissertation. In order to figure out what 
kind o f political imperatives compel the CCP leadership to alter the rational course o f
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action and adopt suboptimal foreign policy options in meeting nationalist demand, 
scholars need to rummage in the belief system o f Chinese foreign policy ideas, which is 
made up o f  the historically-constructed institutions that serve as the independent 
variables in the policymaking process. According to some historical institutionalists, 
political behavior is not a consequential, but obligatory, action, because it is governed by 
the “logic o f appropriateness” rather than rational self-interests.87 Along this line o f 
reasoning, embedded in the collective memory and national identity are the institutional 
structure o f social norms and collective expectations, which define the standard o f 
appropriateness regarding the behavior o f political actors and shape the popular 
perceptions o f foreign affairs. To the extent that these historical forces shape the 
conception o f state interests and the preferences o f  elites and masses, collective memory 
and national identity are, in essence, the internal sociological determinants o f China’s 
foreign policy behavior.
To interpret how the ideational factors that are constructed to boost CCP’s regime 
legitimacy can in turn constrain its policy choice, a crucial component o f  the research
program o f historical institutionalist analysis is the study o f the “moral or cognitive
88templates” inherent in collective memory and national identity. These ideational 
parameters o f  Chinese nationalism are the key to understanding how the master historical 
account is enmeshed in the social values and aspirations shared by the Chinese populace. 
It is also these independent entities, working as active agents in the mnemonic context of 
the CCP’s foreign policy decision-making, that have “bounded” the rationality o f the
87 James G. March and Johan P. O isen, R ediscovering Institutions: The O rgan iza tiona l B asis o f  P o litics  
(N ew  York, N Y : T he Free Press, 1989), 160-66.
88 Peter A . Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three N ew  Institutionalisms,"  
P olitica l S tudies  44, no. 5 (1996): 939.
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actor in its performance on China’s diplomatic stage while empowering its audience in 
contesting with the authoritarian regime.
The research agenda o f my historical institutionalist analysis includes three
steps.90 The first step is concerned with the question o f how collective memory and 
national identity become significant in Chinese political culture. As these ideational 
factors are the essential elements of Chinese nationalism, tracing the origin and evolution 
o f nationalism in the Chinese context is intermingled with our survey o f the pedigree o f 
Chinese collective memory and national identity. In retrospect, the pre-modern Chinese 
cultural supremacy was constructed in the interaction between the Middle Kingdom and 
those vassal states to which it claimed suzerainty in the Sino-centric tribune system.
Such an institutional arrangement was disrupted in its contestation with the Westphalian
system in the Opium War. It was at this critical juncture o f  the Chinese history that ,
nationalism and the collective memory o f  national trauma came to the forefront o f the <
Chinese political landscape.91 Examining the consequences o f such an exogenous shock t
on the survival-based security o f  the Chinese nation sheds light on the understanding o f
how Westphalian concepts, such as sovereign whole and territorial integrity, that were
abhorred by China emperors, came into the mindsets o f Chinese political entrepreneurs.
Historical institutionalists use the concept o f  "bounded rationality” to criticize the strict rationality  
assum ption o f  rational ch o ice  scholars. For the elaboration presented by Herbert Sim on, see Herbert A. 
Sim on, ed. M odels o f  Bounded Rationality: Em pirically Grounded Econom ic R eason, vol. 3 (Cambridge, 
MA: M IT Press, 1997). 291.
90 The design  o f th is  research agenda corresponds to the three distinct theoretical questions proposed by 
Sheri Berman for the ideational scholarship. See Sheri Berman, "Ideas, N orm s, and Culture in Political 
Analysis," C om para tive  P o litics  33, no. 2 (2001): 230-44 .
91 A ccording to Stephen Krasncr’s m odel o f  "punctuated equilibrium .” historical institutions tend to remain 
essentia lly  stable until they are confronted with such an ,exogenous shock and enter a new  stage o f  
equilibrium . C hinese foreign policy ideas were form ed in the 'punctuated equilibrium ” wherein the 
national identity w as constructed in a new  institutional environm ent— the W estphalian international system . 
See Stephen A . Krasner, "Approaches to the State: A lternative C onceptions and Historical Dynamics." 
ib id ,16(l 984): 223 -46 .
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Chatting the origin o f Chinese nationalism is a prerequisite step in the process 
tracing o f the formation o f Chinese foreign policy ideas But at this stage one still cannot 
guarantee that the ideational elements o f Chinese nationalism have taken on the status of 
internal determinants o f China’s foreign policy behavior. For a holistic understanding o f 
the path-dependent mode for Beijing’s foreign policy making that is causally related to 
collective memory and national identity, the second step o f the research agenda is 
engaged in the institutional process o f foreign policy ideas; that is, how the social values 
and meanings inherent in the national identity and collective memory are organized as an 
embedded pattern o f Chinese political discourse, which constitutes the moral foundation
of the state’s diplomatic behavior. With this research orientation, the institutionalization
of Chinese foreign policy ideas is dissected in the following two manners.
The first deals with the cognitive effect o f collective memory and national identity 
on the Chinese inter-subjective understandings o f foreign relations. A caveat needs to be 
noted here. As memory is both retrospective and prospective, members o f  a post-colonial 
society do not simply live in the recollection o f national trauma; rather, as some 
sociologists contend, they are active agents in “transmitting reflexive knowledge about 
the past from the perspective o f a future present.” 92 Along with this logic, the 
institutionalist analysis in my research program will elucidate how Chinese national 
trauma casts its memory forward in such a way that the meanings and values o f the bitter 
experience o f the self in interacting with the other have been conventionalized as “logic 
o f appropriateness,” regarding how the Chinese state should properly behave and what 
kind o f goals it should actively pursue on the foreign relations front. Collective 
expectations concerning the conduct o f China’s diplomacy and the conception o f the state
92 Elzbiela Halas, "Time and M emory: A Culural Perspective," Trames 14. no. 4  (2010): 313.
interest have constituted the “moral or cognitive templates” in the ethical agenda o f 
Beijing’s foreign policy decision-making. These social norms, which have been encoded 
in the traumatic memory, cannot be reduced to the external constraints on the behavior o f 
Chinese political actors, as they serve as the signpost o f the normative practices that are 
constitutive o f the actors themselves.
With reference to the affective dimension o f national identity, the second mode o f 
dissecting the institutional process o f Chinese foreign policy ideas is to test if  these 
ideational factors can steer the emotion o f  Chinese populace, and if they can, how the 
perception, and action o f Chinese in-group members are motivated by the emotional 
appeal o f  collective memory and national identity. In this regard, the thrust o f this study 
is Chinese identity predicament, wherein Chinese rising pride in recovering its historical 
glory uneasily coexists with a lingering insecurity in the national community. By 
observing how the Chinese in-group members perceive and react to the behavior by 
foreign out-group in these situations where the identity-constitutive norms are disrupted 
in the antagonistic intergroup relations, one can figure out the causal pathway in which 
the “moral or cognitive templates” o f Chinese foreign policy ideas shape the affect-filled 
representation o f  collective memory and national identity. The emotional effectiveness 
o f  foreign policy ideas is particularly salient, as will be shown in the case study o f  this 
research, if they convince the China populace o f the similarity o f past trauma to the 
current diplomatic conflicts. As collective identity is accentuated in these cases, 
historical analogy becomes a mental shortcut, not only for those who have personally 
experienced the traumatogenic events, but for those non-involved members o f the 
Chinese in-group as well, in processing the foreign-policy information. This “post­
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memory” feature o f national trauma is important evidence to verify that the collectively- 
held norms have bred a “habitual, natural, ot instinctive” mode of behavior in the Chinese 
community.93
The purpose o f the first two steps o f the historical institutionalist analysis is to' 
portray a comprehensive picture o f the formation and institutionalization o f the ideational 
factors o f Chinese foreign policy making. Now that we understand why collective 
memory and national identity have causal effects on Beijing’s diplomatic decision­
making and the PRC’s foreign policy behavior, another crucial component that should be 
included in our research program is to analyze how  these two historical institutions in 
Chinese nationalism, once evoked in the flashpoint diplomatic issues, are causally linked 
to particular outcomes. The third step o f this research agenda will pinpoint three 
mechanisms, or causal linkages, whereby the historical institutions influencing China’s 
diplomacy have their impact on the political behavior and claim-making o f both the 
Chinese state and societal forces in domestic-foreign-policy interaction.
The first mechanism is elaborated through the dramaturgical analysis o f Beijing’s 
foreign policy making .94 In order to apply the inter-subjective understandings o f  the 
identity-constitutive norms into specific actions to guarantee the CCP’s ongoing 
legitimacy and its hold on power, the authoritarian regime has to stage its performance 
before the fellow members o f Chinese society. To be identified by the audience as 
convincing and thereby legitimate, its actions are obliged to fit into the conceptual
1)3 Berman, "Ideas, Norm s, and Culture in Political Analysis," 239. “Post-m em ory” is a notion borrowed  
from M irianne H irsch’s research on the m em ory o f  war, w hich m eans that individual w ho did not 
participate in war becom e the m ost powerful advocates o f  “rem em bering” the war. See M arianne Hirsch, 
"Past Lives: Postm em ories in E x ile ,” P oetics T oday  11, no. 4 (1996): 649.
<>4 An exam ple o f  such dramaturgical analysis is the psycho-cultural cybernetic m odel established by Chih- 
yu Shih. See Shih-Y u Shih, China's Just World: The M orality o f  Chinese F oreign  P o licy  (B oulder and 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993).
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scheme in the belief system o f  policy ideas. Viewed in this sense. China’s diplomacy can 
be construed as a drama, in which the state actor does not automatically respond to
external reality, but to the “logical o f  appropriateness” as signified in its unswerving 
commitment to the normative scripts o f the drama. The analysis o f  the dynamic process 
o f the CCP’s role performance, which connects historical institutions with the ethical 
foreign policy behavior o f  the state, provides an enlightening lens to answer a key 
question in the empirical examination o f Chinese nationalism: Is domestic nationalist 
opinion a post hoc justification o f the PRC’s foreign policy behavior, or does it actually 
influence Beijing’s decision-making?
The second mechanism that will be explored is the interaction between the actor 
and the audience o f the PRC’s diplomacy and the policy feedback loop connecting the
narrative projectors and receivers in a commercialized communicative environment. The j
linkage analysis in this regard treats the interchange o f Chinese foreign policy 4
information in a marketplace, where media serve as the tradesman between the CCP as j
the information provider and Chinese populace as text receivers.95 For the propaganda- ,
focused official media, given its mission o f advertising the CCP’s policy commitment,
what they actually supply is the foreign policy information crafted in the elite-preferred
frames, in the hope o f gleaning popular support for the regime. On the part o f market-
sensitive media driven by the pursuit o f  profit, an effective strategy for increasing the
demand for their information commodities is to provide sensationalist coverage o f those
diplomatic flashpoint events, which are highly related to Chinese collective memory.
91 In their p o litical-econom ic analysis o f  the com m unication o f  nationalist ideas in the marketplace. Jack 
Snyder and Karen B alietine propose an argument different from what is presented in this research. They  
believe the nationalist m ythm aking o f  the new ly dem ocratizing states is conducted in an im perfect market, 
w hich can create an opening for the m ythologizers to "hijack public d iscourse.” See Jack Snyder and 
Karen Ballentine, "Nationalism  and the M arketplace Ideas." In ternational Secu rity  21. no. 2 (1996): 5-40.
The processing o f such foreign policy information is anchored ir. the reservoir- o f pre- • • 
existing ideas that are encoded in historical institutions, which tends to dramatize the 
political identity in a “community o f feeling.” The autonomy o f the domestic text 
receivers in selecting a narrative frame, which is to be consistent with the normative 
scripts o f  China’s diplomacy, has become a discursive force mitigating against the CCP’s 
efforts in shaping the content o f foreign policy information as required in its rational 
calculation. Further, the emerging information and communication technologies (ICTs), 
while broadening the avenues for the popular engagement with foreign affairs, provides a 
feedback conduit, transferring the timely, reliable information about the nationalist 
sentiments on sensitive diplomatic issues back to the circle o f  foreign policy 
establishment. The empirical examination o f how the state decision-makers 
accommodate, or negotiate with, nationalist opinion through this feedback process is a 
crucial means to weigh the influence o f the state and society in the foreign policy making 
process.
From the analysis o f the above two mechanisms, one can see that historical 
institutions both constrain and enable political behavior. In today’s media ecology, the 
Chinese populace is no longer constrained by a scarcity o f foreign policy information.
The proliferation o f  !CTs has opened a social space for disseminating the information 
pertinent to those emotionally-charged diplomatic issues, which readily activates the 
affective elements encased in Chinese collective memory and national identity. The 
derived emotional locus, which is galvanized in the public awareness o f  these focused 
events in an increasingly transparent media environment, points to another transmission 
mechanism to be analyzed in the study. In the popular contestation with the regime,
historical institutions offer a legitimate narrative frame, which deftly links the critique of 
the CCP’s failure to adhere to the scripts o f  the diplomatic drama to the domestic 
disgruntlement with the regime’s governance. This third mechanism corroborates an 
important argument that is complementary to the rational choice analysis o f collective 
memory and national identity. While the CCP’s claim o f its regime legitimacy is based 
on their instrumental function, these institutional variables provide the epistemic 
resources for linking issues in the domestic and foreign-policy realms in an unofficial 
frame that is capable o f competing with official one.
As such, the ’‘logic o f appropriateness” stipulated in the historical institutions can 
thus be transformed into two lines o f  logic In projecting the strategic narratives that are 
aimed to shore up its regime legitimacy, the CCP is following the “logic o f 
legitimation.”1*6 Meanwhile, as nationalism is perhaps the only state-sanctioned issue 
frame that is technically allowed by the authoritarian regime to exist alongside the 
official ones, historical institutions also provides the “logic o f contestation,” which gives 
ground for the counter-narratives that lead to foreign policy change. As evidenced in the 
large outcry o f  nationalist demand in diplomatic crises, the narrative frame o f  popular 
contention enabled by this line o f  logic has become a release valve, which directs popular 
indignation against foreign entities back to the regime itself. The reason why this kind of 
issue framing is effective in coalition building for popular engagement with the foreign .. 
policy making process is that the “norm entrepreneurs” among Chinese societal forces, 
by deploying the “principled beliefs” in historical institutions, are successful in shaping
96 See, e.g ., V ivienne Shue, "Legitim acy C risis in C hina?,” in C hinese P o litics: State, S o c ie ty  a n d  the 
M arket, ed. Peter Hays C ries and Stanley Rosen (London and N ew  York: R outledge, 2010), 44 -46 .
the political conditions o f Beijing’s decision-making, thereby increasing the CCP’s . -
receptivity to the counter-narratives projected aiong the “logic o f contestation.”97 
With regard to methodology, this study employs a historical, inductive, and 
qualitative approach to discern and explain the origin and transformation o f Chinese 
foreign policy ideas. Rather than a law-like generalization of abstract, atemporal, and 
cross-country regularities in political behavior, this research is an attempt to uncover the 
conditions and circumstances under which the present preferences o f  Chinese political 
actors, the state’s diplomatic interests, and the goals o f national foreign policy are formed 
and developed over time. Since the examination o f these thematic issues needs to be 
equipped with what Cohen calls the “insider cultural knowledge” in a concrete historical 
setting, an adequate appreciation o f  the motivational elements and the normative 
environment o f Beijing’s foreign policy making will not emerge from deductive 
reasoning, featuring highly restrictive assumptions but at the expense of a thorough 
investigation o f  indigenous political culture. Thus, empirical research on the historical 
and cultural foundation o f the PRC’s diplomacy has to grapple with the social values and 
meanings o f institutions, which “are historically specific and temporally embedded, and
(VO
crucial in the translation o f macro- and micro-level processes into outcomes.”
Historical institutional approach, a qualitative research method appropriate for the inquiry 
o f the variables that are historically informed and socially complex, has the promise o f
97 For a similar exam ple in the ‘transnational advocacy networks o f  activists, as described by Margaret 
Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, see  Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, A ctiv is ts B eyo n d  Borders: 
A dvo ca cy  N etw orks in In ternational P o litics  (Ithaca, N Y : Cornell University Press, 1998), 2.
98 Daniel N exon , "Historical Institutionalism and Internationa! Relations," E-International Relations, 
http://w w w .e-ir.in fo/2012/04/16/historical-institutionalism -and-international-relations/. (accessed  on March 
1 ,2 0 1 4 ).
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producing a cause-of-effect view o f the ideational and cultural determinants of China’s 
foreign policy behavior.
Along with the historically-structured study o f the special character o f the 
Chinese nation and its contemporary international behavior, another focus o f  this 
dissertation is the dynamic interaction between the Chinese authoritarian state and 
societal forces on the domestic and foreign relations front. In this vein, an inductive 
approach also fits more comfortably with the single case study o f state-society 
relationship, where collective memory and national identity are the keys to understanding 
how the domestic audience assesses the CCP’s diplomatic performance. Regarding the 
trade-offs between descriptive richness and parsimonious rigor," precisely because o f  the 
particularistic, unioue features o f these social-cultural dynamics that are central to the
accommodation and negotiation between the regime and societal forces, the analytic ,
nature o f a culturally and temporally bounded interpretation o f Beijing’s diplomatic 4
decision-making has pointed to the methodological predilection for a less parsimonious > j
analysis. However, the explanatory richness in the formation o f collective memory and
national identity and the causal mechanism, wherein these historical institutions affect the
state’s foreign policy making, does not mean that the current research is preoccupied with
the purely thick descriptive and subjective accounts without rigorous theorizing. Apart
from the historical analysis o f the cultural-institutional environments in which the
ideational parameters o f Chinese foreign making were constructed, testing the theoretical
propositions regarding the causal effects o f  these independent entities on the policy
Such trade-off reflects different m ethodological foci in the research o f  historians and political scientists.
See, e.g ., Andrew Bennett and A lexander L. G eorge, "Case Studies and Process Tracing in History and 
Political Science: Sim ilar Strokes for Different Foci." in B ridges a n d  B oundaries: H istorians, P o litica l 
Scien tists, a n d  the S tu dy o f  In tern a tional R ela tion s, ed. C olin  Elman and M iriam  Fendius Elman 
(Cam bridge and London: T he M IT Press. 2001). 137.
behavior and political claim-making o f the state and societal factors is also ar, essential 
component in the research program o f this study.
In identifying the causal chain that links the ideational elements of Beijing’s 
foreign policy making and the behavior o f an authoritarian state and societal forces, an 
operational procedure used in this study is process tracing. As collective memory and 
national identity are socially constructed, the systemic exploration o f these ideational 
variables needs to attend to the historical and contextual processes through which they 
are formed and translated to the PRC’s diplomatic behavior. Process tracing is used here 
to delineate the origin o f Chinese national identity and the collective memory o f national
trauma in the social interaction on the international scene, and the institutionalization of 
their normative, purposive, and emotional dimensions that are embedded in the belief 
system o f  Chinese foreign policy. Such a research strategy, as Alexander George notes, 
“employs a qualitative procedure that makes use o f the historian’s methodology o f 
explanation.”100 As an intellectual vehicle, it converts the historical inquiry o f collective 
memory and national identity into an analytic approach that is couched in the theoretical 
form o f historical institutionalism. The process tracing o f the evolution o f some focused 
events in China’s diplomacy provides empirical evidence on whether the CCP’s 
diplomatic rhetoric, the overall posture o f decision-makers, and policy action shift in 
accordance to the level o f public awareness o f and emotional response to these focal 
point issues. Such examinations is indispensable in ascertaining a causal pathway in 
which the historical institutions o f Chinese foreign policy making shape the definition
100 Alexander L. G eorge, "Case Studies and Theory Developm ent: The M ethod o f  Structured. Focused  
C om parison,” in D iplom acy: New A pproach es in History, Theory, a n d  P o licy , ed. Paul Gordon Lauren 
(N ew  York, N Y : Free Press, 1979), 46. A lso, see, am ong others, Bennett and G eorge, "Case Studies and 
Process Tracing in History and Political Science: Sim ilar Strokes for Different Foci," 144-52.
and assessment o f diplomatic situations, the evaluation o f  policy options, and finally, the 
choice o f courses o f action.
As noted above, the intellectual orientation o f this dissertation is not to generalize 
the timeless, universal constants o f political behavior, but to apply theories to the 
interpretation o f the sui generis foreign policy behavior that is temporally and spatially 
bounded. Rather than a hypothesis-generating research, the analytic inquiry o f this
research belongs to what Arend Lijphart terms “interpretive case studies.” '01 As the 
primary source o f the ideational elements o f Chinese foreign policy ideas, collective 
memory and national identity cannot be observed directly by running perfect 
experiments. Some historians have made the remark that collective memory is the “most 
elusive ... phenomena [of] 'popularconsciousness’.”102 Likewise, the historical 
consciousness inherent in national identity, with its “cultural density and fluid textures,” 
can only be measured crudely through survey analysis. 103 To excavate the inter- 
subjective meanings embedded in these independent entities, this study employs 
discourse analysis to grasp the social values and meanings that collective memory and 
national identity give to the Chinese populace. With the data collected from public 
speeches made by the CCP leaders on occasions such as the anniversary o f  the Party and 
other official documents—a major source for observing how the regime’s ideological 
guidelines are promulgated, the discourse analysis explores the affinity o f  the role 
identity o f the CCP, as narrated in official nationalist discourse, to the autobiographical 
accounts o f the Chinese nation. The gist o f  the interpretation o f the counter narratives is
101 Arend Liphart, "Comparative Polities and the Com parative Method," A m erican  P o litica l S cience R eview  
6 5 , no. 3 (1 9 7 1 ):  692.
102 John W. D ow er, E m bracing D efea t: Japan-in  the Wake o f  W orld War Two, l s t e d .  (N ew  York, N Y : W. 
W. Norton & The N ew  Press, 1999), 25.
I0> B ell. "Introduction: V iolence and Memory," 349.
the way that the hegemonic frame is appropriated in the popular discourse and is ■ 
connected to the judgment o f the CCP’s diplomatic performance and to the articulation o f 
popular grievance. This examination shows how the official nationalist discourse is 
applied sensibly in the counter-framing endeavor o f  societal forces, whose contention 
prevails in a discursive environment enabled by historical institutions.
In terms o f case study, two categories o f  flashpoint diplomatic issues, in which 
the perceived foreign provocations are most likely to stir up the emotionally charged 
nationalist sentiments in Chinese community, are highlighted in this research. One is 
China’s conflicts with Japan over historically related diplomatic issues, particularly the 
ongoing territorial disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. To be sure, historically 
derived animosity against Japan is a most likely case to test the causal impacts of 
historical institutions on Beijing’s diplomatic decision-making. Compared with those
Southeast Asian countries with which the PRC is engaged in the territorial disputes,
Japan occupies a central place in the rise o f  Chinese nationalism. The Sino-Japanese War 
(1894-95), a defining point when power in East Asia shifted from China to Japan, was a 
devastating blow to China’s Qing dynasty, as the Middle Kingdom was defeated by a tiny 
country that was dismissed as dwarfs. “The assaults from Japan, a speck o f dust in 
[China’s] backyard,” as indicated by one scholar, “shattered the self-assurance and was 
experienced as a shocking and intolerable humiliation.” 104 Given the tragic historical 
experience, Chinese public’s entrenched wariness o f Japan’s attempt o f remilitarization is
104 Liah G reenfeld, "Roots o f  Japan-China Rivalry," Japan T im es(Septem ber 2 7 ,2 0 1 2 ) ,  
http://w w w .japantim es.co.jp/opinion/2012/09/27/com m entary/w orld-com m entary/roots-of-japan-china- 
rivalry/#.U 410E fldV o4. (accessed  on March 1, 2014).
not surprising .'05 Regarding the state-society relationship, under the situations where 
historically related controversies come to the forefront o f  Sino-Japanese relations, 
nationalist mobilization is most likely to break out and to constrain the C CP's diplomatic 
autonomy. Such focused events provide an important case where Chinese public opinion 
runs in concert with the regimes’ claims to its memory-based legitimacy while 
challenging the government’s rational foreign policies.
The probe o f the affective dimension o f  Chinese national identity uses the cases 
o f  popular nationalist protests prior to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, a long-awaited 
and hard-earned opportunity for the PRC state to showcase its cutting-edge progress, 
economically and athletically. The hyper-nationalist reaction to the disruption during the 
run-up to the symbolic event o f  China’s international status and the perceived bias in 
Western reporting on the riot in Tibet exemplifies the Chinese identity predicament, 
wherein its everlasting quest to affirm its power status is ruptured in the social 
interactions with the foreign “other.” These cases serve as important fodder for testing 
how the emotional elements o f  Chinese historical institutions shape the in-group 
m embers’ perception and behavior toward the foreign out-groups.
CHAPTER OUTLINE
Following this introductory chapter. Chapters 2 and 3 revolve around the CCP’s 
regime legitimacy. Focusing on the entry point o f  the current research program, Chapter 
2 starts from the domestic sphere in the internal-external linkage o f  Chinese foreign
l0’ A  survey conducted by the A sia  Security Initiative R esearch Center o f  the Mast A sia  Institute in ten 
major C hinese c ities  in 2011 on C hinese perceptions o f  external threats provides important ev idence in this 
regard. S ee Joo-Y oun Jung, "Rising China and the C hinese Public's Security Perceptions," (Seoul, Souh  
Korea: EAI A sia  Security Initiative, W orking Paper 23 , 2012).
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affairs. To examine the PRC’s diplomacy beneath its bewildering surface, it is 
imperative to canvass China’s illiberal domestic politics, particularly the primary internal 
concern o f  the CCP as the final decision-maker o f Chinese foreign policy. For an 
authoritarian state, the first and foremost consideration o f  its diplomatic formulation is to 
ensure the perpetuation o f  its political power by augmenting the regime legitimacy. After 
the legitimacy crisis o f the Tiananmen Incident, one o f the strategies for the CCP to 
rehabilitate its political authority is to conceptualize the rightful source o f authoritarian 
state and the moral justification o f the regime. In this regard, this chapter provides the 
background knowledge o f  why and how nationalism was selected from the repertoire o f 
Chinese political culture in the regime legitimation enhancement. By historicizing this 
revamped official ideology, Chapter 2 teases out the correlation o f collective memory and 
national identity in the ideational enterprise o f Chinese nationalism to the domestic 
popular support o f the incumbent regime. On the basis o f  the moral relationship between 
the state and the nation, this chapter also portrays how these historical institutions 
become the cultural parameters o f  Chinese foreign policy making.
In the official nationalist discourse, collective memory and national identity are 
represented in the master commemorative narrative o f  modern Chinese history, which has 
been pumped up in the nationwide patriotic education campaign. The social pragmatics 
of this sort o f  strategic narratives, employed for the instrumental purpose o f regime, 
legitimation, is the focus o f the interpretive analysis in Chapter 3. Following the inquiry 
line o f rational choice approach, this chapter examines how the symbolic, elements o f  
collective memory are utilized to project the CCP’s role identity in the state’s historical 
mythmaking. With the analytic lens o f semiology, this chapter also peruses the semantic
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and syntactic elements in the narrative paradigms of two distinctive master historical 
accounts. These two dimensions o f  political symbolism, as manifested in the Maoist era 
and the patriotic education in the wake o f the Tiananmen crackdown, demonstrate the 
instrumental function o f  collective memory and national identity, the two historical
institution o f Chinese nationalism, in the domestic and foreign policy agendas. The
different reactions o f  the domestic and international audiences to the victimization 
discourse provide evidence for the limitation o f rational choice approach, which cannot 
convincingly explain the internal-external conflict in the state legitimation project. As 
illustrated in the backfire o f the C CP's effort in reconfiguring China’s diplomatic 
rhetoric, the domestic audience o f the regime’s strategic narratives has its autonomy in 
choosing a narrative frame that is congruent with the normative scheme o f China’s 
foreign policy making.
To spell out the underlying factors that condition Beijing’s adjustment of 
diplomatic narrative frame, the inquiry o f this research shifts to the historical 
institutionalist analysis, where collective memory and national identity are treated as 
independent variables o f Chinese foreign policy making. Following the research agenda 
proposed above, Chapter 4 traces the origin and evolution o f these historical institutions. 
As elaborated in this chapter, the dialectical relationship between the Chinese “se lf ’ and 
the foreign “other” has provided the cultural-institutional context for the construction o f 
its national identity. The dramatic positional change o f the Chinese actor in the self-other 
interaction, resulting from the transformation from the tribune system to the Westphalian 
system, and the consequent national humiliation gave rise to the decisive shift o f Chinese 
national identity. It is in this transformation that the normative meanings o f the collective
memory o f national trauma were institutionalized as consensual social norms that were - • 
embedded in the national identity. As a social practice of the state actor, China’s ' • - 
tenacious struggle for national rejuvenation has been guided by the purposive elements o f 
the national identity. Due to the protracted and ambivalent nature o f the state’s action in 
attaining the great-power status on the international stage, the confidence o f the resurgent 
state is compromised by an acute sense o f frustration. This identity predicament has 
engendered a peculiar public emotion in the Chinese community, which has profoundly 
influenced the in-group members’ evaluation and perception o f out- group entities and 
their behavior in the antagonistic intergroup relations.
Chapter 5 provides case studies to illuminate the way the historical institutions of 
Chinese foreign policy ideas influence the behavior o f the CCP leadership and societal
forces. In the case study o f the ongoing stand-off o f Beijing and Tokyo in the territorial 
disputes over the Senkakw'Diaoyu Islands, this chapter manifests how the normative 
scripts o f China’s diplomacy has “bounded” Beijing’s foreign policy choice. Due to the 
conflict between rational thinking in the conduct o f a pragmatic diplomacy and the 
mandate o f  memory-encoded social norms that are central in the ethical agenda o f 
China’s diplomacy, the CCP leadership is backed into a quandary imposed by the 
historical institutions o f Chinese foreign policy ideas. Beijing’s dilemma can further be 
captured in China’s communicative environment. By mapping the accommodation o f the 
propaganda state for commercialized media in the foreign policy marketplace, this 
chapter elucidates how the state-preferred narrative frames in foreign affairs coverage are 
disrupted by societal forces, whose behavior are guided by the “logic, o f  contention” 
offered by historical institutions. From the rhetorical transaction between the state and
society, one can see the agencies o f  elites and masses in the domestic-foreign-policy 
interaction are mutually constitutive. The historical institutional elements o f Chinese 
nationalism, while conducive to the enhancement o f regime legitimacy , have enabled the 
projection o f counter-narratives, which are appropriated from the state-imposed category 
o f  political communication and transmitted through market-oriented media. This kind o f 
societal forces is capable o f undermining Beijing’s efforts in mediating emotionally- 
charged interstate conflicts.
The overall findings and implications o f  this dissertation are summarized in the 
concluding chapter. In terms o f  methodology, the theory-based process tracing and 
“interpretive case” study in this research hold out some promise o f  contributing to the 
scholarship o f  international politics and comparative politics. In the realm of 
comparative foreign policy study, the historical institutionalist analysis o f  Chinese 
foreign policy ideas presents a “deviant case” that has not yet been sufficiently explained 
by existing t h e o r i e s . S u c h  an abnormal case can dissuade sweeping generalization in 
theorizing the domestic politics o f a state’s foreign policy behavior, while assisting in the 
formulation o f a typology theory that can more convincingly explain the diplomatic 
decision-making o f non-democratic states. On the other hand, the comparison o f the 
rational choice and historical institutionalist approaches in this study offers another case 
that may help comparativists to strike a balance between the agency-based and structural 
accounts o f  political life. As evidenced in the strategic narratives highlighting the 
traumatic memory o f the nation, historical institutions can be instrumentalized in the 
strategic calculations o f  rational actors to achieve their goals and preferences.
106 For the notion of'"deviant case stu d ies,” see Liphart, "Comparative P olitics and the Com parative 
Method." 692.
Meanwhile, given their role in forming collective beliefs and social institutions, these 
variables can also be transformed into endogenous “rules o f the game,.’’ which can make 
political actors adapt their strategies not only reflecting, but also reinforcing the “logic of 
appropriateness.”
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C H A PT ER  II 
C H IN ESE N A T IO N A L ISM  A N D  THE LEG ITIM A CY  E N H A N C E M E N T  
OF A N  A U T H O R IT A R IA N  R E G IM E 1
L e g i t i m a t i o n  i s  a  p r e o c c u p a t i o n  o f  a l l  r u l in g  e l i t e s  
because at all times, even in totalitarian systems, 
governance requires some level o f  voluntary 
s u b m i s s i o n  t o  a u th o r i t y .
—Neia C. Crawfordt
To a greater or lesser degree leaders have to 
legitimate their policies ... They do this by the use 
o f  language and concepts. Consequently they must 
draw, proactively or retroactively, on the discourses 
(beliefs, practices and associated linguistic 
realizations) o f  the society o f  which they are a part.
— P a u l  A n th o n y  C h i l to n
For a study o f the PRC’s diplomacy that is aimed at developing an internal view 
o f a China looking out, a crucial component o f  the research program is to lay out the 
domestic pressures that the state leaders face when they hammer out foreign policy. To 
achieve this purpose, as David Skidmore and Valerie Hundson correctly point out, the 
researchers need to “know something not only about the society and political process 
generally, but also about the goals, motives and priorities o f state leader themselves.”4 In 
the “exhaustive list” o f domestic variables that drive the state leaders’ formulation of
1 This chapter is based on  a major rev ision o f  the article N in g  Liao, "Bringing Ideology Back In: Chinese 
N ationalism  C ontextualized in the Legitim acy Enhancem ent o f  an Authoritarian Regime," A sian Profile: 
An In tern ational Jou rn al 40. no. 4 (2012): 351-63 .
‘ Crawford, A rgum ent a n d  Change in W orld P olitics: Ethics. D eco lon iza tion , a n d  H um anitarian  
Intervention , 33.
3 Paul A nthony Chilton. Secu rity  .Metaphors: C o u ld  War D iscou rse  from  C on tainm ent to C om m on H ouse  
(1 9 9 6 ). 31.
4 Skidm ore and H udson, "Establishing the Lim its o f  State Autonom y: C ontending Approaches to the Study 
o f  State-Society  R elations and Foreign Policy-M aking," 6.
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foreign policy, a primary one is the legitimacy of the regime that they stand for. 
Decisively related to the survival o f the state leadership and its ability to  maintain power, 
legitimacy is a catch-ail term that encapsulates the justification of the power and popular 
perception o f a political authority. Once a government comes into being, its viability is 
contingent upon the degree to which it can institute its legitimacy among the populace.5 
Since it is “the highest normative defense against the breakdown o f a system o f social 
order,” legitimacy can be construed as a prerequisite o f regime stability.6 In the practical 
political world, it is hardly controversial that any type o f  regime, be it a democracy, an 
autocracy, or a transitional state positioned somewhere within the democratic- 
authoritarian continuum, has to grapple with its legitimacy Being a top priority o f state
leaders, regime legitimacy is a critical factor that shapes the contour o f Beijing’s 
diplomatic decision-making, and thus a sensible entry point o f  the current research o f  the 
linkage politics its foreign affairs.
The CCP’s tenure o f more than six decades and the enduring deference o f the 
Chinese populace to the state led by the longest-ruling Party in the world is a fascinating 
conundrum that has perplexed students o f comparative politics.7 In the aftermath o f the 
CCP’s crackdown o f the pro-democracy movement in 1989, the anticipation o f the 
imminent demise o f  the Chinese communist regime was prevalent in the West. In the 
new millennium, some Western observers o f Chinese politics still “expect the regime to
5 See, e.g., James L. G ibson, O vercom ing A partheid: Can Truth R econcile a  D iv id ed  N ation?  (N ew  York, 
N Y : Russel] Sage, 2004), 2 8 9 -3 2 7 .Suis
6 Talcott Parsons, "Some R eflections on the Place o f  Force in Social Process," in In ternal W ar: P roblem s  
a n d  A p p ro a ch es , ed. Harry Eckersteir (N ew  York, N Y . Free Press, 1964), 57.
7 H eike H olbig, "Ideological Reform  and Political Legitim acy in China: C hallenges in the Post-Jiang Era," 
in Regime Legitim acy i n C on tem porary China: Institutional Change a n d  S ta b ility , ed. Gunter Schubert and 
Thom as Heberer (London: Routledge, 2009), 13.
fall to democratization’s ‘third wave’.”8 In light o f the lopsided progress o f  China’s 
democratization, compared with phenomenal economic achievement, these propositions 
are not completely implausible. However, these predictions underestimate the CCP’s 
capability to rehabilitate and reconsolidate its legitimacy. As a “resilient” authoritarian 
regime, the CCP is not a passive actor incapable o f responding to the dizzying array of 
internal and external challenges, but rather a proactive adaptor to the changing 
governance environment, engaged in strategic actions to sustain its political authority.9
What, then, are the sources o f the legitimacy o f the Chinese authoritarian state?
In the wake o f  the Tiananmen Incident, how did the CCP survive the most severe 
legitimacy crisis it had experienced since the PRC was founded? How do the ideational 
elements o f the CCP regime legitimacy relate to the belief system in which Beijing’s 
foreign policy making and the PRC’s diplomatic behavior are reasoned? Answering 
these questions will facilitate our understanding o f  the central position o f the CCP’s 
regime legitimacy in the linkage politics o f  Chinese foreign affairs. Starting from the 
source o f the CCP’s regime legitimacy, the first part o f this chapter elaborates why 
China's economic performance is not a panacea for tackling the perceived challenges to 
the CCP’s political authority. To engineer consensus building during the transitional 
period o f institutional change, the Party-state is aware that performance-based legitimacy 
should be synergized with the ideological instrument that can generate the subjective 
values that validate the rightful source o f the monopolistic rule. The second part 
elucidates why nationalism was revamped as a hegemonic official discourse at a critical
8 See, e.g ., Gordon ('hang, The C om in g  C o llapse  o f  China  (N ew  York. N Y : Random H ouse. 2001); 
Nathan. "Authoritarian R esilience,'1 16.
Q See, e.g ., "Authoritarian R esilience," 6-17; Bruce Bueno de M esquita and G eorge W . D ow ns, 
"D evelopm ent and D em ocracy.” F oreign A ffairs  84, no. 5 (2005): 77-86; David Shambaugh, C h in a ’s 
Com m unis! P a rty : A trophy an d  A daptation  (B erkeley, CA: U niversity o f  California Press. 2008).
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moment when the CCP's regime legitimacy was disassociated with traditional ideological 
dogma. This can be revealed from the adaptive effort o f  the CCP regime to refurbish its 
official ideology by leveraging the normative elements o f Chinese political culture. This 
part also examines how official nationalist discourse shapes the subjective values in the 
Chinese popular conception toward the regime’s performance. By fulfilling the identity 
needs derived from the collective memory o f national humiliation, nationalism has 
become an effective means to mobilize popular affection and thus helps to institute the 
legality and moral justifiability o f the authoritarian regime in its legitimation endeavor.
PERFORMANCE-BASED OR IDEOLOGY-BASED: THE SOURCES OF THE CCP’S 
REGIME LEGITIMACY
The source o f legitimacy, notwithstanding its universal significance, varies in 
diverse political cultures. As Max Weber succinctly summarizes this basic insight, 
“according to the legitimacy which is claimed, the type o f obedience, the kind of 
administrative staff developed to guarantee it, and the mode o f exercising authority, will 
all differ fundamentally.” 10 Western civil societies, conventionally portrayed as the 
beacon o f democracy, feature the well-established procedural legitimacy accorded to a 
democratically elected government. The regime legitimacy in the democratic setting is 
premised upon the endorsement o f the state by the electorate. In contrast, in non- 
democratic states, procedural-based legitimacy that is characterized by civil liberty, legal 
order, and political accountability is virtually non-existent. Authoritarian regimes are
10 Max W eber, E conom y a n d  Society: An O utline o f  In terpretive S ocio lo g y  (Berkeley, CA: University o f  
California Press, 1978), 213.
thus stereotypically considered to be illegitimate and fragile at their core. 11 An extremist 
view even holds that the survival o f these regimes can be attributed only to the 
submission o f  their citizens to pervasive coercion and draconian repression by these
states.
This assumption, however, is not consistent with the reality in China. The 
constituencies o f today’s Chinese society are no longer what William Komhauser dubs 
the “atomized masses,” entirely subject to the regime’s surveillance and unconditionally
1 Tobedient to its dictatorship. " In the transition from a rigid planned economy to a quasi 
capitalist economy, the shifting o f  the balance o f  power from the authoritarian state to an 
increasingly pluralistic society has rendered the sociopolitical cost o f the CCP’s 
governance forbiddingly high. Under such circumstances, the infeasibility o f resorting to 
violence to assert the regime’s political authority becomes ever less feasible. Coercion 
and repression cannot be the effective means to maintain the rule of an authoritarian 
regime. As Yanqi Tong contends, “Any regime that can sustain its rule for a long time 
has legitim acy.... So long as the general population accepts the right o f their rulers to 
rule, for whatever reason, the regime enjoys legitimacy.” 13 Even without the procedure 
o f democratic election, authoritarian states can ground their claim to legitimacy on the 
basis o f popular support. The Chinese Party-state, for example, is at pain to emphasize 
that “only the CCP is able to ensure economic growth, provide social stability, and 
defend national sovereignty.” 14 The regime’s purported performance in the domestic and
11 Bruce G illey , "The L im its o f  Authoritarian R esilen ce,” Jou rn al o fD e m o c ra c y  14, no. 1 (2003): 18.
12 W illiam  Kom hauser, The P o litics o f  M ass S o c ie ty  (G lencoe, IL: Free Press, i 9 5 9 ), 62.
3 Yanqi T ong, "Morality, B enevolence, and R esponsibility: R egim e Legitim acy in China from Past to  the 
Present," Jou rn al o f  Chinese P o litica l Scien ce  16, no. 2 (2 0 ! 1): 145.
14 Andre Laliberte and Marc Lanteigne, "The Issues o f  C hallenges to the L egitim acy o f  Cep Rule," in The 
Chinese P a rty -S ta te  in the 2 1 st C entury: A d ap ta tion  a n d  R einvention  o f  L eg itim acy , ed. Andre Laliberte 
and Marc L anteigne (London and N ew  York: R outledge, 2008), 8.
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foieign policy agendas actually shows its effort in defining the instrumental and 
normative dimensions o f the regime legitimacy. Either way, the CCP leadership, just as 
the state leaders in any polity, wants to convince the Chinese populace o f the capacity o f 
the political system, in order to “engender and maintain the belief that the existing 
political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society.” 15
The two normative and instrumental sources for the CCP’s regime legitimacy are 
corroborated by some scholars in their research o f Chinese political legitimacy. Drawing 
on the concepts o f  Western political philosophy, Baogang Guo describes the normative 
and consensual aspect o f the legitimacy as the “original justification,” or the “moral 
capital,” of the CCP regime.16 On the front of foreign relations, the state’s defending of
national sovereignty, as mentioned above, reveals the normative appropriateness o f the 
regime, since the integrity o f sovereignty is one o f the normative linchpins o f Chinese 
national identity. In the realm o f domestic governance, the state’s effort in maintaining 
social stability, which meets the collective expectation o f a society that has weathered the 
scourge o f wars and chronic division, also affirms the moral justification o f the ruling 
authority. Regarding the instrumental aspect o f legitimacy, the Party-state’s governance 
in promoting China’s economic “growth” and “development” reflects the “utilitarian 
justification” o f the regime.17 This notion, founded on the utility principle that is 
emphasized in the rationalist school o f political philosophy, assumes that regime 
legitimacy is a function o f the extent to which the individual’s needs are satisfied by the
15 Seym our Martin Lipset, P o litica l M an, expanded ed. (Baltim ore, M D: John Hopkins University Press, 
1981), 84.
16 Baogang Guo, "Political Legitim acy and China's Transition," Journal o f  Chinese P o litica l Science  8, no.
1 & 2 (2003): 3.
17 "Political Legitim acy and China's Transition," Journal o f  Chinese P o litica l Science  8, no. 1 & 2 (2003): 6:
China's Q uest f o r  P o litica l Legitim acy: The N ew  E quity-E nhancing P o litics  (Lanham, M D: Lexington  
B ooks, 2010), 9.
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government. 18 It denotes the regime’s method for achieving consensus building for the 
political system through “eudemonic appeals,’' or to put it more simply, by 
“ [maximizing] an individual’s happiness and [minimizing] his/her pains.” '9
“Original justification” and “utilitarian justification” are integral components of 
regime legitimacy. To sustain their regime, authoritarian regimes seek to strike a balance
between these two modes o f  ruling justification. However, even in the case o f an 
authoritarian regime with remarkable sustainability, legitimacy is not settled once and for 
all. A regime may put more emphasis on a certain aspect o f  legitimacy, and its 
legitimacy can be realized and retained in divergent ways in different historical periods.
Likewise, the same dimension o f legitimacy may be strengthened or weakened in 
different periods, depending upon the political situations that a regime encounters.
Moving away from the totalitarian rule o f the Maoist era, the appealing <
pragmatism, enshrined in the mandated discourse o f reform and opening-up <
(gaigekaifang), was brought by Deng Xiaoping to the center stage o f Chinese politics j
when he took office in the late 1970s.20 As Deng so memorably put it, without reform,
China would lose its “membership o f the Earth” (kaichu qiuji).21 His admonition 
suggested the CCP leadership’s high concern with its regime legitimacy, after a series of 
social turbulence, particularly the catastrophic Great Leap Forward and the self-inflicted
j8 See, e.g ., Jeremy Bentham , An In troduction  to  the P rin cip les o f  M orals a n d  L egisla tion  (N ew  York. N Y : 
Hafner Publishing C o., 1948).
B aogang G uo, "China's Peaceful D evelopm ent. R egim e Stability and Political L egitim acy ,’’ in China's 
"Peaceful Rise" in the 2 1 s t Century: D om estic  a n d  In tern ational C o n d itio n s , ed. Sujian G uo (Burlington, 
VT: A shgate, 2 0 0 6 ), 47.
20 D en g ’s pragmatism w as v iv id ly  expressed in what w as called  his "cat theory;’’ nam ely, "whether black 
cat or w hite cat, eat w hich can catch m ouse is good  cat." In this approach, id eo logy  w as relatively  
dow nplayed , material incentives were accepted, and som e room was given  to market considerations. By 
advocating the so-called  "eat-theory," D eng insisted on pragmatism as the on ly  rule o f  decision-m aking and 
policy assessm ent.
21 Y uchao Zhu, ’"Performance Legitim acy' and China's Political Adaptation Strategy," Jou rn al o f  C hinese  
P o litica l Science  16, no. 2 (2011): 126.
havoc o f Cultural Revolution. With the inception o f market-oriented economic reform, 
which provided an unprecedented level o f social welfare that could not be achieved in the 
Maoist era, “utilitarian justification” became the chief basis of the CCP’s regime 
legitimacy. Guided by Deng’s dictum that “only development is a hard fact” (fazhan 
caishi yingdaoli), the pragmatic formula o f  performance legitimacy, rather than 
revolutionary legitimacy representing the CCP’s “original justification,” established a 
new “social contract” between state and society, whereby the party-state enacted regime
legitimacy by offering Chinese citizenry substantial improvement o f  their living standard
• • • 22in exchange for the perpetuation o f the political status quo.
More than two decades after the fall o f the Berlin Wall and the dissolution o f  the 
Soviet Union, the CCP still remains at the helm o f power. China has maintained its
economic development at a gravity-defying double-digit growth rate. It is not far-fetched 
to claim that the CCP’s monopolistic rule would not have been possible without its 
sterling economic performance. Looking at the present regime, one would be tempted to 
offer the opinion that the CCP’s main claims to legitimacy rests on its “utilitarian 
justification.”
A logical question one can probably raise within the context o f  the argument 
above is whether the utility and feasibility o f performance-based legitimacy spells the end 
o f the normative dimension o f the CCP’s regime legitimacy, or in other words, the 
“original justification” of its political authority. There is no doubt that the economic 
governance o f the regime provides “eudemonic appeals” of the CCP’s governance, which 
has earned it a significant measure of legitimacy in its orchestration o f the “growth” and
22 For the notion o f  ‘‘social contract, see  Stephen W hite, "Economic Performance and Com munist 
Legitimacy.'' W orld P olitics  38, no. 3 (1986): 463.
“development” o f the Chinese economy. However, the popular perception o f the 
incumbent government as a meritorious regime does not suffice to ensure its legitimacy.
In today’s China, it is important to note, the authoritarian regime is, as Vivienne Shue 
observes, “ill-positioned to claim direct credit for whatever economic advances are in fact 
taking place.”23 While China’s reform and opening-up policies are taking hold, a 
cauldron o f sociopolitical ills is imperiling the party-state’s capacity to garner popular
support. The CCP regime is confronted with a multitude o f domestic challenges—  
endemic corruption, epidemic pollution, emaciated health care, shredded social services, 
entrenched industrial overcapacity, surging ethnic conflicts, to name several. The very 
policies implemented to sustain China’s economic growth have unwittingly triggered a 
slew o f socioeconomic problems, v.'hich has led to a significant increase in the frequency 
and size o f grassroots unrest and protests. Apparently, the pent-up disgruntlement in a 
transitional society cannot be resolved or remedied through economic development alone. 
As a testimony to Seymour Lipset’s cogent argument that “a crisis o f legitimacy is a 
crisis o f change,”24 the intense domestic tensions behind the fa9ade of China’s economic 
prowess is threatening to erode the “utilitarian justification.”
No less important, the CCP needs to be on guard against another major challenge 
induced by its economic growth, which can discredit the argument that economic 
performance alone will necessarily translate into regime legitimacy. As Samuel 
Huntington posits, modernization will generate social demands for increased political 
participation and mobilization. In his words, “Modernization means mobilization,” and
21 Shue. "Legitimacy C risis in China?," 45.
24 Seym our Martin Lipset. "Social Conflict, Legitim acy, and Dem ocracy," in L egitim acy a n d  the S ta te , ed. 
W illiam  C onnolly (N ew  York, NY: N ew  York University Press, 1984), 89.
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“mass mobilization means political participation.”25 in such a scenario as what 
Huntington dubs “performance dilemma, the efforts made by autocratic regimes to “ ■ 
enhance their economic performance may breed the unwanted or unexpected request for 
the entitlement to expanding political participation and democratic freedom, which will in 
turn undermine the basis o f authoritarian power.26 Some scholars have applied this 
notion o f “performance dilemma” to their critical analysis o f  Chinese economic reform, 
arguing that sustained and spectacular economic growth is likely to be accompanied by 
demands for “political participation and pluralization.” 27 This argument is echoed in 
Ronald Inglehart’s modernization theory, which stresses the relationship between
economic development and value changes. In Inglehart’s account, “economic 
development, cultural change, and political change are linked in coherent and even, to 
some extent, predictable patterns.”28 Along this line o f logic, the ongoing economic 
growth in China will arguably lead to the expansion of the modernized sector of its
population, the constituencies o f which are better educated and more inclined to support 
fundamental political change. As Chinese society is becoming “more complex, 
pluralistic, self-confident, [and] resourceful,” Larry Diamond also predicts, economic 
development “will generate growing pressures (and possibilities) for China to make a 
definitive regime change to democracy.”29
25 Samuel P. Huntington, "Political D evelopm ent and Political Decay ," W orld P o litics  17, no. 3 (1965): 388.
26 P olitica l O rder in C hanging Societies  (N ew  Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970), 177; The Third  
Wave: D em ocra tiza tion  in the Late Twentieth C entury  (Norman: OK: University o f  Oklahoma Press,
1991), 46-58.
27 H eike H olbig and Bruce G illey, "Reclaim ing Legitim acy in China,” Politics a n d  P olicy  38, no. 3 (2010): 
400. A lso  see, e .g ., H olbig, "Ideological Reform and Political Legitim acy in China: C hallenges in the Post- 
Jiang Era," 13-34.
28 Ronald Inglehart, M odernization  a n d  Postm odernization: Cultural, Econom ic, a n d  P o litica l C hange in 
F orty-Three Societies  (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1997), 15.
25 Larry Diam ond, D evelop in g  D em ocracy: T ow ard  C onsolidation  (Baltim ore, M D: John H opkins 
University, 1999), 265.
Diamond’s proposition is not without merit. Thanks to the CCP’s emphasis on 
economic “growth” and “development,” Chinese people may be apolitical for the time 
being, as they are more concerned with the extent to which their living standard is 
improved. If China’s economy cannot keep on growing at the unprecedented rates, the 
government will fall short of the social expectation engendered by its economic 
governance. The abrasion o f the instrumental dimension o f the regime legitimacy,
resulting from the erosion o f the CCP’s “eudemonic appeals,” will ultimately turn out to 
be a critical catalyst o f more sociopolitical reforms. Should the economy experience a 
severe decline, the populace could readily blame the government for the economic woes. 
Since contemporary Chinese society has become more assertive and defiant, the 
operational cost o f maintaining satisfactory economic governance is mounting. It is 
increasingly difficult for the Party-state to meet all the social expectations arising from 
economic reform. If the “social contract” between the regime and the Chinese people is 
breached, the legitimacy that the regime has accumulated thus far will eventually 
dissipate. Viewed in this sense, Yuchao Zhu is correct in contending that performance- 
based legitimacy “ is always ‘unfinished business,’ which continues to face constant 
challenges, and reflects the dynamic interaction between an authoritarian state and an 
increasingly pluralistic society.”30
As mentioned above, “original justification” emphasizes consensus building by 
constructing the subjective belief that the directives o f authorities are legitimate and 
generating a sense o f obligation to obey the political authorities. In other words, only by 
demonstrating the normative appropriateness o f  their ruling authority are the incumbent
30 Zhu. ’"Performance Legitim acy' and China's Political Adaptation Strategy." 134.
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power holders able to elicit the voluntary deference o f the populace Such “m oral' ' 
capital” o f an authoritarian regime,, in the view o f some comparativists like Margaret Levi 
and her colleagues, is essentially a mode o f “value-based legitimacy,” which is 
manifested in the “trustworthiness o f government” and “procedural justice .” 31
Foi an authoritarian state lacking established procedural legitimacy that is 
conferred by submitting to competitive elections, an effective means to enact “value- 
based legitimacy” is to nurture the popular trust in its political authority and to justify the 
rightful source o f the regime. To win the general consent o f those over whom the 
authoritarian state rules, according to Antonio Gramsci, political elites need to develop an 
ideology to weave together their interests and those o f their subordinates.32 The process 
o f instituting such an ideology is one o f setting up a coherent set o f  values or common 
social experiences in “a unified system o f meanings for which political actors claim
7 1 . . . .
exclusive authority:’ J By communicating the normative appropriateness o f its political 
authority in the state-society interaction, the legitimating ideology is tantamount to a 
cognitive linkage, which transcends the boundaries lines o f  the authoritarian state and an 
increasingly pluralistic society.
The urgency o f constructing and propagating such a legitimating ideology in the 
form o f official discourse became ever more pronounced in China when the CCP started 
to initiate the market-oriented reform. Due to the decisive shift o f  its policy focus from
11 Margaret Levi, Audrey Sacks, and Tom  Tyler, "Conceptualizing Legitim acy, M easuring Legitim acy  
Beliefs," A m erican B ehaviora l S cien tist 53, no. 3 (2009): 357. A lso  see Richard Flacks, "Protest or 
Conform: Som e Social Psychological Perspectives on  Legitimacy," The Jou rn al o f  A p p lied  Behavior  
Science  5, no. 2 (1969): 127-50.
32 Antonio Gramsci, S election s fro m  the P rison  N otebooks o f  A ntonio C ra m sci, ed. Quintin Hoare and 
G eoffrey H ow ell-Sm ith  (N ew  York, N Y : Inernationa! Publishers, 197 i ), i 14.
33 Carsten Herrmann-Pillath, "Culture, Econom ic Style arid the Nature o f  the C hinese Econom ic System ,” 
China aktuell (Jou rn al o f  C urrent Chinese A ffairs) 34, no. 2 (2005): 38. A lso  see  M ichael Freeden, 
"Ideology and Political Theory," Jou rn al o f  P o litica l Ideologies  11, no. 1 (2006): 3-22.
class struggle to economic-oriented reform, the CCP, leadership was left without an 
integrative ideological force to inspire the Chinese people when they were entangled with 
painful hardships as a side effect of the economic reform. The resultant crisis o f faith
was so severe that the CCP had to scurry to find alternative doctrines tc fill the void. On 
the heels o f the Tiananmen crackdown, Deng him self acknowledged that “the most 
serious mistake” made by the Party in the first decade o f the Post-Mao reform era was the 
omission o f ideological education .34 Aware o f the limitations o f performance-based 
legitimacy, the CCP started to rely heavily on an official ideology to attest to the common 
interest o f  the state and society in the performance o f the government, so as to buttress 
the “valued-based legitimacy” o f its political authority.
More than two decades after the 1989 debacle, ideology remains crucial to the 
CCP’s regime legitimacy. In today’s China, one of the socioeconomic concomitant 
effects o f  the institutional changes, which ate unfolded in a host o f issue areas, is the 
emergence o f “winners” and “losers” in the process o f reform. In stark contrast to the 
situation in the Maoist era, when China was one o f  the most equitable polities, 
contemporary China has become one o f  the least equitable countries in the world. Some 
scholars have also observed that this disparity shows the alarming tendency o f 
perpetuation, to the extent that the most and least privileged social groups have remained 
largely the same ,3S As indicated by these disturbing signs, socioeconomic transition has 
posed a daunting challenge to the capacity o f the Chinese government to maintain social
54 X iaoping D eng, "Speech to Cadres and Soldiers o f  the B eij'ng Martial Law Corps on June 9, 1989," 
http://tsquare.tv/chronoIogy/D eng.htm l. (accessed  on  June ! ,  2012).
35 See, e.g ., Zhou Jiang, "2002 Kiart Z hongguo C hengs hi R edian  Wenis Diaoc.ha  [Investigation o f  the Hot 
Issues in C hinese Cities in 2002]." in 2003  N ian  Shehui Lanpishu: Zhongguo Shehui X tngshi I'enxi Yu Yuce 
[ Blue B ook o f  the C h inese S ocie ty  in 2003: An A an alysis a n d  F orecast o f  Chinese S o c ia l S itu a tion ] ed. Ru 
Xin, Lu X uevi, and Lin Peilin (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian ch u ban sh e , 2003).
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equality. If the regime fails to achieve a more equitable distribution o f wealth between ’ • 
various social groups, this chronic disparity, as the most significant transition costs 
plaguing China’s reform, will threaten the continued viability of the reform and openifig- 
up policy.36 In light of the volatile environment o f the institutional changes, there will 
inevitably be discord between the social groups who traditionally claim the lion’s share 
o f the national wealth and those who consistently reap the least from the reform.
In the socioeconomic transition, ideology is of utmost, importance for the CCP to 
prevent the exhaustion o f  its performance-based legitimacy. One of its instrumental 
functions in this regard, as Douglass North has pinpointed, is to “shape the subjective
mental constructs that individuals use to interpret the world around them and make 
choices.”37 In a transitional society like China, the kaleidoscopic social expectations, 
especially the antagonistic interests o f those social groups that are the “winners” and the 
“losers” in the institutional change, may well induce mass alienation, thereby 
jeopardizing the instrumental dimension o f regime legitimacy. To minimize the 
possibility o f such an adverse situation, one o f the missions o f  the official ideology is tc 
shape the “subjective mental constructs” of the Chinese populace in such a way that the 
indi viduals’ appraisal o f the performance o f the incumbent government is framed in an 
idea! state-society relationship, which demonstrates the competency o f the regime and its 
commitment to the common interests it shares with the society .38 Official ideology, 
while reviving the ‘ original justification” o f the regime’s political authority, has its utility '
36 Yongnian Zheng, "State Building, Popular Protest and C ollective A ction in China," Japan ese Jou rn al o f
P o litica l Science  3, no. 1 (2002).
57 D ou glass C. N orth, Institutions, Institu tional Change, a n d  Econom ic Perform ance  (Cambridge; N Y : • 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 76  
H eike H olb ig, ''International D im ensions o f  L eg itim a cy  R eflections on W estern Theories and the 
C hinese Experience," Jou rn al o f  C hinese P o litica l Science  16, no. 2 (2011): 169; "Remaking the CCP's 
Ideology: Determ inants, Progress, and Lim its under Hu .lintao " China aktuell (Journal o f  C urren t C hinese 
Affairs) 38, no. 3 (2009): 39.
in buffering against various social anxieties and resistance. In the cases where the Party- 
state falls short o f  the social expectations, this normative mediator is an effectual way to 
evade the “performance dilemma” o f  its governance.
NATIONALISM: AN OFFICIAL IDEOLOGY REVAMPED FOR REGIME 
LEGITIMACY
To be sure, the post-Tiananmen Chinese leadership has realized that the 
“utilitarian justification” o f its political authority should not deluge the normative 
dimension o f its legitimacy. Instead o f downplaying the “original justification” o f the 
regime, the CCP has brought ideology back to bolster the “moral capital” o f its 
governance. Compared to the “utilitarian justification,” which reflects the empirical and 
instrumental dimension o f its legitimacy, the “original justification” o f the regime is more 
related to the subjective values and normative beliefs held in popular perception. 
Enhancing such “value-based” legitimacy is an ongoing project o f  ideological 
legitimation undertaken by the CCP leadership.
It should be noted, however, that one o f the sources o f “value-based” legitimacy 
can be rarely found in the Chinese political landscape. In retrospect, since the Zhou 
Dynasty, Chinese history has featured feudal authority and despotic tradition. Even the 
CCP, a modem Party that evolved from a revolutionary regime, does not believe that 
procedural democracy endows it with legitimacy. It is the CCP’s historical mission o f 
carrying out the socialist revolution that initially validated the legitimacy o f the regime. 
Viewed in this light, “procedural justice”— a widely recognized element that constitutes 
the legitimacy basis o f  legal authority in Western democratic states— is virtually absent in
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the 4000-year history o f Chinese governance. Thus, in enhancing the “value-based 
legitimacy” o f the CCP regime, official ideology should largely focus on the 
‘trustworthiness o f government'' to demonstrate the rightful source o f the regime and 
garner popular support for the authoritarian state.
How, then, does the CCP’s official ideology present itself as a trustworthy regime 
lacking the procedural-based legitimacy? David Beetham’s model o f political 
legitimation offers an enlightening hint to our inquiry here. In Beeham’s multilayered 
framework, legitimate power, existing in whatever kind o f  political system, is predicated 
on its “conformity to established rules,” the “justifiability o f the rule by reference to 
shared beliefs,” and the “expressed consent o f the subordinate.” 9̂ Only when the first 
two levels o f legitimacy, legality and normative justifiability, are present can a regime 
obtain the third level o f legitimacy, as is demonstrated in the form o f the popular trust of 
the regime and the behavior o f  complying with the trustworthy government. These two 
elements o f legitimacy are more tacit in Chinese political culture than those entrenched in 
the Western context. Ironically, while legitimacy literally means the quality o f being 
lawful (hefaxing), the legality o f political authority in China attaches less importance to 
rule by law (fazhi) than to rule by virtue (dezhi). The ideological foundation o f regime 
legitimacy enacted in the Chinese political landscape, therefore, can only take distinct 
form from that o f  its Western counterparts.
With its lasting impact on the contemporary Chinese political system, political 
culture is a primary ideational resource that the CCP has actively resorted to in
39 David Beetham , The L eg itim ation  o f  P o w er  (Atlantic H ighlands, NJ: H um anities Press international, 
Inc., 1991), 16-19. "Political Legitim acy," in The B lackw ell C om panion  to  P o litic a l S ocio lo g y , ed. Kate 
N ash and Alan Scott (M alden: B lackw ell, 2 001), 110.
revamping its legitimating ideology. From the cultural repertoire, nationalism— a 
distinctive discourse that draws deeply from the normative elements in national history—
is selected as an alternative fodder for the state legitimation. In erecting an evaluative 
belief system that is a normative fit into the cognitive scheme o f popular perception, 
official nationalist discourse is integrated with the normative framework o f Chinese 
political culture, in which the regime’s ethical rule and the rightful source o f its one-Party 
rule is justified by the moral requirements o f a legitimate ruler that have been well 
established in the normative tradition o f political authority
In the Chinese political culture, as just noted, it is imperative that the exercise of 
power conform to informal conventions rather than formalized law. According to 
Confucianism—an archetypal representation o f the Chinese political culture and 
normative schema from which the stability o f traditional Chinese political order 
originated, the legality o f  a legitimate regime is first and foremost derived from the so- 
called “mandate o f heaven,” the preeminent source o f rightful rule. Chinese emperors, 
recognized as “the son o f heaven,” are the supreme rulers processing the highest level o f 
morality .40 In this sense, the Western notion o f  legality is reflected in the setting o f 
Chinese political culture as the inherent connection between the right to rule and the ethic 
o f morality. According to such “established rules.” the touchstone o f successful political 
authority in Chinese political culture, as noted by John King Fairbank and Edwin
40 Donald E. P olkinghom e. "Narrative and Self-C oncept," Jou rn al o f  N arra tive a n d  Life H istory  1, no. 2&3 
(1991): 40-53 .
Reischauer, is the virtue o f the ruler.41 In order ic be legitimate, the regime has'to 
‘'become the undisputed moral authority 1,42
In this sense, the post-Mao legitimating ideology o f the CCP has avoided Mao-era- 
motifs and Marxist homilies. The morality o f the CCP regime is a major theme presented 
in the nationalist discourse as a revamped official ideology. For an authoritarian regime, 
the salience o f its ideology does not necessarily require that political life be wrapped in 
an overlay o f platitude and political dogma, as was the case in the Maoist era. To 
effectively fulfill its legitimating functions, ideology can be “a symbolic resource for the
formation o f public opinion” that can frame the popular perception of “the social
construction o f reality.”43 Nationalism, in this regard, is an ideal vehicle to mobilize 
popular support, because it is based on a set o f common symbols shared in what Benedict 
Anderson phrases “imagined community ”44 In the CCP's regime legitimation, two 
symbolic elements within the enterprise o f Chinese nationalism are highly relevant to the 
morality o f the Communist regime, which, in accord with the normative scheme of 
Chinese political culture, is intertwined with the regime legitimacy. One is the collective 
memory o f  the “century o f national humiliation” (baiman guochi), a historical period 
when China was oppressed, bullied, and torn asunder by imperialist invasion and 
territorial division from the first Opium War to the founding o f  the PRC state. This 
traumatic symbol has bred the strong nationalist aspiration o f attaining a rightful place on 
the international stage, the other symbolic element o f Chinese nationalism that has
41 John K ing Fairbank and Edwin O. Reischauer, eds., China: Tradition a n d  Transform ation  (Boston, MA: 
H oughton M ifflin, 1979), 44.
42 Tong, "Morality, B enevolence, and Responsibility': R egim e Legitimacy in China from.Past to the 
P resen t" 146.
43 H olbig, "Remaking the CCP's ideology: Determinants. Progress, and Limits under Hu Jintao," 39, A lso  
see M ichael W ohlgem uth, "Evolutionary A pproaches to Politics," K yklos  55, no. 2 (2002).
44 Benedict Anderson, Im agin ed  Com m unities: R eflections on the O rigins a n d  S p rea d  o f  N ationalism  (N ew  
York, N Y : Verso, 1983).
signified the purposive meaning o f the national identity. To undo China’s erstwhile 
subjugation by foreign powers and to restore its prominent position in the international 
status hierarchy have become the contemporary “mandate o f heaven” for the CCP regime 
as the political agent o f  the Chinese nation. Meeting these symbolic needs thus endows 
the authoritarian state with an informative sense o f political ioyalty from the national 
members.
Insofar as the regime’s performance in the foreign relations front reflects the 
“justifiability o f  rule” o f the authoritarian regime, the CCP’s morality, which subscribes 
the emotional narratives o f the nation’s past victimization, makes diverse groups and 
classes o f Chinese society cohered around the state, whose rule is perceived to conform 
to the “established rules” embedded in the political culture. In an effort to exalt the 
rightful rule o f a trustworthy government that is suffused with ethical goodness, the 
CCP’s legitimating ideology revolves around a key theme; that is, the relationship 
between the authoritarian state and the principal o f the nation, the Chinese people. This 
explains why nationalism is expressed as patriotism in Chinese official discourse, which 
means that the love o f the nation is indistinguishable from the support o f the Communist 
state and the authoritarian regime. By presenting the state and nation as “the whole moral 
and intellectual condition o f a people,”43 official nationalist discourse provides a systemic 
version to convince the Chinese populace that the one-Party rule o f the authoritarian 
regime is justifiable, feasible, and sustainable.
Achieving this purpose is particularly important in the wake o f the Tiananmen 
crackdown, when the ideological vacuum in the Chinese political life led to a series of
A lex is de T ocqu eville , D em ocracy  in A m erica  (N ew  York, N Y : Alfred A . K nopf, 1945), 299.
“belief crises.”46 Indoctrinating the notion that the regime was the incantation o f the 
highest moral standards was a required undertaking for the regime to get out o f  its 
legitimacy crisis In the ideological education, the CCP regime was incessantly narrated 
in the nationalist discourse as the only regime capable o f protecting the nation from a 
coalition o f foreign enemies, and o f leading the nation to modernization. Deng’s 
successors, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping who is currently leading the Party- 
state, have ail devoted a large amount o f political resources to the propagation o f 
nationalist discourse in the state-led patriotic education. In light o f the legitimating 
function o f nationalism, which is viewed by Ernest Gellner as “primarily a political 
principle that the political and the national unit should be congruent,”47 what is 
continuously inculcated in the state-led patriotic education is a popular belief in the 
integrated and inseparable relationship between the ruling and the ruled. As the current 
Chinese political system is conceived o f as right and just in the evaluative system o f 
popular perception, the “original justification” o f the CCP regime, as a “divine being” or
4 Q
“a leader o f moral characters” with this unique quality,s is vigorously revived in the 
representation o f moral linkage between o f the state and the Chinese nation. Viewed 
from this perspective, the nationalist propaganda in the CCP’s ideological education has, 
in Suisheng Zhao’s words, become “a new basis o f  legitimacy to bolster faith in a system 
in trouble and hold the country together during the period o f rapid and turbulent
16 A s enumerated by Jie Chen, the ‘three b e lie f  crises" plaguing the CCP in the post-M ao reform were the 
crisis o f  faith in socia lism , the crisis o f  b e lie f  in Marxism and the crisis o f  trust in the Party. See jie  Chen, 
"The Impact o f  Reform  on the Party and Ideology in China," Journal o f  Chinese P o litica l S cience  4, no. 9  
(1995): 131.
47 Ernest Gellner, N ations a n d  N ationalism  (Ithaca, NY- Cornell University Press, 1983), 11.
49 G uo, "Political Legitim acy and China's Transition," 3.
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transformation .”49 By renewing the ideological orthodoxy o f loyalty to the nation-state, 
nationalism, a political ideology that identifies the nation with the state, has been 
exploited as a coalescing force in the state, legitimation project o f  the post-Tiananmen
CCP leadership.
In Beetham's model.of political legitimacy, as noted above, a regime’s exercise o f 
its political power based on the social convention in political culture and the justification 
o f the rightful source o f that power can lead to the popular consent o f  the regime power. 
Has the CCP’s regime legitimation achieved such an outcome9 To a large extent, the 
expressed popular consent has been confirmed by some scholars in their empirical 
research, which gauge the popular trust o f the authoritarian regime. For instance, Jie 
Chen’s study of the popular support in urban China has found that the CCP regime enjoys 
at least a moderately high level o f  legitimacy.50 Chen’s research is conducted within 
David Easton’s theoretical framework, in w'hich popular political support is divided into 
diffuse support and specific support.51 Diffuse support, defined as a learned loyalty 
representing the individual conviction that the incumbent regime conforms to the moral 
or ethical principles in political life, can be seen as an indicator o f the “expressed 
consent” regarding the “valued-based legitimacy” of the regime, or the “original 
justification” o f its political authority. Measuring the positive evaluation o f particular 
policies o f the government, specific support, in the case o f  China, reflects the CCP’s 
performance-based legitimacy. In Chen’s three surveys conducted in Beijing,
49 Suisheng Zhao, "A State-Led N ationalism : The Patriotic Education C am paign in Post-T ianm en China," 
Com m unist a n d  P ost-C om m u nist S tudies  31 , no. 3 (1998): 289.
50 Chen. P opular P o litica l S u pport in  U rban C hina.
51 David Easton, A System  A n alysis o f  P o litica l Life (N ew  York, N Y : W iley, 1965).
respondents registered a much higher level o f diffuse support than specific support.52 An 
important argument that can be inferred from thic- empirical study is that the moderately 
high level o f popular support that the CCP enlists is less a reflection o f its policy 
performance in socioeconomic areas than it is of the regime’s success in shaping the 
subjective cognitive o f the Chinese populace within the normative framework of 
ideology.
According to Chen’s research findings, expressive nationalist attitude is one o f the 
ideational sources o f the CCP regime legitimacy.53 Such empirical evidence supports the 
epistemic function o f national identity and collective memory in achieving social 
solidarity and popular mobilization. In the CCP’s legitimating ideology, these two
essential elements in the enterprise o f nationalism are utilized in the state legitimation to 
forge an emotional bond within the Chinese community, thereby supplying diffusing 
support to the political authority o f the authoritarian state This point o f view can be 
better understood if  we historicize the concept o f nationalism. As John Unger 
summarizes in the introduction o f a volume collecting a series of scholarly works on this 
emerging topic in Chinese politics, to unearth the ramifications o f Chinese nationalism, 
“one must first come to grips with the historically derived content o f  Chinese 
nationalism .”54 To be more specific, as Yan Sun observes, “the Chinese concern for 
ideological and conceptual adaptation is related to the national search for identity and 
resurrection that has faced the nation since its confrontation with the West in the last
54 Chen, P opular P o litica l Support in U rban China, 54-! 53.
53 P opular P o litica l Support in Urban C hina, 106-08.
54 Jonathan U nger, ''Introduction," in Chinese N ationalism , ed. Jonathan Unger (Arm onk, N Y : M E . Sharpe, 
1996). x iii., em phasis in original.
century ,v55 Tracing the vicissitudes o f  the Chinese nation and the formation o f national 
identity in its social interaction with the foreign “other,” it is not difficult to find one 
leitmotif o f  Chinese nationalism, whose moral significance has been evinced in Chinese 
foreign relations. Along its historical trajectory, Chinese nationalism is prominently 
defined in the context o f  national sovereignty and territorial integrity, the notions that
were introduced to the Chinese political discourse in the “century o f national 
humiliation ” To the extent that national salvation throughout Chinese modem history 
centered on the leitmotif o f preserving national unity at all cost against Western powers’ 
encroachments, there is an entrenched tie between the collective memory o f national 
trauma and the national sovereignty and territoriality. In Sow Keat Tok’s account, “the 
persistent efforts to leverage humiliations and crises o f  the Chinese nation contributes to 
one o f the most noteworthy phenomena o f modern Chinese history— the strange, 
continued passion o f the Chinese mentality toward the fascination o f the ‘sovereign 
whole’ and the messianic devotion to preserving it.”56 Consistent with this tendency, the 
perpetual dynamic o f Chinese identity politics is the tenacious struggle for national 
rejuvenation, an identity need inspired by the national humiliation o f the loss o f  
sovereignty and the dismemberment o f territory .57
In the official nationalist discourse, the CCP’s alleged credential as the sole 
guardian o f the Chinese nation animates the ever-lasting nationalist sentiment and 
aspiration in the national community. The purported capability o f the Chinese state in
55 Yan Sun, The Chinese R eassessm ent o f  Socialism , 1976-1 9 9 2  (Princeton, N Y : Princeton University  
Press, 1995), 18.
56 S ow  Keat Tok, "N ationalism -on-D em and? W hen C hinese Sovereignty G oes Online,'' in O nline Chinese  
N ationalism  a n d  China's B ila tera l R e la tion s , ed. S im on Shen and Shaun Breslin (Lap.ham, M D: Lexington  
B ooks, 2010), 20 . A lso  see John W . Garver, Foreign P o licy  o f  the P eople 's R epublic  o f  China  
(E nglew ood  C liffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 1993).
57 Yaqing Q in. "Struggle for Identity: A  Political P sychology .o f China's Rise," in China's R ise in H istorica l 
P ersp ec tive , ed. Brantly W om ack (Lanham, M D: R owm an & Littlefield  Publishers, 2010).
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fulfilling the historical mission o f the Chinese .nation afifh ms its moral, commitment to the 
national polity. In this way, the legitimating ideology o f nationalism demonstrates that 
the CCP’s interest in clinging to political power is congruent with the nationalist interest 
in restoring a strong and unified China on the international stage. Such a centripetal force 
in the project o f nation-state building, to use Suisheng Zhao’s words, “gives the 
Communist state the responsibility to speak in the name o f the nation and demands the 
citizens subordinate their individual interests to China’s national ones.”58 As a 
fundamental source o f the diffuse support, collective memory and national identity have 
injected a strong dose o f emotionality and morality into the relationship between the 
Chinese state and nation, thereby ensuring that Chinese national members succumb their 
private selves to a “hierarchy o f felt identity” existing in the political community o f 
nation-state39
With the animation o f such “identity hierarchy,” in the portrayal o f  the moral 
competency o f the regime as the sole actor in Chinese political life that is able to prevent 
violation o f the national sovereignty, emotional analogies are constantly made in official 
nationalist discourse between China as a nation and a loving mother who deserves the 
“filial devotion” o f all her children .60 Insofar as the image o f nation-state has been 
constructed as a collectivity in the official nationalist discourse, the loyalty o f  the Chinese 
populace to the nation is transferred to the dependence o f the society on the state in 
pursuing its nationalist passion, and thus arouses the affectionate feeling o f  the populace
’8 Suisheng Zhao, "China's Pragmatic N ationalism : is  It M anageable?" The W ashington Q u arterly  29, no. 1 
(2005): 134.
59 M abel B erezin, "Emotions and Political Identity: M obilizing A ffection for the Polity," in P assionate  
Politics: E m otions a n d  S o c ia l M ovem ents, ed. Jeff G oodw in, James. M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta  
(C hicago, 1L: U niversity o fC h ic a g o  Press, 2001), 85.
60 V anessa Fong, "Filial Nationalism  am ong C hinese Teenagers with G lobal Identities," A m erican  
E thnologist 31, no. 4 (2004): 634.
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toward the regime. This morality-based legitimacy conceptualized in the nationalist 
discourse, as a peculiar example o f “value-based legitimacy,” helps to frame the 
government’s performance in a positive, light and avoid the legitimacy deficit in the 
process o f socioeconomic transition.
1
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C H APTER  III 
M A ST E R  H ISTO RICAL A C C O U N T S: STRATEG IC N A R R A T IV E S IN 
THE STATE LEGITIM ATION
Communities... have a history—in an important 
sense they are constituted by their past—and fo r  
this reason we can speak o f  a real community as a 
"community o f  memory, ” one that does not forget 
its past. In order not to forget that past, a 
community is involved in retelling its story, its 
constitutive narrative.
— Robert N. Bellah et al.1
Narratives help to construct personal and social 
identity, provide sense and order to experience, and  
fram e and structure action. In other words, the 
ontology o f  the human world is defined by the 
existence and ubiquity ofprivate and public 
narrative (including ... the stories o f  historians).
—Geoffrey Roberts2
Collective memory, as analyzed in the literature review section o f Chapter 1, is 
not only possessed by individuals, but also consumed by a social group. Owing to the 
frequent lack o f immediacy in first-hand recollection, the construction o f socially- 
embedded memory always relies on the symbolic techniques o f cultural representation, 
which encode and preserve memories into narrative stories that are distributed among 
group members. By capitalizing on the symbolic resources in the repertoire o f collective 
memory, political actors can narrate the past to reflect the present and even to formulate
1 Robert N . Bellah et al., H abits o f  the H eari: Individualism  a n d  C om m itm ent in A m erican  Life (B erkeley, 
CA: University o f  California Press, 1996), 153.
2 G eoffrey Roberts, "History, Theory and the Narrative Turn in International Relations," R eview  o f  
In ternational S tudies 32, no. 4 (2006): 710.
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the future. Viewed in this light, the symbolic representation o f collective memory is 
interwoven with the strategic deployment o f historical narratives. An archetypical 
example in this regard is the creation and dissemination of master commemorative
narratives, which serve to activate the nationalist aspiration in a mnemonic community 
based on the shared destiny o f its members.3 Political regimes seeking to mobilize social 
resources typically resort to this sort o f strategic narrative to invoke public memory and 
enact collective identity in their endeavor o f policy legitimation.
This is especially true in an authoritarian state like China. Historical education 
launched by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), as a crux element o f the moral- 
ideologv pedagogy o f the so-called "patriotic education” (aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu), has been 
an integral intermediary for the symbolic representation o f the collective memory. By 
bestowing determined meanings upon the past, which is causally related to the present 
and future o f  the Chinese nation, the state-sanctioned commemorative narrative, as a 
product o f the state’s historical mythmaking, defines the identity role o f  the Communist 
regime in Chinese nation’s sociopolitical development and projects varied self-images o f 
the People’s Republic o f China (PRC) in distinctive contexts. In the structuring o f the 
expectation and behavior o f the Chinese populace, the master historical account, 
implicated in the construction and consumption o f collective memory, has become an 
effective sense-making tool maneuvered by the CCP in the internal and external 
legitimation o f the authoritarian state.
This chapter seeks to systematically investigate the formation and projection o f 
the historical accounts propagated in the CCP’s patriotic education campaign, and the 
reception o f  this sort o f  strategic narratives that has influenced the CCP’s pursuit o f  its
3 See., e.g, Zerubavel, R e co vere d  Roots: C o llec tive  M em ory a n d  the M aking o f  Israeli N ation al Tradition.
domestic and diplomatic strategic aims. Starting with the social pragmatics o f political - ' 
communication, the first section delves into the. instrumentalization o f  master historical 
account in the regime legitimacy enhancement, with a focus on the primary plot line 
underpinning the story-telling o f the official historiography o f modem Chinese history. 
The second section compares and contrasts two lines o f master historical accounts 
spotlighted in the nationalist discourse o f M ao’s China and the post-Tiananmen era, 
illuminating how the symbolic representation o f collective memory is structured in the 
narrative frames in the state’s historical mythmaking. In order to shed light on the 
discursive texture o f the linkage politics o f Chinese foreign relations, the third section
maps the domestic and international reception of the victimhood discourse— a thematic
focal point o f  the patriotic education staged by the CCP from the 1980s onward— and the 
reconfiguration o f Beijing’s diplomatic discourse in reworking the PRC’s public image 
on the international scene.
PATRIOTIC EDUCATION: THE SOCIAL PRAGMATICS OF STRATEGIC 
NARRATIVES4
The formation o f strategic narratives is a power-laden undertaking, functioning as 
a dynamic link between two categories o f actors: elites and masses. Those wielding the 
regime power have vested interest in shaping the public discourse and deliberation by 
crafting particular narratives in their political claim-making, in order to gain political 
leverage or mobilize popular support. The social pragmatics of strategic narratives was 
catapulted to the forefront of legitimacy enhancement o f the Chinese authoritarian state
4 t  his section  uses the data in m y article N ing Liao. "The Enbaliug and Constraining Effects o f  Strategic 
Narratives: N ationalist D iscourse and China's Foreign R elations,” Fudan Jou rn al o f  the H um anities a n d  
S ocia l Sciences  6, no. 2 (2013): 26-32.
when the Party-state inaugurated an extensive propaganda campaign o f  patriotic 
education in the early 1990s, on the heels o f the Tiananmen pro-democracy movement, to 
mitigate the most severe crisis o f  the regime.
The main theme o f the patriotic bandwagon was the indoctrination o f the state- 
sanctioned nationalist discourse detailing the wartime suffering foisted upon the Chinese 
nation by foreign colonial powers and Japanese imperialists during its modern history. In 
the process o f historical representation, nationalism became a centripetal force o f turning 
national affiliation into political solidarity, to the extent that the commemorative accounts 
helped to create an “ imagined community'" on the basis o f  the common past shared by the 
members o f the Chinese nation .5 As Stephen Crites argues, “A self without story 
contracts into the thinness o f its personal pronoun .'’6 According to the instrumental logic 
o f nationalism, collective memory, a primary source to construct the “selfness” o f  the 
Chinese nation, is an ideal and convenient resource for political actors to promulgate 
master historical accounts. At a critical moment when the moral standing of the CCP 
regime fell to an all-time low, the communicative symbols intrinsic to the collective 
memory were intensely exploited in the Chinese Party-state’s historical mythmaking, 
with an effort to persuade the masses to follow the elites’ political leadership.
How is Chinese collective memory constructed in the state-projected strategic 
narratives? In essence, the dissemination and consolidation o f the meanings that are 
distilled into collective memory results from a process o f  creating o f master 
commemorative accounts, which are treated as a “true” discourse through the narrative
5 For the notion of "im agine com m unity," see  A nderson, Im ag in ed  C om m unities: Re flections on the O rigins  
a n d  S p re a d  o f  N ationalism .
6 Stephen Crites, "Storytime: R ecollectin g  the Past and Projecting the Future." in N arra tive  P sych ology:
The S to r ie d  N ature o f  H um an C o n d u ct , ed. T heodore R. Sarbin (N ew  York, NY: Praeger. 1986), 571.
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arrangements o f historical episodes. For the purpose- o f policy advocacy and legitimation, 
communicators need to organize the “storyline’’ of national history within selected frames 
and “emplot” those seemingly disconnected events and actions by unifying them ihto a 
coherent whole under the proposed thesis.7 On the foundation o f such a “schemata” 
dictating the storyline o f  national history ,8 the persuasiveness o f master historical 
accounts increases the probability that the audience’s interpretation of, and response to, 
domestic and international affairs are primed in those frames preferred by the narrative 
projector.
In the patriotic education staged by the CCP, the centerpiece o f the state-projected 
strategic narratives is the relationship between the Party-state and the Chinese nation. A 
stable and constant theme o f the patriotic bandwagon is thus the incessant articulation o f 
the CCP’s role identity as the sole savior and guardian o f the Chinese nation and its 
credentials for a monopolistic grip on political power. All the “specific narratives” in the 
historical vicissitudes are patterned into this “schematic narrative template” that reigns in 
the construction o f the master historical account.9 As the CCP regime has set its 
propaganda machine in motion for the campaign, the narration o f the authoritarian state 
as a “regime o f truth” and its relationship with the nation has become a political ritual 
repeatedly performed in the Chinese public space, 10 which helps to create a “community
7 P olkinghom e, "Narrative and Self-C oncept," 141. Gearcid OTuathail, "Theorizing Practical G eopolitical 
Reasoning: The Case o f  the United States' R esponse to the War in Bosnia " P o litica l G eograph y  21 , no. 5 
(2002): 627. A lso  see Paul Ricoeur, Time a n d  N arra tive ( Volume I), trans. K athleen M cLaughlin and . 
David Pellauer (C hicago, M l: University o f  C hicago Press, 1984).
8 Frederic Charles Bartlett, Rem em bering: A S tu dy in E xperim ental an d  S o c ia l P sych o lo g y  (Cambridge, 
N Y : Cam bridge U niversity Press, 1995), 208.
9 Jam es V . W ertsch, "C ollective M emory," in M em ory in M in d  an d  C ulture, ed Pascal B oyer and James V. 
W ertsch (N ew  York, N Y : Cambridge University Press, 2 0 0 9 ), 128-32 , F orthe differentiation betw een
schem atic narrative tem plate” and specific  narratives,” aiso see  Voices o f  C ollective R em em bering.
10 T he phrase “regim e o f  truth” is borrowed from M ichel Foucault, "Tiuth and Power," in M ichel F oucault 
E ssentia l Works: P o w e r , ed. James D. Faubion (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2001), 131.
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o f feeling’' that obscures the divide between the state and the nation .’1 it is this 
“schemata" that has guided the construction o f  collective memory, in an attempt to enact 
the role played by the Communist Party in the Chinese revolution and social development
in Chinese political imaginary. As asserted by Hu Jintao, former General Secretary o f the 
Party at the congregation commemorating the 90th anniversary o f the founding o f the 
CCP,
In the 170 plus years since the Opium War o f  1840, our great country has 
weathered untold hardships, our great nation has waged earthshaking 
struggles, and our great people have scored splendid achievement in the 
annals o f history. Following the Opium War, China gradually became a 
semi-colonial and semi-feudal society, and foreign powers stepped up their 
aggression against China. The feudal rule became increasingly corrupt, the 
country was devastated by incessant wars and turbulence, and the Chinese 
people suffered from hunger, cold, and oppression. To salvage China from 
subjugation was an urgent mission for the Chinese nation. And the Chinese 
people faced the historic tasks o f winning independence and liberation. ...
The birth o f  the [CCP] was a natural product o f  the development o f  modern j
and contemporary Chinese history as well as the indomitable exploration o f
the Chinese people for survival o f the nation. [It] put the Chinese revolution a
on the right course, gave the Chinese people a powerful motivation, and i
created bright prospects for China’s future development.1- t
After recounting the historical role the CCP has played in the new-democratic revolution, :
the socialist revolution and the establishment o f  the socialist system, and the reform and
opening up over the past 90 years, which was described as "a grand epic in the history of
human development on [the] ancient land o f China,” Hu continued to state:
These three ma jor events reshaped the future and destiny o f the Chinese 
people and the Chinese nation. They irreversibly ended the misery endured 
by China in modern times when it suffered from both domestic turmoil and 
foreign invasion and was poor and weak. They also irreversibly started the 
Chinese nation’s historic march for development, growth, and great
11 For the notion o f  "com m unities o f  fee lin gs,” see  Berezin. "Em otions and Political Identity: M obilizing  
A ffection  for the Polity," 92-94 .
12 Hu Jintao, "Speech at the M eeting C om m em orating the 90th Anniversary o f  the Com m unist Party o f  
China,” Xinhua A gen cy , h ttp://new s.x inhuanet.com /english2010/ch ina/2011-07/01 /c 13960505.htm . 
(Septem ber 3, 2 012)
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rejuvenation They gave China, a civilization o f  over 5,000 years, a 
completely new look and created unimagined prospects for the great 
rejuvenation o f the Chinese nation. What has happened shows that in the 
great cause o f China’s social development and progress since modem times, 
history and the people have chosen the [C C P ]... History has also fully • 
shown that the [CCP] truly deserves to be called a great, glorious and 
correct Marxist political party, and the core force leading the Chinese 
people in breaking new ground in development.13
The regime legitimacy o f the CCP, as demonstrated in Hu’s official statement, is 
symbolized in its role identity as the genuine representative of the Chinese nation. Too 
often, the strategic narration o f national history needs “an evaluative framework in which 
good or bad character helps to produce unfortunate or happy outcome.”14 Structured by 
such a normative logic, which aptly integrates the experiential elements o f Chinese
historical development and the popular evaluation o f the Communist state, causal linkage 
is established between the source o f the traumatic humiliation inflicted on the Chinese 
nation— the corrupt feudal rule and foreign subjugation— and the foundation o f the CCP, 
depicted as an inevitable outcome o f Chinese modem history. Within this framing 
structure, the determined role that the Communist regime has played throughout the path 
taken by the Chinese nation along its independence, liberation, and modem development 
validates the capability and morality o f the CCP leadership
With regard to the rhetorical transaction between the elites and masses in the 
political communication system, how well the state-driven strategic narratives are 
received by the general populace is, according to Michael Schudson’s analysis on the 
power o f cultural symbols, less dependent on the audience’s personal interests in the 
content or nature o f the narratives themselves than on the position o f the narrated
13 Ibid.
14 Alasdair M acIntyre, "Epistem ological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy o f  Science," The 
M onist 60, no. 4 (1977): 456.
memory “in the cultural tradition o f the society the audience is a part of.” 1' Oniy when 
historical representation is contextual ized within such social milieu can it become 
intelligible. Given that reconstructing a modem state is an unfailing dynamic driving the 
tenacious struggle o f  generations o f Chinese political elites, the representativeness o f the 
CCP nicely fits the ongoing purposive action o f the Chinese nation in recovering its 
powerful status in the international community, and is thus resonant with the targeted 
audience o f the strategic narratives formulated for the sake o f political mobilization.
As such, the histoiical identification o f  the CCP resembles what Kenneth Gergen 
terms a “stability narrative” in the official nationalist discourse, through which the 
highlighted elements in the Chinese collective memory are indexed “in a way that the 
trajectory remains essentially unchanged .” 16 To achieve the rhetorical efficacy o f  such 
hegemonic discourse in the patriotic education campaign, an innovative means for the 
ruling elites in the “symbolic enhancement” o f the incumbent regime is, as Lowell 
Dittmer proposes in his elaboration o f political symbolism, “to enhance the status o f the 
collectivity [it] represents, and emphasize the indissoluble linkage between the office [it] 
holds and the high status and great power o f  that collectivity, alluding frequently to [its] 
own competence as an incumbent and deriding [its] opponent’s inexperience.v l7 This 
narrative technique o f social representation is widely used in the formulation o f strategic 
narratives in the CCP’s patriotic education For instance, Jiang Zemin. H u’s predecessor.
15 M ichael Schudson, "How Culture Works: Perspectives from M edia Studies on  the E fficacy o f  Symbols,"  
Theory a n d  S ocie ty  18, no. 2 (1989): 169.
16 Kenneth J. G ergen, "Narrative, M oral Identity, and H istorical C onciousness."  in N arrative, Identity a n d  
H istorica l C onsciousness: A S o c ia l C onstruction ist A ccount, ed. Jiiigen Straub (N ew  York, NY : Berghahn, 
2 005). 104.
17 Low ell D ittm er." Political Culture and Political Sym bolism : Toward a Theoretical Synthesis," W orld  
P olitics  29, no. 4 (1977): 542 , 74.
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once articulated the “indissoluble linkage” o f the Party- state and the Chinese nation in an
assertive manner.
Our party has inherited and carried forward the Chinese nation’s 
outstanding tradition, and has made the biggest sacrifice and the biggest 
contribution in the struggle o f national independence and safeguarding the 
national sovereignty. We have therefore won the heartfelt love and support 
from people of all nationalities in China, The Chinese Communist is the 
firmest, the most thoroughgoing patriot. Chinese Communist Party’s 
patriotism is the highest model o f conduct for the Chinese nation and the 
Chinese people. 18
Given the woeful memory o f extraterritoriality and concession imposed by foreign 
aggression and subjugation, the absolutist notions o f “national independence” and 
“national sovereignty” inferred from the traumatic experience o f national humiliation 
have been ingrained in Chinese political culture as the ‘ ideational codes,” or the 
“distinctive patterns o f assumptions,” o f  the basic property o f the Chinese nation.19 The 
historic agency o f  the CCP in unifying the Chinese nation and restoring it dignity has, as 
claimed in Jiang’s speech and other authoritative political documents, emblematizes the 
“indissoluble linkage” between the state— the alleged indefatigable defender of China’s 
territoriality and sovereignty— and the nation, whose felt need o f cleansing national 
humiliation is fulfilled by the incumbent regime. Since the character o f the Communist 
regime is evaluated in the narrative framing in accordance with the normative values 
sustained in the Chinese political culture, the CCP’s identity role, which is symbolized as 
the paramount patriotic force that is capable o f protecting the nation from foreign 
intrusion and leading it to modernization, appeals to the consensual assumptions 
inherent in Chinese political imaginary.
18 Jiang Zemin, "Speech at the Sixth Plenary Session  o f  the ! 4th Cep National Congress," P eople's D a ily , 
October 10, 1996.
15 David J. Elkins and Richard F,.B. S im eon, "A Cause in Search o f l t s  Effect, or What D oes Political 
Culture Explain?,'1 C om parative P o litics  11, no. 2 (1979): 128-29.
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How, then, does such ‘mnemonic legitimation,” as Jan-Wemer Muller terms i t /  
make its way into public awareness? To enhance their communicative efficacy, the 
reception o f elite-driven strategic narratives projected in the patriotic education is
guaranteed by the social and institutional reinforcement o f the patriotic education. Just as
memory is a social undertaking manifested in cultural practices, so do commemorative
narratives function in institutionalized social relations, where the shared meanings lodged
in ihe collective memory are enacted .21 To shore up the legitimacy o f the authoritarian
regime, patriotic education has constituted a primary instrument o f the propaganda state
in socializing the Chinese populace to the ideological system instituted in the state’s
consensus building project. Today, more than two decades after the prodernocracy
protests, this central means o f  constructing and reproducing canonical national historical
narratives is still crucial to mustering allegiance to the unity of the Chinese nation-state i
and is hence underscored in the CCP’s emphasis on patriotism. In an official document i
lectified in the sixth plenary session o f the 17th CCP’s Committee, patriotism is explicitly |
affirmed as one o f the “core socialist values” :
Patriotism is the deepest intellectual tradition o f  the Chinese nation, and it 
is the thing most able to arouse Chinese sons and daughters to unite in 
struggle. ... We need to carry out education in a national spirit on a broad 
scale, put great effort into fostering ideologies o f patriotism, collectivities 
and socialism; strengthen people’s sense o f national pride, self-confidence 
and self-esteem; encourage people to turn their patriotic fervor into 
practical action to revitalize the country; and view it as the greatest honor to 
love the motherland and contribute all their strength to developing the 
motherland and as the greatest disgrace to harm the motherland's interests 
and dignity . 72
20 M uller. ’'Introduction' The Pow er o f  M em ory, the M em ory o f  Power and the Power over Memory.'' 26.
21 Schudson, "How Culture Works: Perspectives from M edia Studies on the E fficacy o f  Sym bols," 170.
22 The CCP Central C om m ittee, "The D ecision  o f  the CCP Central C om m ittee on M ajor Issues Pertaining 
to D eepen ing Reform  o f  the Cultural System  and Prom oting the Great D evelopm ent and Flourishing o f  
Socialist Culture." h ttp ://w w w .cctb .n et/b vgzyw xfy /201111 /W 020111121519527826615 .p d f. (accessed  on 
Septem ber 12, 2012)
To susta.n social recognit ion,, public acceptance, and ethical practice o f the 
“national spirit” with patriotism, the Chinese Party-state has made unremitted efforts to' 
ensure that the master historical narratives be ‘physically present” and “cognitively 
memorable’ in social relations.21 The state education system is, as Podeh has found in 
bis research on the construction o f collective memory in Israeli history education, 
“another arm o f the state” to transmit the “approved knowledge” to the young 
generation.24 Under the rubric o f patriotic education, Chinese state-centric history 
education remains an important avenue o f “mnemonic socialization” in China,25 wherein 
state-sanctioned commemorative narratives can be readily retrieved by the general 
populace
As modern Chinese history has been integrated into the national educational 
curriculum up to the postgraduate levels, all college students are required to study what 
they should believe. The testing o f the uniform and approved historical knowledge is an 
effective means for the retention o f master commemorative narratives. Apart from the 
college enhance examinations, modem Chinese history is an essential part in the 
nationwide matriculation exam o f graduate schools. In the subject o f politics, all 
examinees, regardless their majors, have to retrieve the “true” historical knowledge and 
relate the information to their comments on contemporary Chinese politics. Their 
answers must dovetail with the official discourse printed in state-sanctioned textbooks, 
another pedagogical element o f history education manifesting the quintessence o f 
institutionalized patriotic education. To be erected as orthodox knowledge, master
2j Schudson, "How Culture Works: Perspectives from M edia Studies on the Efficacy o f  Sym bols,” 163.
24 Elie Podeh, "History and M em ory in the Israeii Educational System : The Portrayal o f  the Arab-Israeli 
C onflict in History Textbooks ( l 948-2000),"  H istory  a n d  M em ory  !2 , no. 1 (2000): 66.
2: Zenibavel, "Social M emories: Steps to a S ocio logy  o f  the Past," 286-89 .
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historical accounts projected in the C CP's patriotic education are always disseminated 
through historical textbooks. In Chinese historical education, textbook writing is an 
uncontestable “memory regime," whereby master commemorative narratives 
promulgated by the “privileged interpreters” o f national history, along with the codified 
judgment o f  historical events, are transmitted into the minds o f the national audience.26 
In order to maximize the discursive power o f  patriotic education, the compilation and 
revision o f these textbooks are unconditionally subject to rigid censorship by the 
government. Such a memory agent, as Zheng Wang describes, “[functions] as a kind o f  .
‘supreme court’ whose task is to decipher, from all the accumulated ‘pieces o f the past,’ 
the ‘true’ collective memory .”27
Therefore, in the process o f the selection and organization o f  historical 
knowledge, the CCP has managed to insulate the master discourse o f national history i
from any form o f alteration. Through the discursive colonization, the molding o f 4
collective memory in the symbolic system of patriotic education provides a pretext to ^  i
purge various forms o f “unofficial history,” which is perceived by the regime to deflect i
the dogmatic conclusion o f past events drawn by state authorities/ 8 Any attempts to 
challenge the symbolic relationship between the Party- state and the nation are tantamount 
to treason, thereby being banished from the Party-state's educational socialization of the 
Chinese populace. In this way, heterodox social voices in discord with the consensual
25 Eric Langenbacher, "C ollective M em ory as a Factor in Political Culture and International Relations," in
P o w er a n d  the Past: C o llec tive  M em ory a n d  In tern ational R e la tio n s , ed. Eric Langenbacher and Y ossi 
Chain (W ashington , D .C .: G eorgetow n U niversity Press, 2010), 33-36 .
27 Z heng W ang, "National H um iliation, H istory Education, and the P olitics o f  H istorical M em ory: Patriotic 
Education C am paign in China," In ternational S tud ies Q u arterly  52. no. 4 (2008): 786. 
i8 Qiu .fin, "The P olitics o f  History and H istorical M em ory in China-Japan Relations," J ou rn al o f  C hinese
P o litica l Scien ce  ! 1, no. 1 (2006): 36. For a d iscussion  o f  C hinese ‘‘offic ia l history" and ‘‘unofficial 
history." see  "The P olitics o f  History and Historical M em ory in China-.lapan Relations." J ou rn a l o f  C hinese  
P olitica l Scien ce  11, no. 1 (2006): 25-6.3.
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narrative o f national history are relentlessly coerced, which facilitates the ‘'"symbolic 
enhancement” o f regime legitimacy. ,
REMEMBERING OR FORGETTING. THE SELECTIVE PARADIGMS OF 
NARRATED MEMORY29
As a pragmatic usage o f narratives, the structuring o f historical storylines, which 
is formulated in consistence with the communicator’s political agenda, invariably 
involves the selective remembering and forgetting o f certain parts o f the past, so that the 
historical narrative fits the ontological reflection o f the contemporary world. Given its 
malleability, the construction o f collective memory tends to be the enactment o f ’ myth” 
in forming master historical accounts, which are less about the chronology o f the past 
than the assertion o f the past that is motivated by the logic o f legitimation. It is this genre 
o f narrative, described by Heuser and Buffet as ‘a shorthand for a particular 
interpretation o f a historical experience ... invoked in the present to justify certain 
policies,’ 30 that is often institutionalized as official discourse when the state is engaged in 
mythologizing national history.
As a defining feature o f  historical mythmaking, symbolic elements extracted from 
communication events are “emplotted” within particular framing paradigms, which 
provide the epistemic resource for the moral judgment rectifying in the inter-subjective 
meanings of the collective identity. Such narrative framing includes two semiologica! 
dimensions involving the communicative constituents o f  political symbolism. The first is
29 This section is based on  a major revision o f  Liao, "The E abaiing and Consira:mng Effects o f  Strategic 
Narratives: N ationalist D iscourse and China's Foreign Relations," 32r40.
30 Beatrice H euser and Cyril Buffet, "Introduction: O f M yths and M en,” m H aunted by  M em ory: M yths in
In ternational R elations, ed. Cyril Buffet and Beatrice Heuser (O xford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1998), 
ix.
the semantic relationship between “the symbol and the political reality ... it refers to .5'31 
Since the selection o f symbols is contingent upon the semantic context that conditions the 
state’s mythmaking, the framing o f historical events is subject to the elites’ structural
imperatives under shifting domestic and international circumstances. Second, the chosen 
symbols bear socially binding connotations, and hence register specific signs in public 
memory, whose relationship reflects the syntactic dimension o f historical accounts.32 
With the mediation o f the meanings connoted from the selected symbols, which are 
capabie o f animating the emotions that are deep-seated in the political culture, the syntax 
o f master historical narratives structures the feeling o f the audience regarding how the 
domestic politics and international affairs work and their comprehension o f the distinct 
signs associated with the mythic symbols.33
These semiological elements o f political symbolism are applied to the distinctive 
narrative paradigms prevalent in the Chinese state-led history education under the Maoist 
totalitarian regime and the patriotic bandwagon initiated in the wake o f the Tiananmen 
crackdown. Within the dominant narrative structures, two paradoxical symbols have 
been formed in projecting modem Chinese history: the triumph o f the Chinese people in 
the Communist revolution led by the CCP arid the national humiliation wrought by the 
imperialist intrusion and aggression .34 The projection o f these symbolic polarities are 
shaped by the agenda-setting o f  historical narrative framing, which highlights “particular 
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” concerning
Ditim er, "Political Culture and Political Sym bolism . Toward a Theoretical Synthesis." 571.
33 Ibid.
33 ''Political Culture and Political Sym bolism - Toward a Theoretical Synthesis,'' 568.
34 E.g.. G ries, China's N ew N ationalism : Pride, P o litics , a n d  D ip lo m a cy , 69 -85 , W ang, N ever F orget 
N ational H um iliation: H isto r ica l M em ory in  C h inese P o litics a n d  F oreign  R ela tion s , 95-117 .
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the structural constraints o f the Parly-state in diverging situations.35 The glorious and 
traumatic, symbols selected for narrative framing,have signified antithetical national ■ 
identities In this communicative process, the syntax o f master historical accounts has 
provided the CCP with a discursive means to “filter identity discourse” that is 
instrumental in justifying the behavior and policy o f the state.36 The political advocacy 
and legitimation o f the authoritarian regime have therefore been aligned “with public 
justifications which enact the identity and moral purpose o f the state.” 37
In Maoist era, China was headed by a charismatic leader who was obsessed with 
the purported ‘ grand enterprise o f continuous revolution .”38 The definition o f the major 
challenges confronting the Party-state was structured within the frame o f “class- 
struggle,” an overriding theme o f the sociopolitical development instituted by a 
totalitarian regime. Predicated by such agenda setting, those actors in an ideological 
camp that was heresy to a revolutionary state were identified as the primary culprits that 
were conspiring to overthrow the regime. In the face o f the imminent threats from these 
arch enemies the state was in bad need o f a heroic image, communicated through the 
mobilizing ‘identity discourse,” to substantiate its capability o f enduring the adverse 
diplomatic environment and muster the broad-based popular support for the “continuous 
revolution” o f the revolutionary state. Within such a semantic context, the Communist 
victory in the warfare o f national 'liberation— including the Chinese resistance against the 
Japanese invasion and the civil war between the CCP and the nationalist Kuomintang
35 Robert M . Entman. "Framing: Toward Clarification o f  a Fractured Paradigm,'' Jou rn al o f  
C om m unication  4.3, no. 4 (1993): 52.
36 Jeffrey T. Checkle, "Social Co.nstructivisms in Cdobal and European Politics: A R ev iew  Essay," R eview  
o f  In ternational S tudies 30, no. 2 (2004): 234.
37 Mark Lynch, State  Interests a n d  Public Spheres: The In ternational P o litics  o f  J o rd a n s  Identity  (N ew  
York N Y - Columbia University Press, 1999), 18.
3S Jian Chen, M ao's China a n d  the C o ld  War (Chapel Hill, NC: University o f  North Carolina Press, 2001).
(KMT)— was privileged as the most appropriate symbol fitting the structuring logic o f 
the state's historical mythmaking.
To enhance its rhetorical potency in fostering popular identification with the 
Communist regime, the social categorization function o f  nationalist discourse was 
fulfilled in the Party-state’s historical mythmaking. This was achieved in the framing 
process through the projection o f a referent sign that serves as a foil, that is, by “alluding 
frequently to [the CCP’s] competence as an incumbent and deriding [its] opponent’s 
inexperience.''39 To be more specific, the determined meaning connoted from the mythic 
symbol o f Communist triumph was accentuated in the juxtaposition o f two protagonists 
o f  the same historical period. Thus, it should come as no surprise that the positive 
contribution o f  the KMT led by Chiang Kai-shek, M ao's nemesis, in the Sino-Japanese 
War was largely ignored in official discourse. On the 20th anniversary o f the Communist 
victory over Japan, Lin Biao, then Vice-chairman o f the CCP’s Central Committee, wrote, 
“The basic reason [for the victory] [was] that the War o f Resistance against Japan was a 
genuine people’s war led by the [CCP] and Comrade Mao Tse-teung .”40 As quoted in an 
authoritative document o f  the CCP, Chiang’s resistance to Japan was pinned down by 
Mao as the “consequences o f the serious blow Japanese invasion dealt to the interests o f 
Anglo-U.S. imperialism in China as well as to those o f the big landlords and big 
bourgeoisie whom Chiang Kai-shek directly represented.” With regard to the impact of 
the KMT on the Communist victory, Mao specifically noted that “Chiang opposed the
”  Dittm er, "Political Culture and Political Sym bolism : Toward a Theoretical Synthesis," 574.
40 Piao [B iao] Lin, L ong L ive the V ictory o f  the P eop le 's W ar! In C om m em oration  o f  the 20 th  A n n iversary  
o f  V ictory in the C h inese P eop le 's W ar o f  R esistance a g a in st Japan  (Peking: Foreign L anguages Perss,
105
general mobilization o f the people for tola! war, and adopted the ieactionafy policy 'of' ' '  : ' 
passivity and resisting Japan but actually opposing the Communist and the people.”41
Apparently, the competence o f the CCP- led army and urtdergiound forces, which 
was given full credit for the national independence and affirmed the “victor” identity o f 
the nation-state, was in sharp contrast with the KMT troops, whose corruption and 
impotence along with its yielding to the Japanese aggressors were, diagnosed as a primary 
cause for the agony o f the Chinese nation under the nationalist rule. In a syntactic sense, 
the social categorization textually implied in these “self-glorifying” and ‘other 
maligning” myths conveyed the normative evaluation o f the historical narrative frame.42 
The demarcation o f the two dichotomized signs promoted the moralism o f the 
Communist state, which was extolled in the official discourse as ‘ the sole leader of the 
‘Great Chinese War o f  Resistance against Japanese Aggression’.”43
&
In the political symbolism o f historical mythmaking, the in-gt oup and out-group 
identities attributed to the patriotic CCP and the traitorous KMT were signified in the 
syntactic '‘structures o f attention,” which logically means that some other aspects o f the 
same historical event that were incompatible with the dominant frame must be 
simultaneously consigned into “structures of inattention .”44 During much o f the Cold- 
war period, the nationalist force became “almost a codeword for any political dissident
41 Tse-tung [Zedong] M ao. The P olicies, M easures, a n d  P ersp ec tives o f  C om batin g  Japan ese Invasion  
(Beijing: Foreign L anguages Press, 1954), i-ii
^  Yinan H e, "National M ythmaking and the Problem s o f  H istory in Sino-Japanese Relations," in Japan's  
R ela tion s w ith  China: F ac in g  a R ising P ow er, ed Peng Er Lam (London arid N ew  York: R outledge, 2006), 
70.
43 "National M ythm aking and the Problem s o f  H istory in Sino-Japaaese Relations,'1 in Japan 's Relations  
w ith  China: F acing a  R ising P o w e r , ed. Peng Er Lam (London and N ew  York: R outledge, 2006), 73.
44 M ieke Bal, D eath  & D issym m etric  The P o litic s  o f  C oherence in the B ook o f  Judges  (C hicago, IL: The 
U niversity o f  C hicago Press, 1988).
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tendency” in the Chinese political discourse.*5 The internal conflici between the two 
actors representing diametrically opposed classes overshadowed the international fissure 
between China and Japan in the political legitimation o f  the Communist regime. The
trauma inflicted upon the Chinese people in the Sino-Japanese war, in the view o f the 
CCP’s historical mythologizers, was not an appropriate symbol by which the narrative 
audience would remember and interpret a historical issue in the way that a revolutionary 
state wished. Hence, this symbolic element was stylized as a peripheral issue in the 
narrated memory o f modern Chinese history in Maoist era.' ’ Such intended amnesia, as a 
manipulative technique o f the state’s historical mythmaking and a communicative 
component o f the “symbolic enhancement” o f the Communist state, directed the 
nationalist hatred toward the reactionary actors and Beijing’s ideological opponents 
rather than an external entity whose conflict witn China was in discord with the “class- 
struggle,” a dominant narrative frame and preordained mission o f the revolutionary 
regime.
On the front o f Chinese foreign relations, Japan’s strategic position in the balance 
o f power o f  the Asia Pacific region pushed Beijing to engage Tokyo in an attempt to 
hedge against Western containment o f  the fledging regime. In step with this calculation, 
distinction was made between the Japanese people at large and the coterie o f Japanese 
militarists whose brutality was the real cause o f the Chinese war misery .47 In accordance 
with this “separation” thesis, historical feuds, considered as secondary to the 
normalization o f the bilateral relations that was more profitable in geo-political terms,
45 Rana Mitter, "Behind the S cen es at the M useum: N ationalism , History and M em ory in the B eijin g  War 
o f  R esistance M useum , 1987-1997,"  The Chino. Q u arterly  161(2000): 283.
46 E.g., James R eilly , "China's History A ctiv ism  and Sino-Japanese Relations," China: An International 
Jou rn al 4, no. 2 (2006): 192.
47 He. "National M ythm aking and the Problem s o f  History in Sino-Japanese Relations," 73-74.
were largely slighted. For instance, the Nanjing Massacre; one of the most appalling " 
holocausts in the Sino Japanese war, was dealt with cursorily in the state’s mythmaking. ' 
Until the renewed focus o f narrative framing emerged in the 1980s, not only did official 
historiography soft- pedal this wartime suffering o f the Chinese people, scholarly 
investigation, as noted by Daqing Yang, was also criticized for “stilting up national ■ 
hatred and revenge” against Japan, and was thus suppressed into silence.4* Instead o f 
being singled out for special commemoration, Japanese intrusion was pinned down as 
one o f the objects o f the Communist victory in countering foreign imperialism and 
domestic reactionary forces.
In the post-Mao reforming era, the profound transformation o f China’s domestic 
social structure and the external contextual constraints has led the state to revamp 
nationalist discourse and hence the framing package o f historical accounts. The 
narratives celebrating revolutionary' heroism, which were at odds with the social reality of 
the market economy, could not ameliorate the rampant complaints made by a large part 
o f the populace thav was adversely affected by the socioeconomic reform. The 
centrifugal forces o f  disintegrating social cohesion culminated in the pro-democracy 
movement in 1989, the repression o f which further took the limelight from the CCP’s 
impressive accomplishment in the economic realm. The Western-imposed sanction in the 
immediate aftermath o f  the astounding suppression and the collapse o f the Communist 
regimes in Eastern Europe exacerbated the regime’s vulnerability and insecurity. In the; 
volatile domestic and international environment, the pressing task o f the official 
nationalist discourse was to mitigate the glaring fissure between the authoritarian state
48 Dali Yang, "Convergence or D ivergence? R ecent Historical W ritings on the Rape o f  Nanjing," A m erican  
H istorica l Review  104, no. 3 (1999): 858.
and the disgruntled society. For an authoritarian state whose power relations with the 
society was severely challenged in the social disruption, a transformative production of 
official discourse was vital in sustaining China’s socioeconomic development in a 
direction where the one-Party rule could be maintained .49 As the endpoint o f  the 
narrative framing has shifted from justifying the radical initiatives o f class struggle to 
energizing the populace disillusioned by the waning appeal o f  the orthodox ideology on
which the CCP could claim its legitimacy, a new mythic symbol that can distract the 
general populace from the cauldron o f  the socioeconomic problems at issue must be 
conjured in the transformative reproduction o f  the impoverished official discourse.
Shaped by the overhaul o f the agenda setting, the endemic memory o f China’s 
victimization in the “century o f national humiliation” (bainian guochi), from the Opium 
War through the founding o f the PRC. stood out from the “symbolic reserve” o f the 
Chinese political culture, as a narrative resource for the political elites to highlight certain 
aspects o f  collective memory in order to mobilize support in the historical mythmaking/ 0 
In the so-called “education on national conditions” (guoqingjiaoyu), the categorization of 
the s e lf  and other in Chinese diplomatic history, which connotes how the woeful memory 
is related to the chief perils o f  contemporary China, is less premised upon the 
Communist-Nationalist conflict than on the ethnic ones between the Chinese nation and
49 A ccording to Norm al Fairclough’s conceptualization o f  the mutual constitutive relationship betw een  
discourse and social structure, conservative and/or transformative reproduction o f  d iscourse is  often needed  
at the time o f  social changes. See Norman Fairclough, Language a n d  P ow er  (London and N ew  York: 
Longm an, 1989). 37 4 0 .
50 See .iames H. Liu and Tom ohide A tsum i, "Historical Conflict and R esolution betw een Japan and China: 
D evelop ing and A pplying a Narrative Theory o f  H istory and Identity," in M eanin g  in A ction:
C on stru ction s N arra tives, a n d  R epresen ta tion s , ed. Toshio Sugim an, et al. (Tokyo: Springer. 2008), 330. 
A lso  see Stephen D. R eich eran d  N ick  Hopkins, S e lf  a n d  N ation  (London, UK: Sage, 2001).
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foreign invaders,51 In an attempt to augment the CCP’s Outreach to the K.MT on the 
Taiwan issue, the official narrative framing has departed from emphasizing Chiang’s 
non-resistance policy to eulogizing the KMT’s contribution in the anti Japanese war, 
which gives ground to the common interest arid joint efforts o f  the antagonist actors in • 
opposing foreign intrusion,52 Such a kind o f “empiotmeni”—something unthinkable in 
Maoist era when the projection o f the revolutionary state’s heroic image dominated the 
structuring o f historical storyline— dissociates the demonization c f  a former negative sign 
from the syntactic context o f historical account and ushers in those external entities that 
are identified as the “causal agent’’ in the formation o f the Chinese “victim” identity 
signified from the renewed symbol.53
In the obsessive attention to national humiliation, with regard to the “connotative 
property” o f the traumatic symbol/ 4 no other foreign encroachment can better stoke 
Chinese nationalist resentment than Japanese incursion. In the reformulated narrative
paradigm, Japanese war crimes, which were deemphasized in the Maoist historical 
narrative, are brought into the center o f  the “structures of attention.” The tragic tale o f 
the ferocious ravaging o f the Chinese victims by Japanese militarists has been revived as 
one o f the showpieces in the “new remembering o f the World War II.”5'1 The collection 
o f archival data in academic volumes and the acti ve representation o f this cataclysmic 
war by the memory agents o f museums and memorials features what Parks Coble
51 Wang, "National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics o f  Historical M emory: Patriotic 
Education Campaign in China," 791.
52 He, "National M ythmaking and the Problem s o f  History in Sm o Japanese Relations," 80.
53 Entman, "Framing: Toward Clarification o f  a Fractured Paradigm,” 52 .
54 See Dittmer, "Political Culture and Political Sym bolism : Toward a Theoretical Synthesis," 568.
55 Arthur Waldron, "China’s N ew  Rem em bering o f  W orid War li: The Case o f  Zhang Zizhong," M odern  
A sian Studies  30, no. 4 (1996).
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describes as the “number game” in sensationalizing the hon or o f Japanese imperialism .56 
Given that the categorization o f Japan as an invader and China as a resistor runs so 
deeply in the Chinese collective memory, it is hardly surprising that the reinvigorated war 
commemoration impresses itself on public consciousness with intense resonance. With 
the introduction o f the external sign, the causal interpretation and normative evaluation 
carried with the mythic symbol— that the former intruders and aggressors, the most 
egregious one being Japan, are the worst villains in modem Chinese history— tends to 
activate a particular collective emotion when the in-group is infuriated by the out-group’s 
provocations. In such cases where the threats imposed by the contemporary 
“victimizers” harken back to their past savage act, the Chinese populace, whose inter- 
subjective understanding o f foreign affairs is framed in the historical narrative paradigm, 
coheres as a “victim" group. The normative orientation created by the master historical 
account distracts the general populace from mounting internal tensions in the painful 
domestic transition, thereby serving as a legitimating glue o f national cohesion.
Despite the dominant position o f the victimization discourse in the discursive 
package o f patriotic education, it should be noted, the symbolic representation o f the 
traumatic symbol uneasily coexists with, if not overwhelms, the eulogy o f Chinese 
heroism in the official historiography. The state’s mythmaking strikes a balance between 
the marked focus on the magnitude o f  foreign subjugation and the concurrent portraying 
o f  the. Chinese fortitude displayed in their indomitable resistance.57 Such a nuanced
56 Parks M. C oble. "China's 'N ew  Rem em bering' o f  the A nti-Japanese War o f  R esistance, 1937-1945,"  The 
C hina Q u a rter ly  190(2007): 404-05 .
57 B.g., G ries, China's N ew  N ationalism : Pride, P o litics , a n d  D ip lo m a cy , 43-53; Kirk A. D enton, ''Horror 
and Atrocity: M em ory o f  Japanese Im peralism  in C hinese M useum s," in R e-E nvision ing  the C hinese  
R evolution: The P o litics  a n d  P o e tic s  o f  C o llec tive  M em ories in Reform  C h in a , ed . C hing Kwan Lee and 
G uobin Y ang (W ashington, D .C . & Stanford, CA: W oodrow  W ilson  Center Press & Stanford University  
Press, 2 0 0 7 ). 248.
narrative arrangement suggests the sociai action o f  oariona! sejuvesiation as a remedy o f  
China's past victimization, a storyline that orients the audience tc the future o f  a - 
traumatized community.
As a strategic narrative o f  a political regime, master historical accounts are not 
only projected in historical representation. In the state's mythmaking, it is vital that this 
communicative device portray a vision o f  the future for the nation, which, by connecting 
with the historical agency o f the regime power, provides a sense o f sameness in the 
national community and moral motivations to inspire the general populace to participate 
in the cause o f the “causal agent.” In the nationwide discussion helmed by the current 
CCP’s General Secretary Xi Jinping over the “Chinese dream” (zhongguo meng), the 
unambiguous subtext o f this eatohphrase was borne out in the nationalist call made by 
People’s Daily (renmin rlbao) in an editorial commemorating the 80th anniversary o f 
Japanese invasion “China’s goal for the great national rejuvenation relies on the
58solidarity o f the people arid the strong leadership o f the [CCP].
This slogan propagated by the mouthpiece o f the Chinese propaganda state offers 
a compelling example o f the symbolic technique o f the CCP’s strategic narratives. In the 
historical path taken by the Chinese nation in eradicating the source o f its humiliation and 
achieving the goal o f its rejuvenation, the decisive role played by the Communist state in 
the course o f causal transformation”59-— from a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society to 
an independent and strengthening state-—comports with the interests o f  the widest
58 English.new s.cn, "People's D aily U rges Chinese "Never Forget National Humiliation" on Sept. 18," 
Xinhua A gen cy , http://new s.xinhuanet.roin /english20l0/indepth /2011 -09/1 S'c 131145289.htm . (accessed  
on October I , 20! 2).
59 For the notion o f  "‘causal transformation” in the projection o f  strategic-, n an aiives, se e  Andreas 
Antoniades, Ben O'Loughlin. and A lister M iskim m cn, "Great Power P olitics and Strategic Narratives,"  
(Center for Global Political Econom y, U niversity o f  Sussex, 2010), 4. Tzvetan Todorov, The P oetics o f  
P rose , trans. Richard Howard (Ithaca N Y : Cornell University Press, 1977).
possible swath o f the Chinese population. Avoiding the Mao-era m otif o f  “class 
struggle” and Marxist homilies, the all-encompassing Chinese dream serves as a broad 
summon for nationalist sentiments. The menage o f shared nostalgia in the national
community and the Party vision infuses the purposive dimension o f  the national identity, 
thereby instilling the feeling o f the Chinese “se lf ’ and fostering popular loyalty to the 
state above individual agendas. As the narrative frame highlighting the unique 
representativeness o f the CCP is aligned with the “source-path-goal schematic pattern” o f 
the master historical account,60 the patriotic motto that love o f the nation is 
indistinguishable from support for the state has been made socially intelligible.
AN AGGRIEVED OR A CCO M M O D A TIO N S! STATE: RECEPTION OF THE 
VICTIMIZATION DISCOURSE
In conjunction with the domestic consideration o f enhancing regime legitimacy, 
the projection o f historical narratives is a discursive venue for the PRC state to justify its 
persistent quest for power status on the world stage. Notwithstanding its current power 
base and growing influence in international affairs, China’s social rank in the status 
hierarchy o f international society is perceived by the Chinese “se lf ’ as incommensurate 
with its grandiose national history. To achieve the social purpose intrinsic to the national 
identity, the “othermg" protagonist is incorporated into the PRC’s identity narrative. Just 
as the “symbolic enhancement” o f  its domestic legitimacy needs an opposite sign, so is 
the enactment o f Beijing’s external legitimacy premised upon the “relational comparison”
60 Polkinghom e, "Narrative and Self-C oncept," 142. For the narrative technique o f  "‘frame alignment,"’ see  
D avid A. S n ow  et al., "Frame A lignm ent Processes, M icrom obilization, and M ovem ent Participation," 
A m erican  S o c io lo g ica l R eview  51. no. 4 (1986): 464-81 .
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of China’s moral id e n t i t y  to those o f  out-group entit»e*.6' The sign o f  the “victimizing” 
other is employed here as a sort o f ‘ssytnbolic markers,”67' exhibiting China’s undeserved' 
treatrrient in a Western- founded institutional context. Along with the poignant reminder' 
entreating the domestic audience “not to forget, national humiliation” (wuwang guochi), 
Beijing often claims that the Chinese nation, given “the moral authority o f [its] past 
suffering,”63 has a thorough understanding o f the value o f peace and the price o f 
inequality in the Westphalian international system. Viewed in this light, what the 
victimization discourse presents is an “ethical argument” that the PRC possesses the 
normative credentials for asserting membership in the social category o f legitimate great
64powers
Nevertheless, this ‘ ethical argument” is more persuasive to the Chinese audience 
than to its Western counterpart. According to Vamik Volkan’s conceptualization o f 
“chosen trauma,” what the narrators o f national humiliation really “choose” is “to 
mythologize and psychologize the mental representation” o f the traumatic symbol.65 
Since the narrative paradigm o f the victimization discourse is congruent with the Chinese 
national feeling, the selected symbol o f national trauma “[conveys] an unambiguous and 
emotionally compelling frame” to the domestic audience.66 Once the “conr.otative 
property” o f the “chosen trauma’’ is activated in response to foreign discrimination or
61 Rawi Abdelal et al., "Identity as a Variable," P erspectives on P o litics  4, no. 4 (2006): 699.
62 Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumbord, Rethinking Europe: S ocia l Theory an d  the Im plications o f  
E uropeanization  (London: R outledge, 2005), 51.
63 Gries, China's N ew N ationalism : Pride, P o litics, a n d  D ip lo m a cy , 50.
64 For the notion o f  “ethical argum ent;' see Amrita Narlikar, "All That G litters Is N ot Gold: India's Rise to 
Power." Third W orld Q u a rter ly  28 , no. 5 (2007): 986.
°5 Varmk D. V olkan, Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to  Ethnic Terrorism  (N ew  York, N Y : Farrar. Straus 
and Giroux, 1997), 36-39. "Chosen Trauma, the Political Ideology o f  Entitlement and Violence,"  
http.//w w w  vam ikvolkan.com /C hosen-Traum a.-the-Po’Ptical-ideology cf-Entitlem ent-and-V iolence.php.
66 Robert M. F.ntman, "Cascading Activation: Contesting the W hite H ouse's Frame aiter 9/11," P olitica l ~ 
C om m unication  20, no. 4  (2 0 0 3 ). 416. For the elaboration o f culturally congruent narrative frame, see  
P rojection  o f  P ow er: F ram ing News. P ublic Opinion, a n d  L'.S F oreign  P o licy  (C hicago IT: University o f  
C hicago Press, 2003).
mistreatment, the tragic story readily invokes the normative elements in the Chinese 
collective memory. As a result, the perceived provocations o f the out-group tend to 
fortify the cognitive consistency o f the populace in processing the information o f foreign 
affairs that are germane to historical grievance.
Take the Sino-Japanese controversy over the Senkakit/Diaoyu Islands as an 
example. In the Chinese in-group members’ evaluation, Japan’s audacious move of 
nationalizing the islands is associated with its annexation o f  the Chinese territory in the 
maritime sphere— a symbol signifying the onset o f  Japanese imperialist invasiona- nd its 
current reluctance to hold real remorse for its wartime transgression. As seen by a 
resentful actor that is instinctively hardwired to detect the illegitimate motives o f its past 
invader, the latter’s action affirms the pre-existing beliefs concerning its war-prone 
character and the ambition o f  military expansion. The propensity o f threat perception not 
only determines how the members o f the victim state draw inference o f the resented 
actor’s intention, but also shapes how they act upon the ‘ preconceived stereotype” 
communicated in the selective paradigm o f  historical narratives.67 The external stimulant 
o f  perceived injustice thus evokes Chinese nationalist sentiments that are fermented in the 
collective memory. Such responsive emotion— an outgrowth o f the "mental 
representation” in consuming the commemorative narratives— magnifies the negative 
image o f  the former wrongdoer and exaggerates a “sense o f entitlement,” whereby the 
Chinese in- group seeks “to regain what was lost, or seek to revenge” for the misconduct 
o f  the victimizer.68
67 A llen  S. W hiting. China Eyes J apan . (B erkeley, CA: California U niversity Press, 1989), 18.
68 V am ik D. V olkan, "Transgenerational T ransm issions and C hosen Traumas: A n A spect o f  Large-Group  
Identity," G ro u p  A n alysis  34, no. 1 (2001): 89,
As a dramatic manifestation, of the entitlement syndrome, the geyser o f  Chinese ■ 
nationalist sentiments is reactive vis-a-vis the out-group references, which are perceived-• 
as jeopardizing the in-group's crusade for national renaissance and its purposive action in 
foreign affairs. Due to the conventional role prescribed to an illiberal political regime, 
however, the reigning Western powers often take the CCP to task for stoking domestic 
nationalist fervor in an attempt to keep its grip on power. For those who are taken aback 
by Beijing’s muscular position when it is embroiled in the emotionally-charged 
diplomatic skirmishes, China’s foreign policy behavior seems to be grounded on such a 
self-proclaimed logic: “To have been a victim gives you the right to complain, to protest, 
and to make demands .’’69 Actually, the reiteration o f China’s moral superiority that rest 
on this justification does not grant it the accreditation o f a full-fledged power, but rather 
paints it as an insecure and defensive actor, which, on the account o f some Western 
observers, “has not been psychologically prepared to play a full ‘great power’ 
leadership.”70 The cathartic venting o f nationalist sentiments in the antagonistic 
miergroup interactions precisely attests to their inference that the aggrieved strain o f 
Chinese nationalism has de /eloped into the aggressive display o f a dissatisfied and 
bellicose power, whose self-proclaimed status as a “responsible great power” evinces its 
ambition “for dominance or relative gains over its adversaries.”71 Ironically, the PRC’s 
“ethical argument” has brought upon itself an assertive and expansionist reputation that it' 
regularly denounces. The threat perception constitutive in.the Chinese “mental 
representation” o f national trauma has been reciprocated with a negative image assigned
69 Tzvetan T odorov, The A buse o f  M em ory  (Paris: Arlea, ; 995), 56. Quoted in Paul R icoer, M emory, 
H istory, F orgettin g  (C hicago, 1L: University o f  C hicago, 2 0 0 4 ), 86.
70 O rville Schell, "China Reluctant to Lead," YaleG lohal. iviaich 1 1, 2009
71 Lei Guang, "Realpolitik N ationalism : International Sources o f  C hinese N ationalism ," M odern  China  31, 
no. 4 (2005 ): 498.
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by the foreign “other.” It is on the basis o f the stereotypical out-group intention that the 
progenitors o f the “China threat” thesis appraise China’s international character and 
gauge the motivation o f its behavior.
The rising tide o f acrimonious exchange between China and Japan provides a 
compelling annotation on the international reception o f the PRC’s victimization discourse.
With regard o f status politics, threat imputation implicated in the intergroup 
differentiation is “symbiotically interactive.”72 Given the unwieldy character o f historical 
grudge and the adversarial nationalisms in both countries, the two actors have identified 
each other as an “unforgivable other.”73 While frequently chastising Japan for being 
insufficiently repentant over the grave harms it brought to the Chinese nation, Beijing is 
perceived by Tokyo as a strategic rivalry competing for the stewardship o f regional
affairs. Insofar as anti-Japanese animus can be easily tapped by the projector o f the <
victimization discourse as a leverage for its political ends, such as discrediting Japan’s 4
moral qualification as an international actor, the excessive and disturbing hostility o f the j
Chinese populace toward the erstwhile colonial overlord has begot the repugnance o f the |
Japanese people, with many concluding that the nationalist hysteria in today’s China is
orchestrated by the CCP that is committed to exploiting the “guilt card” to extract Japan’s
concession 74 The everlasting xenophobic sentiments against Japan have reinforced
China’s outlier status assigned by Tokyo, which has hardened the latter’s diplomatic and
defense posture in response to Beijing’s burgeoning influence across Asia. In the vicious
72 Y ong D eng. "Reputation and the Security D ilem m a: China Reacts to the China Threat Theory ." in New  
D irection s in the S tudy o f  China's F oreign  P o licy , ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. R oss (Stanford,
CA: Stanford U niversity Press, 2 006), 191.
73 Yu Li and Y unxiang Liang, eds., W enming Sh ijiao  X ia D e Z hongri G uanxi [the  S ino-Japanese R elations 
in a  C iv iliza tio n a l P e rsp e c tiv e j  (H ongkong: X ia n g g a n g sh eh u i kexue ch u ban sh eyo u x ia n  zon gsi  [H ongkong  
Social Science Publishing C o.l, 2006), 259.
74 D enny R oy, "The Sources and Lim its o f  Sino-Japanese T ension s,” S u rviva l 47 , no. 2 (2005): 195. 204.
spiral o f  pernicious social categorization, the threat imputation to the '‘ot her''’ is 
concomitant with the magnification o f  the distipctiveness of the superior ‘se lf’'' Viewed 
in this vein, what Christopher Hughes calh. ‘ Japan’s remilitarization” is partly 
emboldened by domestic revisionist nationalist, discourse.75 Some Japanese far-right 
wingers, while decrying the apologetic view o f their country’s military past, openly 
glorify Japan’s war aggression and challenge the historical narratives prevalent in East 
Asia by counter-framing the Pacific War as a “sacred struggle for Asian liberation.”76 As 
evidenced in outburst o f  Chinese public outcry and nationalist upsurge in 2005, the 
approval o f Japanese history textbook, which were claimed to distort the history o f
Japan’s colonial imperialism, has added fuel to the flare-up o f  Sino Japanese tensions.
The undercurrents o f mutual antipathy have rendered the CCP reflective upon the 
weighty costs o f  the victimization discourse in its external legitimation. In actuality, the 
overreliance on the “othering” sign to represent China’s moral identity has engendered its 
political estrangement from major powers and neighboring states. Considering the CCP’s 
aversion to the dire security landscape o f external coalitional containment that would 
abort its modernization drive, the denigration o f China’s international reputation has 
necessitated substantial adjustment in the rhetoric package o f Beijing’s diplomacy. In 
combating the discriminatory response from the concoctor o f the “China threat” thesis 
and legitimizing the PRC’s upward mobility, some strategic thinkers in Beijing’s foreign 
policy establishment proposed the notion o f “peaceful rise” (hepingjueqff—a key 
watchword o f the PRC’s diplomacy that was revised later by the top leaders as “peaceful
75 Christopher W. H ughes, Japan's R em ilitarisa tion  (Oxford & New.York: Routiedge for International 
Institute 2008).
76 Shunji Cui, "Problems o f  N ationalism  and Historical M emory in China’s Relations with Japan," Journal 
o f  H istorica l S ocio logy  25, no. 2 (2012,): 215-16 . A lso  see Keniehi Goto, Tensions o f  E m pire: Japan  a n d  
Southeast A sia  in the C o lo n ia l a n d  Postco lon ia l W orld  (Athens, OH: O hio University Press, 2003). 290.
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development” (heping fazhan), out o f  the profound concern that the term “rise” would 
convey a disturbing connotation o f China’s global activism to an alarmed external 
audience.77
The ascension and swift modification o f the “peaceful” thesis is by no means the 
CCP’s political expediency. In addition to its utility in the interna! legitimation o f the 
state, strategic narratives do not just play an auxiliary role in the diplomatic project o f 
shaping China’s role conception and rebuilding its public image in the international arena. 
To effectively dilute its intransigence displayed in the raucous frays with the foreign 
“other”— the target audience o f  the "peaceful” narrative, a gentler moral identity other 
than a victim state seeking historical redress is sorely needed to signal the pacific nature 
o f China’s emergence in the international arena. The “symbolic reserve” that the CCP 
appropriates for this end is Chinese civilizational root— Confucianism. In the selective 
interpretation o f the indigenous discourse, some o f the core values o f  Confucianism with 
contemporary relevance to Chinese foreign relations are framed into a rehabilitated 
narrative paradigm, which orients the reconfiguration o f identity narrative so as to 
reshape China’s external image. As Lene Hansen cogently argues, “foreign policies rely 
on representations o f  identity, but it is also through the formulation o f foreign policy that 
identities are produced and reproduced.” 78 To provide a cultural underpinning o f 
Beijing’s peaceful diplomacy, Confucian China’s benign history is articulated as a 
metonym, bestowing credible meanings upon a fresh international identity o f  the PRC
7/ See, e.g ., Bonnie S. G laser and Evan S. M edeiros, "The Changing E cology o f  Foreign P olicy  M aking in 
China: T he A scen sio n  and D em ise o f  the Theory o f  P eacefu l Rise'," The C hina Q u arterly  190, no. 291 -3 1 0  
(2007).
78 Lene H ansen, S ecu rity  a s  P ra c tice : D isco u rse  A n alysis a n d  the B osn ian  W ar (London, UK: R outiedge, 
2 0 0 6 ), 1.
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state that is in tandem with the pragmatic approach to defusing longstanding tensions and 
thorny conflicts.
In the social philosophy o f Confucianism, two interrelated notions centering on 
the concept o f  harmony (he), among others, are held up as an exemplar o f China’s 
culturalist role -playing on the foreign relations front. One is “harmony !s most precious” 
(he wei gui), a dictum historicizing Beijing’s conduct o f  foreign affairs in the time- 
honored tradition o f “Confucian pacifism .”79 Unlike the victimization discourse, which 
is framed in the symbolic representation o f the “chosen trauma” and naturally acquires 
the negative and reactive “sense o f entitlement” on the part o f a recalcitrant state standing 
ready for revenge, the harmony-centered Confucian discourse has visualized an amiable 
China with a peace-loving heritage on the foreign relations front. The international 
system that it envisages is encapsulated in another Confucian adage, that is, “harmony 
but without uniformity” (he er bu tong). In contrast to Huntington’s “clash of 
civilization” thesis, the Confucian preoccupation with harmony places a premium on the 
feasibility o f peace that can be achieved in a diverse and pluralistic global community
BOthrough the “adaptation, reconciliation and mutual tolerance” o f its constituencies. As 
Beijing is ultra-sensitivity to the specter o f the negative identification o f China’s 
dispositional traits, which it fears would agitate unfriendly image attribution and thus 
escalate into mutual hostilities, the ideal vision o f a world order based on the Confucian 
virtuous relationship casts its fcrmulator as a humanitarian acloi, featuring the moderate
79 Q ing Cao, "Confucian V ision  o f  a N ew  World Order? Culturalist D iscourse Foreign P olicy  and the Press 
in Contemporary China," The In ternational Com m unication G azette  6 9 , no. 5 (2007): 437.
80 "Confucian V ision o f  a N ew  W orld Order? Culturalist D iscourse, Foreign Policy and the Press in 
Contemporary China," The In ternational C om m unication G azette  69 , no. 5 (2007): 438. For Huntington s 
conflicting antithesis, see Samuel P. Huntington, 7 he C lash  o f  C iv iliza tion s a n d  the R em aking o f  W orld  
O rder  (N ew  York, N Y : Sim on & Schuster. 1996).
and conciliatory approach to foreign affairs in an attempt to assuage the apprehension and 
distrust o f China’s rise.
In terms o f normative evaluation, an inter-textual allusion suggested in the
harmony-based diplomatic rhetoric is the comparison o f China’s moral high ground with 
the hegemonic and democracy-exporting Westphalian international system. Just as 
Gilbert Rozman states in his testimony on Beijing’s security discourse, the Confucian 
icon is elevated “as the centerpiece in an ideologically tinged narrative about what has 
made China superior to other civilizations over thousands o f years and will enable it to
c  1
prevail again in the future.” China’s civilizational attraction signified in the diplomatic 
syntax panders to the nationalist impulse o f its domestic audience
However, the realignment o f strategic narratives with the recaptured Confucian 
value is not a panacea to abate the external clamor o f “China threat” argument. In the 
cases where historical disgruntlement come to the stage, the CCP often finds itself in a 
bind: On the one hand, it needs to pursue a pragmatic diplomacy directed at. an external 
audience suspicious o f its power aspiration, while on the other hand, it has to appease the 
strident domestic public opinion. Such a scenario unveils the autonomy o f text receivers 
in selecting a narrative frame that fits into their “existing belief [system],”82 which in turn 
structures the diplomatic behavior o f the narrator.
Here, one needs to note the irreconcilable contradiction between the Confucian 
notion o f a harmonious world and the victimization discourse narrated to enact the moral 
justification o f the PRC’s aspiration for a deserved international status. As will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 4, Chinese collective, memory of imperialist invasion and
81 Gilbert R o z m a n ,11 Written Testim ony for the Hearing on China's Narratives Regarding National Security 
Policy " (W ashington, D.C.: U .S.-C hina Econom ic and Security R eview  C om m ission. 2011).
82 Entman, "Framing: Toward Clarification o f  a Fractured Paradigm," 53.
the derived territorial concession has made Beijing's foreign policy making 
hypersensitive to the integrity o f sovereignty and territorialit y. According to Dante! Bar - 
Tai, the collective beliefs o f victimization, with a focus on the atrocities perpetrated by 
the out-group, and hence the dedication to the in-group are important sources of 
“ethos.”83 In the animosity-building situations where the public memory o f 
dismemberment and subjugation is readily retrieved from the victimization discourse, 
such “ethos” entails preserving a cohesive nation, safeguarding the state sovereignty, and 
upholding national honor at all cost. These social actions taken by the members o f the 
Chinese nation to dislodge external provocation involves the underlying assumption of
irreconcilable conflict with the foreign “other’ infringing China’s territorial integrity, 
which is ever present in the PRC’s diplomatic disputes. However, the role conception of 
the states in the harmonious world that is informed by the Confucian cultural value 
constrains the antagonistic actions among the member states, “to the extent that the [they] 
denounce [their self-interests] so that the group and its internal harmony can be 
cherished.”84 Apparently, in the normative environment o f Beijing’s foreign policy 
making, the appropriate behavior determined by the Chinese “ethos” is anathema to the 
Confucian notion o f harmony. The “peaceful” thesis o f Chinese diplomacy may thus be 
abhorred its domestic receivers. Inasmuch as their interpretation o f flashpoint diplomatic 
issues is heavily supported by the “chosen trauma” frame, the domestic response to • 
Confucian diplomatic rhetoric may well transcend the framing intention o f the Chinese 
leadership
83 Daniel Bar-Tal, Shared  Beliefs in a  S ociety: S ocia l P sych o log ica l A nalysis  (London. Sage, 2000).
84 Chih-yu Shih and Jiwu Yin, "Between Core National Interest and a Harm onious World: Reconstructing 
Self-R ole C onceptions in Chinese Foreign Policy." Phe Chinese Journal o f  Internationa! P olitics  6, no. ! 
(2013): 65.
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This line o f  reasoning can accounts for the failed attempt o f some liberal 
intellectualists to bring “new thinking’’ to China’s diplomacy toward Japan. In late 2002, 
having w itnessed the swelling o f virulent popular nationalism, P eople’s Daily journalist 
Ma Licheng lamented in an influential journal the misleading effect o f Chinese media on 
the parochial public opinion toward Japan, which he viewed as an obstacle to an 
improved relation between China and its neighboring states.85 Echoing M a’s advocacy of 
downplaying the apology diplomacy in the bilateral relations, Shi Yinhong, a realpolitik 
scholar at Renmin University o f  China, suggested Beijing’s rapprochement with Tokyo 
through shelving history issues and seeking a comprehensive partnership with Japan to 
counter U.S. hegemony in East Asia.86 Almost predictably, the “new thinking” ignited a 
remarkable flurry o f nationalist backlash. With the heightened “emotional schema” 
pervading in the in-group community and the oversimplified group categorization, the 
two iconic figures, Ma Licheng and Shi Yinhong, found themselves under vitriolic 
attacks. Ma, branded as a “traitor” to China, even received death threats that prompted
87him to move to Hong Kong. Since Japan-bashers got the upper hand in the ensuing 
heated debate, those sharing a similar view on the “cool diplomacy” toward Japan with 
Ma and Shi had to keep a low profile. Just as one Chinese scholar flatly explained their 
reticence, “W e’ll be regarded as traitors if we say anything positive about Japan. We 
may even be blacklisted .”88
8' L.icheng Ma, "Duiri G uanxi X in Siw ei: Zhongri M injian Zhiyu [N ew  T hinking or. Sino-Japanese  
Relations: W orries o f  Peoples].'' S tra teg y  a n d  M anagem ent /Z h a n lu e y u  g u a n li]  6 (2002).
86 Y inhong Shi, "Zhongri Jiejin Y u W aijiao G em ing' [Sino-Japanese Rapprochem ent and 'D iplom atic  
Revolution']," ib id .2 (2003).
87 G ries. "China's 'N ew  Thinking' on Japan," 838-39 .
88 Strait T im es, "China: B eijing Tightens Control on D om estic R eporting on Japan," O ctober 4, 2004.
The, social resistance encountered by the short-lived “new thinking’'' exemplifies' 
how an alternative narrative recommending a cure io the deter iorating Sino-Japanese 
relations is considered heresy to the “ethos” o f memory- encoded norms. Whether or not 
Ma and Shi were nudged to express their viewpoints by the decision- making circle, the 
fact that their provocative articles were published shortly after the fourth generation o f 
the CCP leadership came into office suggested Beijing’s intention o f dousing anti- 
Japanese sentiments that would derail the bilateral relations.89 Such a credible signal 
indicated that Beijing’s desire for a prudent and carefully calibrated set o f reaction to 
navigate away from confrontation with Japan. Nevertheless, once the Japanese out­
group’s affronts that are. perceived as a blatant offense to Chinese sensibilities— for 
instance, its motion o f  purchasing the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the Prime 
M inisters’ pilgrimages to the Yasukuni Shrine, a symbolic center o f the state 
institutionalization o f  war dead— come under the spotlight, the Chinese “ethos” reified as 
sovereignty, territoriality, and national dignity are socially recognized as the “dominant 
national ideas” about “what the nation should  do .”90
Insofar as the Chinese public bases its assessment o f  the state’s diplomatic 
performance on these ethical criteria, Beijing’s desire to tone down contentious history 
issues is rendered unwarranted. As the attention o f domestic audience is decidedly 
bounded by memory-based “ethos,” rather than the judicious calculation o f presenting 
China's benevolent image informed by the Confucian harmonious account, the state’s 
accommodationist stance does not squarely fit the normative paradigm that has figured
89 Jian Zhang, "The Influence of Chinese N ationalism  or. Sino-Japanese Relations," in China-Japan  
R elations in the Twenty-Firs! Century: C rea tin g  a Future Hast'?, ed. M ichael H eazle arid N ick  Knight 
(Cheltenham , UK & Northampton, M A: Edgar Publishing, 2007), 29..
90 Jeffrey W . Legro, "What China W ill Want: The Future Intentions o f  a R ising Power," P erspectives on 
P olitics  5, no. 3 (2007): 522, 23.
prominently in the popular imagery. Given the narrated role o f an indefatigable defender 
o f  the Chinese nation, which distinguishes the CCP from those incompetent regimes 
permitting the transgression o f China’s sovereign whole, the diplomatic treatment
recommended by the pacific discourse carries a strong risk o f abrading the regime’s 
mnemonic legitimacy. Viewed in this sense, not only does the victimization discourse 
shape the public expectation of the state’s diplomatic behavior, it also creates an 
ideational structure that is capable o f  arresting the dexterity o f  Beijing in handling crisis 
situations. Beijing’s intention to reaffirm the civilizational line o f  its diplomatic tradition 
is incompatible with its adherence to the domestic “ideational codes.”
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CH APTER IV  
M E M O R Y -E N C O D E D  A N D  IDENTITY -C O N STITU TIV E N O R M S. 
EM O TIO N A L R EPR ESEN TA TIO N  IN CH IN ESE FOREIGN  
R ELA TIO N S'
Not Ideas, but material interests, directly govern 
men's conduct. Yet very frequently the "world 
images ” that have been created by "ideas ” have, 
like switchmen, determined the tracks along which 
action has been pushed by the dynamic o f  interest.
— Max Weber2
[The] primary role o f  emotion in humans is to alert 
the individual experiencing the emotion that action 
in some situation is necessary and to motivate or 
energize that action.
Jefferson A. Singer and Peter Salovey3
In the normative environment o f the PRC’s diplomacy, collective memory and 
national identity, which are mutually constitutive in the enterprise o f Chinese nationalism, 
are two ideational factors shaping Beijing’s foreign policy making and the external 
behavior o f the Chinese state. In Chapter 3, the examination o f state-centric strategic 
narratives, contextual ized in the mythmaking o f the CCP regime’s patriotic education, 
employs the rational choice approach. Along this inquiry line, the ideational variables o f 
memory and identity, as the raw materials o f the CCP’s strategic narratives, are in
1 This chapter contains materials o f  N ing Liao, "Dualistic Identity, M em ory-Encoded Norm s, and State 
Em otion. A  Social Constructivist A ccount o f  China's Foreign Relations," E ast Asia: An In ternational 
Q uarterly  30 , no. 2 (7013): 139-60.
2 M ax W eber, "The Social P sychology o f  the W orld Religions." in F r o n M a x  W eber: E ssays in S ocio logy , 
ed. H. H. Gerth and C. W right M ills (London and N ew  York; R outiedge. 1991), 28ti.
3 Jefferson A . Singer and Peter Salovey, The R em em bered  Self: Emotion a n d  M em ory in P ersona lity  (N ew  
York, N Y : The Free Press, 1993), 12.2.
essence constructed by the rational political actor to foster popular support for the 
authoritarian state and thus to achieve its desired domestic and foreign policy outcome.
In an effort to test the social-cultural interpretation o f Chinese foreign policy behavior 
against rational and material explanation, the following two chapters (Chapters 4 and 5) 
represent an conceptual move from the rational-choice analytic paradigm., in which the 
two ideational constructs mentioned above are treated as the intervening variables 
between the rationality o f  authoritarian state in its regime legitimacy enhancement and 
the outcome o f its domestic and foreign policy agendas, to the historical-institutional 
approach.
As the independent variables in the alternative analytic framework, historically- 
constructed institutions are capable o f structuring the rationality o f  political actors and 
their behavior in the policymaking process. In the attempt o f this dissertation to chart out 
the causal mechanism in which collective memory and national identity shape the 
conception o f China’s diplomatic interests and behavior, two empirical questions are 
central to the historical-institutional analysis o f Chinese foreign policy making: First, 
how did collective memory and national identity gain their prominence in Chinese 
political imaginary? Second, how do the social norms inherent in these historical 
institutions take on a life o f  their own? Put another way, how are the ideational 
motivations o f Chinese foreign policy behavior institutionalized in the indigenous 
political culture? Centering on these focal points o f memory and identity, this chapter 
delves into the formation o f these two important components o f  Chinese nationalism and 
their normative and affective dimensions on the foreign relations front.
With the analytic lens o f political sociology that views the state as a social actor 
interacting with its counterparts in the international society, this chapter starts with the 
delineation o f  the construction o f the Chinese national Identity in two distinctive cultural 
institutional contexts. The process tracing o f the origin o f Chinese nationalism contours 
the way that the adversarial aspects o f  the Chinese nationhood, or national identity, were 
forged in its dramatic positional change in the transformation from the tianxia (all-under- 
heaven) order to the Westphalian system. In such an external setting where ideational 
factors came to the fore o f  Chinese political life, the second section canvasses the 
constitutive and regulative meanings o f  the col lective identity, which compose a 
normative paradigm o f Chinese foreign policy choice. In order to spells out the causal 
pathway by which the purposive element o f the Chinese national identity have constituted 
the social norm underpinning the state’s purposive actions in the international arena, this 
section also examines China’s tenacious struggle for national rejuvenation, a social action 
that is seen as the constant theme in the vicissitudes o f the nation-state, from the 
performative perspective o f the national identity. By looking at how the identity- 
constitutive norms, or the “ideational codes”4 embedded in the Chinese collective 
memory, have informed the instrumental awareness o f the state, and are thus linked to the 
state’s preference in the foreign policy choice, the second part o f the chapter carves out 
the institutionalization process o f  the ideational factors motivating the PRC’s diplomacy. 
Turning to the affective dimension o f the national identity, the third part'of the chapter 
pinpoints the formation and representation o f Chinese identity predicament and the 
derived emotion o f the Chinese state in its social practice o f aspiring for the great-power
4 Elkins and Sim eon, "A Cause in Search o f l t s  Effect, or W hat,D oes Political Culture Explain? " 128.
A lso  see  Roger M. K eesing, "Theories o f  Culture," Annual Review o f  A n th ropology  3( 1974): 77.
status. Drawing on the intergroup emotions theory, this part attempts to tease out the 
mechanism wherein the group-based emotion serves as a cognitive scaffold for the 
perception and behavior o f the Chinese state members in their interaction with the foreign
“other.”
SELF-OTHER INTERACTION: CULTURAL-INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF THE 
NATIONAL IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION
While it is a political phenomenon existing in all types o f political systems, 
nationalism is exhibited in various fashions in different political cultures. With regard to 
China, as Lucian Pye, an eminent China scholar, noted as early as the 1960s, patriotic 
Chinese in the twentieth century, be they Communist or nationalist, were more ardent in 
detailing “the real and imagined ways in which China [had] been humiliated by others” 
than other former colonial or semi-colonial countries.5 Whereas in the era o f Mao, 
charismatic appeals and heroic glory were one o f the overriding themes o f the state- 
crafted nationalist discourse, in contemporary China, both the political elites and the 
masses, as Pye observes, “continue to dwell on the idea that they were years ago grossly 
and cruelly mistreated by others, and consequently they have a huge burden o f 
humiliation.”6 The constant reference to national humiliation, so much at odds with the 
celebration o f  China’s historical greatness showcased in the opening ceremony o f the 
Beijing Olympics, can be attributed to a peculiar statehood and nationhood, constructed 
in the institutional and cultural context o f the interaction between the Chinese “se lf ’ and 
the foreign “other.”
5 Lucian W . Pye, The S p irit o f  Chinese P o litic s; A .P sychocu ltura! S tu dy o f  the A u thority C risis in P o litica l 
D evelopm en t (Cambridge. M A: M.I.T. Press, 1968), 71-72 .
6 "China: N ot Your Typical Superpower," P rob lem s o f  P o st Com m unism  43 . no. 4 (1996): 12.
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According to modernization theorists, a nation can oe analyzed terms o f a  host 
o f stable indicators shared by the members o f a group or community- --for instance, 
history culture, language, customs, and territory---on the basis of which the group or 
community asserts its identity. The Chinese national identity, conventionally determined 
by the genealogy one is bom into, is first and foremost comprehended in the analytic 
paradigm o f ethnic nationalism (minzu zhuyi), rather than that o f state nationalism (guojia 
zhuyi)1 The focus on ethnicity echoes what David George calls the “involuntarist” 
approach to nationality,8 on the premise that nationality is an objective entity 
characterized by an array o f racial attributes. With regard to Chinese nationalism, these
given characteristics include, as asserted by SunYat-sen, one o f the iconic figures o f the 
Chinese nationalist pantheon, all the traits o f Chinese ethnicity— ‘ common blood, 
common language, common religion, and common customs”—that have rendered the 
* Han people “a single, pure race.”9 Behind the ascriptive vision of the Chinese national
i identity, it should be noted, is the discernible sense o f cultural superiority constructed
within a specific social structure. The distinctive ‘selfhood” held and projected by the 
Chinese is, in accordance with the analytic apparatus o f identity proposed by Rawi 
Abdelal and his colleague, forged in the “relational comparisons” between the in-group 
Chinese and the out-group foreigners, the interactions o f  which have composed the social 
reality o f  the Chinese foreign relations.'0 While the primordial dimension o f national 
identity is a given in social life, the nobility o f the “single, pure race” o f  the Chinese is
7 fam es T ow nsend, "Chinese Nationalism," The Australian. Journal o f  Chinese A ffairs 27(1992):
8 David G eorge, "National Identity and National Self-D eterm ination,” in N ational Rights, In ternational 
O bliga tion s, ed. Sim on Caney. David G eorge, and Peter Jones (Boulder, CO: W estview , 1996)
9 Yat-sen Sun, The Three P rincip les o f  the P eople: San M in Chu  / ,  trans. Frank W. Price (Taipei: China 
Publishing C o m p a n y ,!9 2 4 ), 5.
10 A bdelai et a!., "Identity as a Variable," 698.
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enacted and reinforced in its interactive relationship with other collective identities. 
Chinese civilization, an ideational source o f its national identity, is conceptualized in the 
self-other dialectic throughout Chinese history.
This dynamic is captured in R. B. J. W alker’s proposition that politics is 
predicated upon a “sharp delineation o f here from there.” 11 In actuality, the demarcation
o f boundaries may not be in the geographical sense, but is exhibited in a myriad o f
divisions inscribing the inside and the outside.L> In retrospect, while the pre-modern
Chinese attained cultural superiority from its envisioned central position in the world, the
Sino-centric worldview was largely based on the interrelated dichotomy o f self and other.
Since all the entities at the fringe o f the Middle Kingdom were regarded as less-favored
groups, the primordial notion o f China was epitomized in the tianxia order, a hierarchical
model o f  concentric zonation.11 In his incisive discussion o f  Sino-centrism, Samuel Kim
elaborates the key characteristics o f  the institutional system o f tianxia:
[The Sino-centric] world order was a concentric extension of the 
hierarchical principle which prevailed in the domestic social structure o f the 
Middle Kingdom. It was a system o f ‘interstate’ relations unto itself with 
its own rules o f the game. It was not a system o f international relations in 
the modern European sense, w'hose stability was maintained by the balance 
o f power among more or less equal member states. It was instead a system 
o f hierarchical harmony enforced by the preponderance o f  power and virtue 
anchored in China.14
11 R. B. J. W alker, Inside'O utside: In ternationa! R ela tion s as P o litic c l Theory  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
U niversity  Press, 1993), ix.
12 G aston Bachelard, The P o litics o f  S p ace  (B oston , M A: B eacon  Press, 1994), 211 . 17-18.
n A ccording to the historiography on the glorification o f  C hinese civ ilization , other contemporary states at 
that tim e, such as Korea, V ietnam , and Japan, were all cast under the pow er shadow  o f  Chinese culture. 
Thus, the lack o f  any rival civ ilization  w as a primary factor ;n the developm ent, o f  the Sino-centric 
w orldview . See Norton G insberg. "On the C hinese Perception o f  a W orld Order," iri Cttina in Crisis, 
Column 2: China's P o lic ies in A sia  a m i A m erica’s A lte rn a tiv es , ed. Tang Tsou (C hicago, I f :  University o f  
C hicago Press, 1968).
14 Sam uel S. K im , China, the U n ited  N ations, a n d  W orld  O rder  (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
1979), 23.
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The. tianxia order is in stark contrast to the Westphalian interstate system, a 
decentralized political order defined by the Icga* equality among its constituencies. In all 
Its ramifications, the Sino-centric system was uniquely marked by its moral hierarchy and ; 
a centripetal tendency o f  movement toward the symbolic center o f a ritualistic society.
An archetypal example o f such Sino-centric cosmology is the harmonious and 
hierarchical relationship between the Middle Kingdom and those countries it deemed as 
culturally interior on the circumference, one that was instituted through the tribute 
system— a quasi-international order centering around and governed by China.15 Within 
this institutional mechanism, China— the most powerful state in East Asia in the moral, 
material, and cultural sense— was held accountable for the actions o f those states over 
which it claimed suzerainty. In return, Chinese emperors received confirmation o f their
leadership from their vassal states, whose rulers or envoys would perform rituals and
present gifts to show deference and submissiveness in their periodic missions to the 
Celestial Empire.
With respect to identity politics, Chinese narcissistic cultural superiority, the 
positive dimension o f the national identity is demonstrated in its interactions with the 
peripheral countries. Ruled by the “Son o f Heaven”- -a  “cardinal point in the universal 
continuum” and the “apex o f [Chinese] civilization”— w  ho exercised d e  j u r e ,  if  not 
always de f a c i o ,  reign and rule over all human affairs ,1'’ China was envisioned as the sole 
prominent actor a* the center o f  the Confucian international society. Unlike the 
Westphalian system, which took for granted the equality o f the constituent sovereign
15 John King Fairbank, China: A Vevv H istory  (Cambridge, M A: Harvard University Press, 1992).
16 Mark M aneall, " The C itin g  Tribute System : A n Interpretive Essay," ir. The C hinese W orld O rder: 
T raditional China's F oreign R ela tion s , ed. John King Fairbank (Cambridge, M A: Harvard University Press. 
1968), 63 .
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nation 'States, the tribute system was modeled on the ‘‘asymmetry and interdependence o f 
the superior/inferior relationship,”17 with emphasis put upon the prestige o f the primary 
state in the hierarchic social order and the legitimacy o f  this ranking order collectively 
accepted by the secondary states.
To a large extent, the moral justification o f  China’s preponderant position— or the 
“noncoercive command,” to borrow David Lake’s words,18— that the Chinese empire 
attained, was founded on the credible commitment it made as not to exploit the secondary 
states in the tribute system .19 In this sense, the ritualized and institutionalized form in 
which the self-other dynamic manifested itself in the tribute system was essentially an 
incarnation c f  Confucian patriarchy. To be more specific, the social nature o f the stabie 
hierarchy formed in the tianxia order reflected the Confucian principles o f  li (ritual) and 
renai (benevolence) that the tributary' homage was morally subject to.20 The consensus |
on these ceniral paradigmatic norms, which originated from the ethical tenets guiding the 
hierarchical relationship in Chinese society and later underpinned the interstate order, (
contributed to the legitimation o f China’s social status in the tribute system and the \
stability o f  the tianxia order. In that it incorporated the normative architecture of 
Confucianism formalized in the relations between the Chinese empire and those 
peripheral states, the ideational structure o f the tianxia order was constitutive o f the 
differentiated positions in the society o f pre-modern states. Although the idea o f 
nationalism resting on the Western concept o f  nation-state had not yet been introduced to
17 Jam es L. He via, C h erish in g  M en fro m  Afar: Q ing Q uest R itu a l a n d  the M a cartn ey  E m bassy o f  1793  
(Durham, NC: D uke U niversity Press, 2 0 0 5 ), 124.
18 David A . Lake. "The N e w  Sovereignty in International Relations," In ternational S tud ies R eview  5, no. 3 
(2003)- 304.
19 David C, K ang, "Hierarchy and L egitim acy in International System s. T he Tribute System  in Early 
M odern East Asia," S ecu rity  S tud ies  19, no. 4 (2010): 592.
20 Y aqing Qin. "Why Is There N o  C hinese International R elations Theory?," In tern ational R elations o f  the 
A sia -P a c ific  7. no. 3 (2007): 323 . "Struggle for Identity: A Political P sych ology  o f  China's Rise," 2 5 ! -52.
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China during the era o f  tribute system, such an insfTutiorm1 and cvluiiraJ construct 
represented the ideal identity o f  China as a prominent power in the international society. 
The derived affective sense o f cultural superiority, enacted on the basis o f the self-other 
interaction in the Sino-centric tianxia system, lends support to Diftmcr and Kim’s 
proposition that the Chinese national identity is not “constructed, let alone enacted, in 
isolation.” 21
The boundaries denoting the political space o f the Chinese tianxia order were 
strictly cultural. The self-other division connate in the traditional Chinese national 
identity constitutes a fault line between “the [barbarian] steppe and China proper,” 
denoting the supremacy o f Chinese civilization as well as “the nature and authority” of 
the Chinese ruiership under the heaven22 This inter-cultural comparison, through which 
the superior dimension o f the Chinese national identity was molded, provided the frame 
o f reference for the conceptualization o f Chinese foreign relations in the institutional 
context o f  the tianxia order. Given that the idea o f nation-state sovereignty—-the 
cornerstone o f the Westphalian international system— was repugnant tc Chinese empires, 
one o f the distinguishing features o f  foreign affairs in the imperial China was the absence 
o f a foreign ministry, which was replaced with such institutions as the Board o f Rites 
(libit) or the Court o f  Colonial Affairs (lifanyuan) handling relations with non-Chinese 
groups.23 As indicated in the scant attention the tribute system paid to the territoriality o f  
the state, Chinese emperors, endowed with a divine moral “mandate" over the barbarian
21 Low ell D ittm erand Sam uel K im . "Whiter China’s Q uest for National Identity?,1 in China's Q uest f o r  
N ational Identity, ed. Lowell D itm m er and Samuel S. Kim (Ithaca and London Cornell University Press: 
1993), 240.
“  Arthur W aldron The G rea t W all o f  China: F rom  H istory  to  M yth  (Cambridge: C am bridge University  
Press, 1990), 90.
23 June T eufel Dreyer, China's P o litica l System : M odern ization  a n d  T radition , 8th ea . (B oston , M A: 
Pearson Longm an, 2012). 327.
neighbors, were inclined to view diplomacy as “giving expression externally to the same 
principles o f social and political order that were manifested internally within the Chinese 
state and society” ; and therefore, the foreign relations o f pre-modem China were, as
noted by John King Fairbank, “accordingly hierarchic and non-egalitarian, like Chinese
society itself.” 4̂ Guided by such a perception o f the outside world, Chinese imperialist 
rulers did not differentiate between foreign relations and domestic politics. For them, the 
demarcation o f these two arenas o f activities, if any, was demonstrated in the dichotomy 
between the positive “civilized se lf ’ and the negative “barbaric other.”
However, a state’s external and domestic environment and the national identity 
that it shapes are not monolithic. Variation in the cultural-institutional context can 
reconstruct the national identity. Correspondingly, in accordance with Claude Lefort’s 
proposition on the “fundamental indeterminacy ... of relations between ,ve//and other,“25 
the position o f the Chinese actor in the self-other dialectic is m flux. With the breaking 
out o f the Opium Wars, China’s prominent position and cultural supremacy in the tianxia 
order came to an abrupt end. A watershed in Chinese history, the wars ushered in the 
toe-to-toe contest between the Westphalian international system and the Sino-centric 
tribute system, and raised the curtain on China' s "century o f national humiliation.” As a 
result o f  a series o f military debacles o f the Qing court at the hands o f foreign aggressors 
and the surrender o f  its sovereignty, swaths o f Chinese territory were “carved up like a 
melon” (guafen) by foreign predators. Correspondingly, the tribute system was severely
24 John K ing Fairbank, "A Preliminary Framework," in The C h inese W orld  O r d e r  T raditional C h in a ’s 
F oreign R ela tion s , ed. John K ing Fairbank (Cambridge, M A: Harvard University Press, 1968), 2.
25 Claude Lefort, D em o cra cy  a n d  P o litica l Theory, trans. David M acey (M inneapolis. M N: U niversity o f  
M innesota Press, 1988), 19.em phasis in original.
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attacked and gave way to the treaty system , which destroyed the inst.iUiior.al m echanism  
of the tianxia ord er26 ■
In its haish clash with the Western powers, the im.ate confidence o f the Qing 
Empire in the validity and viability o f Smo-centiism was shattered In 1860, the Garden 
o f Perfect Splendor (yuanmmgyuan), the imperial palace compound in a northwestern 
suburb o f Beijing, was razed to the ground by Anglo-French forces. British officer 
Garnet Wolseley described this defeat as “the strongest proof o f [the United Kingdom’s] 
superior strength . . [It] served to undeceive all Chinamen in their absurd conviction of 
their monarch’s universal sovereignty.’ 27 Due to the demise o f the tribute system, the 
Middle Kingdom that had formerly basked in the warm glow o f  a self-indulgen*
perception o f invulnerability was degraded to a humiliated subordinate disdained by the 
i invading “barbarians” as the ‘ sick man o f East Asia” (dongya lingfu). Unlike their
* forefathers in the heyday o f the tianxia order, who would self-abase China as “ our
I inferior nation1 (biguo)” while referring to the tributaries as '“ your superior nation’
< (guiguo)” the late Qing emperors, confronted with the Western governments vying with
one another in their imposhion o f concessions and extraterritoriality upon the Manchu 
court, could not afford such “self-deprecation'’ in addressing foreigners.28 Apparently, 
China’s “sacred” self image was desecrated in the intergroup rivalry. Its iatal defeat in 
the inter-systemic contest introduced by the Opium Wars signaled the decisive shift in the 
Chinese national identity from the superiority dimension to the inferiority aspect. Such
“ Kim, China, the U n ited  Nations, a n d  W orld O rder, 30-37. M ancall, 'The Ch’ing Tribute System : An  
Interpretive Essay."
27 Garnet W olseley , Normative o f  the War w ith  C hina in I8 6 0 . To Which is  A d d e d  she A cco u n t o f  a  Short 
Residence with the Tai- P in g  Rebels a t Nankin a n d  a Voyage fro m  Thence to H ankow , vol. Longm an, Green, 
Longman, and Roberts (London, 1862), 281.
28 Gries, China's N ew  N ationalism : Pride, P o litics, a n d  D ip lom acy. 9.
identity conversion provided the Chinese political actor with an impetus of forceful 
retribution in the intergroup relationship and an ideational pointer to address the 
sociopolitical challenges encountered in the transformed cultural-institutional 
environment.
“ IDEATIONAL CAUSALITY”29: STATE’S PURPOSIVE ACTION GUIDED BY 
SOCIAL NORMS
The agency o f the state actor and the social environment in which national 
identity is constructed are mutually constitutive. Variation in the external and domestic 
contexts, as some constructivists point out, will affect “contingent properties (identities, 
interests, and capabilities)” o f political actors.J J Since the relationship between the 
Chinese “se lf ’ and the foreign “other” was significantly altered by the defeat o f  the 
tianxia order by the Westphlian system, China began a steady decline in the late 19lh 
cent ury and plunged into chaos, the presuppositions o f  Chinese political elites about the 
international setting was restructured, which, in turn, shaped the objectives o f  the Chinese 
state actor and opened up alternative paths for the enhancement o f  its capabilities to 
withstand the competition among modern nation-states. The qualitative shift o f the 
national identity from superiority to inferiority aroused self-reflection by Chinese 
political elites regarding questions as to “why China [was] weak and how'it [could] be
The notion o f ‘‘ideational causality” is quoted in A rm ika B jo rk d a h l "N orm s in In ternational Relations: 
Som e C o n cep tu a l a n d  M eth o d o lo g ica l R eflections,"  C am bridge R eview  o f  In tern ational R e la tion s 15, no. I 
(2002)., a  re v iew  e ssa y  on the stu d y  o f  norm s in in tern a tion a l re lations.
30 Ronald L. Jepperson, A lexander W endt, and Peter J. K atzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in 
N ational Security," in The C ulture o f  N a tion a l Security: N orm s a n d  Identity-• in W orld  P o litic s . ed. Peter J. 
K atzenstein (N ew  York, N Y : C olum bia U niversity Press, 1996), 41.
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strong, about lost territory and about reclaiming a If-ading position in '.he-world.”31 
China';, intelligentsia commenced a restless search for a C.ss aggrieved persona in their 
encounter with the Western actors.
At the early stage of identity reconstruction, the humiii.i<lon: incurred as a result 
o f foreign encroachments were, due to the entrenched ethnic fissures between the 
Manchu rulers and their Han subjects, attributed to the incompetency o f the Qing court as 
opposed to the waning o f the Chinese nation 32 China's humiliating defeat by Japan in 
the first Sino-Japanese War, which heralded “a conclusion to the brightest hopes o f the 
era o f  self- strengthening, ”j3 not only accelerated the collapse o f  the Qing dynasty, but 
aiso triggered the contemplation in the national community o f  a practical means tc 
rejuvenate China Disillusioned with the rosy dream o f national rejuvenation through 
self-strengthening,34 some intellectuals o f  the late Qing realized that China had fallen 
prey to the immutable pattern o f  evolution that applied to all civilizations. But they still 
held out the possibility o f the state’s survival in the complex international environment, 
with an appeal to the Western concept o f  nation-state. In leading the nationalist cause, 
political elites attempted to syncretize the exotic theories imported from China’s 
subjugators with the indigenous conditions. Thus, the notion o f sovereignty seeped into 
Chinese political thinking. Making China a unified nation and forging a cohesive 
political system out o f  what Sun Yat-sen called the ‘sheet o f  loose sand” iyipan sarnha)
31 Andrew Nathan and Robert R oss, The G rea t W all a n d  the Empty Fortress: China's Search f o r  Security  
(N ew  York: W . W . Norton, 1997), 34.
32 Frank DikOtter, The D iscourse  o f  Race in  M odern C hina  (Stanford, CA- Stanford U nviersity Press, 
1992), 20 -30 . A m ong others, also see John King Fuirbank. 7he G reat C hinese Resolution: 1800 -1985 
(New''York, N Y : Harper Perennial, 1987).
33 Jonathan D. Spence, The Search  f o r  M odern  Chm a  (N ew  York, N Y  W W. Honor., 1 9 9 1 ),2 2 4 .
M In their struggle for an ideal national identity and international status,‘ som e offic ia ls in the Q ing court, 
with the b e lie f  that C hinese values w ere superior w hile the W estern technologies could  be utilized for  
China to regain its identity as a strong power, initiated the self-strengthening m ovem ent {yangw u yundong).
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was recognized by the Chinese political elites as the only viable means for it to survive in 
a Social Darwinist world. Motivated by the goal o f saving the nation. Sun advocated the 
adoption o f nationalism and cried out to his compatriots:
We [the Chinese people] are the poorest and weakest state in the world, 
occupying the lowest position in international affairs; the rest o f  mankind 
is the carving knife and the serving dish, while we are the fish and the 
meat. Our position now is extremely perilous; if we do not earnestly 
promote nationalism and weld together our four hundred millions into a 
strong nation, we face a tragedy— the loss o f our country and the 
destruction o f our race. To ward off this danger, we must espouse 
nationalism and employ the national spirit to save the country.35
The 1911 Revolution led by Sun and his cohorts eventually demolished the
millennia-old imperial system. While the ensuing warlordism and the chronic division of
the state were inimical to Sun’s goal, they brewed another epoch-making event, the May
Fourth Movement. In accordance with the Versailles Treaty signed at the Paris Peace
1
Conference, Germany s China concessions were transferred to Japan. The continued
<
experience o f being ‘‘carved like a melon” inspired humiliation that was similarly felt by '
a large number o f Chinese citizens. The student protest in May 1919 and the New ^
I
Culture Movement gained ground among intellectuals who were dismayed at the failure 
o f  the new Republic to revitalize China and return it to a dignified state.36
In this sort o f  social movements, which was aimed at overthrowing a regime that 
was accused o f  kowtowing to foreign demands and was perceived as incompetent for 
safeguarding national territoriality and state sovereignty, national identity was 
“actualized” in the actions o f the members of the Chinese state. Inferring from Judy
35 Sun, The Three P rincip les o f  the P eople: San Min Chu  /, 12.
56 For how  the C hinese nationalism  appeared to reach its zenith form in the M ay Fourth M ovem ent, see 
Rana M itler, A B itter Revolution China's S truggle with the M odern W orld■ (Oxford: Oxford University  
Press. 2005), 119-25.
139
Sutler's conception oPperform ativity to identity," 31 one can srgue tte t the identity of 
the Chinese nation-state was enacted, as Sun Yat sen appealed, through the collective- 
action o f preserving the Chinese race and p; eventi ng the destruction o f the state in the
• jo
“extremely perilous” moment. One o f the “ontological effects” o f this social practice is 
that the structural relationship between state sovereignty and the nation was incorporated 
into the reconstitution of a powerful and unified China. Recognized as the normative 
value that was o f central importance in defining what “China” should be in the 
transformed cultural-institutional setting, the Westphalian concepts o f autonomous 
sovereign and indivisible territory were thus ‘ structurated/’ to use Anthony Gidden’s
o n  »
words, as a social norm that has ever since been engrained in a non-Western society 
haunted by the bitter memory o f foreign aggression and territorial secession.
i In the constructivist school o f IR, norms have both defining and regulative effects
1
i in their guidance of political actors’ behavior.40 In terms o f the defining sense, social
norms, which specify the practice that will “bring respect and approval (or disrespect and 
disapproval) from oneself and others,” can be understood as the “prescriptive accounts” 
constituting the identity o f political actors.41 Over the past century and a half, various 
reform and revolutionary movements mobilizing for the cause o f Chinese national 
salvation — from Sun Yat- sen’s search for an independent Chinese nation-state, to
37 Judy Butler, G ender Trouble: Feminism a n d  the Subversion o f  Identity  (N ew  York, N Y : Rotledge, 1999).
38 Cynthia W eber, "Performative States,” Millennium: Journal o f  International S tudies  27, no. i (1998): 78.
39 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution o f  Society: O utline o f  the Theory o f  S tructuration  (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1984).
40 See., e.g ., Katzenstein. "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives ort National Security," 5. BjOrkdahl, 
"Norms in Internationa! Relations. Som e Conceptual and M ethodological Reflections," 15-16. N icholas  
Onuf, The W orld o f  O ur M aking  (Columbia, SC University o f  South Carolina Press, 1989).
41 Paul Kowsrt and Jeffrey Legreo, "Norms, Identity, and Their-Limits: A Theoretical Reprise," in The 
Culture o f  N ational Security: N orm s a n d  Identity in Wot id  P olitics , ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (N ew  York,
NY : Columbia University Press, 1996), 453. Francesca Cancian, What A re N orm s? A S tudy o f  B eliefs and  
A ction in a  M aya Com m unity  (N ew  York, N Y : Cambridge University Press, 1975), 6.
Chiang Kai -shek’s attempt to unify China, to Mao Zedong’s mass-based movement to 
overthrow the “three mountains” o f imperialism, feudalism-colonialism, and bureaucratic 
capitalism— have all cohered around the persistent quest for sovereign independency and 
territorial integrity. In the interactions o f  Chinese “se lf ’ and foreign “other,” the 
preservation o f a cohesive nation and its inseparable territories and the safeguarding o f 
state sovereignty at all costs have been valorized as “a quintessentially Chinese idea,” or 
the “constitutive norms” o f the Chinese national identity 42 As a leitmotif in the 
promotion o f the nationalist mission to cure what has been perceived as the weak, 
diseased national character, such practice provides the Chinese community with a 
validation o f its identity and thus earns the allegiance o f the group members o f  the 
nation-state.
The discourse o f  nationalism, which resembles a normative paradigm for the 
assessment o f the state’s policy, is simultaneously brought to bear on the state actor in a 
regulative fashion. In the enactment o f  the identity o f  the nation-state, social norms, 
although not necessarily defining specific policy option, provide the ethical foundation 
and a diffuse normative structure that delimits the boundaries and establishes the moral 
criteria for policy choices.43 Guided by these normative underpinnings, statesmen, as 
Puchaia and Hopkins assert, “nearly always perceive themselves as constrained by
4i Sam uel S. Kim, "Sovereignty in the Chinese Im age o i  W orld Order," in E ssays in H on or o f  W ang T ieya, 
ed. Ronald St. J.  M acdonald (London: M artinus N ig  ho f t  1994), 428; Abdelal et al., "Identity as a 
Variable," 697.
41 Jepperson, W endt, and K atzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in N ational Security," 54. Steven
Bernstein, "Ideas, Social Structure and the C om prom ise o f  Liberal Environm entalism ," E uropean  Jou rn al
o f  In tern ational R ela tion s  6, no. 4  (2000): 467.
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principles, norms, and rules that prescribe and proscribe v.irtetfof o f  behavior,” 'with 
limited leeway for improvisation 44 '
In the Chinese context, the absolutist notions of sovereignty 'and territoriality have 
served as the signposts shaping the policy agenda o f the onteniporaty authoritarian 
regime on the foreign relations front Only those foreign policies embracing the 
consensual social norms can be judged as ethical. In this sense, Beijing's foreign policy 
cannot be intelligible without taking into consideration the circumscription o f  social « 
norms that have been settled as domestic convention that regulate the stave s behavior.
The arena in which the CCP’s diplomacy is conducted is, according to Bruce Andrews' 
social constructivist approach, comparable to a stage o f performance where the “second- 
order purposive relationship ... of reciprocity” between the state and society is 
unfolded.45 On this symbolic stage, the normative justification o f the incumbent regime 
is largely dependent upon the regime’s commitment to following the diffuse social norms 
and its fulfillment o f the role prescribed by these norms.
Viewed in this light, Chinese nationhood cannot be discounted as simply a 
desideratum o f the state-building project. Take the Taiwan issue, one o f the thorns in 
Beijing’s side, for example. The unification of the island, a conviction that has taken the 
form o f a shased social norm, emblematizes a cohesive national polity Meeting the 
expectation o f the Chinese community has constituted a means for the Communist regime 
to preserve its 'nationalist legitimacy.”46 Not a single CCP leader could afford to stand
44 Donald I. Puchala and Raym ond F. Hopkins. "Internationa! R egim es: Lessons from inductive Analysis,"  
in ternational O rganizations 36, no. 2 (1982): ?.70.
45 Bruce A ndrew s, "Social R ules and the State as a Social Actor," W orld P o litics  2.7, i.-o. 4 <1975)' 573.
44 Elena A tanassova-C om elis, "Chinese N ation Building and Foreign P o lic y  Japan and the U .S . A s the 
Significant 'Others' in National Identity Construction." E ast Asia: An In ternational Q u arterly  29, no. 1 
(2012): 97.
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condemned in national history for shrinking from a fight to prevent Taiwan’s 
independence. It would be counterintuitive then for a “nationless state”47 to remain so 
steadfast in the mission of uniting the state and the nation under a single banner. In view
o f the “agency (state/regime)-principal (nation) relationship” between the state and 
nation,48 if  the state disregards the consensual norms and its diplomatic performance 
deviates from the rule o f conduct widely shared in the domestic society, it has to face the 
loss o f public support and thus the erosion o f regime legitimacy. Hence, in the 
deliberations on and execution o f Chinese foreign policy, when it comes to issues 
concerning national unity and territorial integrity, particularly those pertinent to the 
emotionally-charged memory o f  national dismemberment and subjugation, the CCP 
leadership has ample grounds for heeding the prevailing domestic social norms.
According to the analytic framework o f Abdelal et al., the configuration of 
collective identity encompasses interrelated normative and purposive elements. In other 
words, the normative principle imposing obligatory actions that validate the collective 
identity is intimately linked to certain “social purposes” shaping the “interests, goals, or 
preferences” o f a given group.49 As such, national identity functions as an ideational 
mediator, connecting the normative structures o f domestic conventions and the state's 
interests. Apart from regulating Beijing’s foreign policy choice, the ideational norms 
encoded in the Chinese collective memory—as the inter-subjective understandings 
constituting the national identity— offer a general vision for the state’s course o f action.
47 John Fitzgerald, "The N ation less State: T he Search for a N ation in M odern Chinese Nationalism ," The 
A u stralian  J ou rn a l o f  C hinese Affairs 3 3 (1995).
48 Jungmin S eo , "Nationalism  and the Problem o f  Political Legitim acy in China," in L egitim acy: 
A m bigu ities o f  P o litic a l S uccess or Failure, in E ast a n d  Sou theast Asia,- ed. Lynn W hite (H ackensack, NJ & 
London: W orld Scientific, 2005), 142.
49 A bdelal et al., ’’Identity as a Variable," 698.
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Ey meeting the social need o f the past-victim ‘ se lf  rccon'Structing a powerful modem 
state, which is expected to sustain and de velop the .dentify of the idea; ‘Chin?” that was 
destroyed in the cultural- institutional, transiormadc-y constitutes the foundation Of the 
state’s status concept and the purposive norm guiding its performance on the diplomatic 
stage. It is this desire o f achieving effective rehabilitation ir. the mtergroup relations that 
has been driving the unremitting efforts o f  generations o f Chinese political elites and 
activists in their struggle toward national rejuvenation, from the demolishment o f the 
imperialist system to various political reforms in the republican era, and from the 
establishment o f the nationalist republic to the founding o f the Communist regime.
’ As such, collective memory takes on its importance in a setting of “ideational 
causality” in the Chinese identity politics, wherein the identity-constitutive norms 
motivate the state’s purposive actions in foreign affairs while revealing the social 
instrument for the state to achieve its aims By virtue o f the above-mentioned concept of 
‘‘relational comparison’ required for the formation o f collecti ve identity, the pursuance of 
great-powei statue in the international community is explicitly related to the socially 
constructed categories o f  inter-groups. Inasmuch as the state’s social position is highly 
relevant to the recognition it acquires from other members o f the international society, the 
symbolic significance o f the prestige motive o f the state is conceivable only when its 
honor-driven behavior is situated in the milieu, o f the interaction between the Chinese 
“se lf’ and the foreign “other.” The imperative to regain ‘face1’ (rnianzi) before the 
audience o f the international theatre can be construed as a “rational [pursuit] to fulfill the 
drive for [the] ontological security” o f the Chinese state.'0
50 Cries China's N ew N ationalism : Pride, P o litics  a n d  D ip lom acy, US -30. Brent Steele, O ntological 
S ecurity in Internationa! Relations: Self-iden tity  a n d  the Ir S tate  (N ew  York, N Y : R ou ik d ge, 2 0 0 8 ), ?..
In performing the nationai identity, China’s persistent quest for power-status on 
the world stage reflects the instrumental character o f the state’s aim in wiping away 
national humiliation and thus affirms the social needs inherent in the state’s self-identity. 
In the process o f seeking “ontological security,” the normative expectations intrinsic to 
the collective identity entail that the nation-state secure all possible affirmation o f its 
recovered eminence from the originators o f the modem international system— the West. 
The Beijing Olympics is particularly illustrative o f  such a social practice. Underlying the 
triumphant spirit was not only China’s objective to solidify its stance as a sports 
powerhouse, but the identity need that has been reciprocally shared by both the state and 
nation as a social norm, impelling the elevation o f the country’s international standing to 
a position commensurate with the progress it has made since its opening-up.
On the part o f  the authoritarian regime, considering the domestic end to which its 
international considerations are geared, the external legitimacy that the Chinese state 
attains can be transposed to the CCP’s internal legitimation. As regime legitimacy is 
always the sanctioned top priority o f  Beijing’s foreign policy choice, acquiring the 
desirable “international status” has been routinized as an “overriding policy objective” of 
Beijing’s diplomacy.51 Along this line o f  logic, not only is the CCP keen on attaining 
international legitimation, it also earnestly wishes to give the domestic public the 
impression that their government has made strenuous efforts to conform to the domestic 
social convention. That is why, as Minxin Pei comments, the Chinese leaders “spent so 
much political capital to try to get practically all the foreign leaders to attend the [Beijing
51 Y ong D eng. China's S tru ggle  f o r  S tatus: The R ealignm ent o f  In tern a tion a l R elations  (N ew  York. N Y : 
C am bridge U niversity Press, 2 0 0 8 )  8.
Olympics’] opening ceremony.”"  Such a purposive actio.', of the stete corroborates 
Andrews’ viewpoint. As be vividly puts it, if  a n '''international project is transformed into 
conventional and social action,” the diplomatic aims o f  the ‘.tats “may at times be nothing 
more than a political channeling and articulation c f  domestic expectation.”53 To the 
extent that the CCP’s foreign policy choice and its diplomatic performance are shaped by 
the identity-constitutive norms, China’s pursuit o f external legitimation can be defined as 
a means, rather than an end, toward the social purpose engraved on its national identity.
IDENTITY PREDICAMENT: THE COGNITIVE SCAFFOLD OF COLLECTIVE 
EMOTION
China’s strong sense o f entitlement to international, particularly Western, 
acclamation is a characteristic o f its national identity that is o f a social and cultural nature 
It is an emotional and cognitive practice integrating history and the present teality. Given 
the collective memory o f national defeat and the resultant humiliation, the compulsion to 
re-attain the long-denied international prestige has been at the core o f Chinese nationhood 
and statehood In pursuing such a purposive action, China’s excessive attention to 
outward appearance and its catering to “world opinion” lend support to the role theory in 
IR. As proposed by K. J Holsti, the social position o f a state on the international stage is
not only determined by the ego’s role conception, but is also “influenced or restrained by
the international counterpart o f the social aiter.”54 Insofar as regaining national glory 
involves grave contradictions between the Chinese “se lf’ and the foreign “other” in their
52 Quoted in. Larisa Epatko, "O lym pics Mark China's 'C om ing o f  A g e '" PB3. N ew shours, 
http://w w w .pbs.org/new shour/indepth_coverage/asia/china/2008/olynipici.htm !.
53 Andrews, "Social Rules and the State as a Social A c to r " 523, 26.
54 Holsti, "National R ole C onceptions in the Study o f  Foreign Policy," 243.
prescriptions o f China's international role status, the disparity between these two lines o f 
social understanding has been bedeviling the Chinese state’s purposive action in 
reconstituting its great-power identity. On the part o f China, attaining a position of 
prominence that is consistent with the self-image that prevailed during the long period 
prior to the “century o f national humiliation” is destined to be an arduous journey.
Today, after more than three decades o f phenomenal growth and development, 
China does meet the tangible criteria for the designation as a great power, as it has been 
transformed from the “sick man o f East. Asia” to an independent and strengthening 
nation-state in terms o f influence, prestige, and international reach. However, China’s 
external legitimation is no longer premised, as was the case under the tiatixia order, upon 
the compliance o f the subordinate states with the dominant actor. In contemporary 
hierarchical international system, the socially-conferred power status is to be validated by 
the shared understanding among those powerful actors already in this social category- 
regarding the role ascriptions o f the state in question. Although China does hold the 
entry card o f the great-power club, its social position in the current international society 
is rather equivocal.55 It may be true that Beijing has bid farewell to the possibility o f a 
new Cold War between China and the West, but the non-democratic regime’s handling of 
a dizzying array o f domestic and external issues, such as human rights, media freedom, as 
well as the Tibet and Taiwan issues, is under intensified external scrutiny. The mismatch 
between the ego’s self-attributed position on the basis o f its material and moral power 
and the social rank assigned by the alter often makes the aspirant to international stature 
and respect feel frustrated, or even alienated in the Westphalian system. Given that the
55 Shogo Suzuki, "The Importance of'O thering' in China's National Identity: S ino-Japanese Relations as a 
Stage o('Identity Conflicts." The P acific  R eview  20, no. 1 (2007): 33
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purposive noitr. innate in the national identity has tendered China’s social mobility on the 
world stage a culturally-defined core in a society predisposed with “post-colonial 
consciousness,"56 once the action o f the state in seeking the credentials accredited for the 
social status that it perceives to be rightfully deserved is obstructed, the Chinese populace 
can be rallied around the “self-protective urge to re-establish [the state’s] ‘rightful 
position’” to defend the challenged “ontological security” o f the nation-state.57 As the 
group value o f the state is disparaged, the coalescing function o f national identity and the 
resultant emotional work o f both its leaders and the public at large come to light in the 
intergroup interactions.
The suspicion and resistance that China has met with along its odyssey to  acquire 
national honor and prestige serve as an activator o f emotional arousal, on the basis o f the 
perception that the reigning Western powers are— according to a commentator in Qiushi, 
the most influential and authoritative CCP magazine devoted to policy making and 
theoretical studies— “unwilling to see an independent, powerful, prosperous China’’ stand 
alongside them on the international stage.58 This statement made by the CCP’s 
propaganda organ can be viewed as an annotation on the identity predicament o f the 
emerging power, in which its habitual assurance o f cultural supremacy and assertion o f 
rectifying the injustice deep-seated in the collective traumatic memory are disconfirmed 
by the depreciating behavior o f the foreign “other.” Such a national feeling explicates' 
why large numbers o f Chinese citizens were awash in venomous fury in response to what
56 Zheng W ang, "Never Forget National Humiliation: Postcolonial C onsciousness and China’s Rise," (T he  
International Institute for A sian Studies (H A S), 201?.).
57 Reinhard W olf, "Respect and Disrespect in International Politics: " h e Significance o f  Status 
Recognition," In ternational Theory 3, no. 1 (2011). 106
58 Shizhong Xing, "'Zhongguo W eixie Lun’ Keyi X iuyi ['China Threat1 Thesis Can B e  Stopped] ” Q iushi 
1996, 20.
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they saw as grossly unfair criticism from the West, while confidently embracing the 
world with the celebration o f common humanity as manifested in the motto o f  the Beijing 
Olympics— “One world. One Dream.”
At the same time that the state was laboring to frame the high-wire public 
spectacles as a decisive proof o f its international emergence, riots erupting in Lhasa were 
perceived as plot, w hich were conspired by foreign forces bent on “defacing” China 
ahead o f the Beijing Olympics through leveraging its handling o f human rights and ethnic 
issues. The military crackdown on the Tibetan protests attracted a chorus of 
condemnation o f the Chinese government in the Western media, depicting the Beijing 
Olympics as a “magnet for unfavorable attention to China’s human-rights abuses at 
home.”59 The opprobrium surrounding the Olympic torch relay that the Chinese nation­
state experienced was in discord with its effort to burnish a legitimate image in the i
international theatre o f  the Olympic sports. Through the lens o f the Western audience, \
the Chinese national identity performed in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics, as > \
manifested in the collective rage vented toward the resented opponents who stymied this <
state’s purposive action, was arguably a paradoxical demonstration o f the “humiliated 
pride” that was displayed by a “frustrated great power ”60
The complicated feeling of the Chinese community', informed by what William 
Callahan tenns China’s “pessoptimist national aesthetic,”61 has given life to a collective 
emotion. Collective identity is. as defined by social psychologist Henri Tajfel, “part o f
59 Paul M ooney, "Beijing O lym pics: Shadow  over a C om ing-out Party," Y aleG lobal Online. 
http ://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/beijing-olym pics-shadow -over-com ing-out-party.
N> Julia L ovell, "Prologue: B eijing 2 0 0 8 —the M ixed M essages o f  Contemporary C hinese Nationalism ," The 
In tern ational Jou rn al o f  the H isto ry  o f  S p o rt 25, no. 7 (2008): 765 . A lso  see Shogo Suzuki, "Seeking 
’L egitim ate’ Great Power Status in Post-C old W ar Internationa! Society." In ternational R ela tion s  22 . no. 1 
(2008): 45 -63 .
01 W illiam  A. Callahan, C hina: The P essop tim is t N ation  (O xford, N ew  York: Oxford U niversity Press.
2010). 10. 15.
an individual's self-concept which derives front hk  knowledge of his membership in a 
socia! group ... together with the value and emotional significance attached to that - 1 - 
membership.”62 Consistent with this definition, the xenophobic outburst in the run- up to  
the Beijing Olympics was essentially the discharge o f an intergroup emotion, not only 
expressed by the individual members o f the Chinese state but also experienced and acted 
upon by the collectivity. In the performance o f the national identity, public emotion has 
become a causal variable structuring the perception o f the Chinese state members and 
shaping the behavior tendency o f the in-group in the situations where the collective 
identity is accentuated.
According to social identity theory, the individual self can become meaningful 
only when it is socially identified.63 So long as members o f the Chinese state— including 
the C'CP’s leadership and the Chinese populace, both domestic and abroad— are 
“depersonalized” in the encounter with the foreign “other,”64 even those who do not 
personally subscribe to the aspiration for international status or simply lack the nationalist 
outlook may find it difficult in the emotionally-charged situations to ignore the social 
value o f group standing— a symbolic need ascribed by the national identity and moral 
agent o f the individual sense o f  worth in the intergroup context. On the condition that 
individuals’ self-serving evaluation o f the intergroup relationship that has been framed in 
the vantage point o f  the nation-state coincides with the external attestation o f China’s 
importance and merits, the normative meanings o f the Chinese in-group is empatheticaily
62 Henri Tajfel, H uman G roups an d  S o c ia l C ategories. S tudies in S o c ia l P sych o logy  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), 255.
63 See, e.g.. Human G roups a n d  S o c ia l C ategories. S tudies in S o c ia l P sych ology  (Cambridge: Cam bridge' 
University Press, 1981).
M Brent E. Sasley, "Theorizing States’ Emotions," In ternational Studies R eview  13, no 3 (2011): 458. A lso  
see John C. Turner et al., R ediscovering  the S o c ia l Group: A S elf-C ategoriza tion  Theory  (N ew  York, N Y : • 
B asii B lackw ell, 1987), 50.
150
confirmed, which provides its members with psychological benefits and assistance. As 
exemplified in Beijing’s victory in bidding for the Olympic Games, the emotional reward 
stemming from the success o f the state's purposive action enormously reinforced the 
social cohesion o f  the nation-state. In response to the announcement made by the 
International Olympic Committee that Beijing was selected to host the 2008 Summer 
Olympics, the outburst o f  exultant nationalistic passion pervading the. whole country 
illustrated the transference o f the individual sense o f  self to the larger social identity of 
the state-as-group, which gave ground to the emotional representation o f the national 
pride in cleansing the historical humiliation and elevating the social status o f  the Chinese 
nation-state.
Since emotion is context-specific, group identification also arises when the 
identity predicament comes to the fore o f  Chinese foreign relations. While the members 
o f  the Chinese state take pride in its emergence in the international arena, the optimistic 
strain in the "national aesthetic” can be overshadowed by their forceful reaction to 
foreign condescension. At these moments when the group-based emotion is heightened, 
one o f the “principled beliefs” implied in the national identity65— the conviction that the 
humiliating legacy o f its past victimization must be vanquished— is put into question. 
Under such circumstances, social nonns encoded in the public memory constitutes what 
Guobin Yang terms an “emotional schema” that moves the in-group to collective 
action.66 As indicated in the nationalist indignation that roiled China in the run-up to the 
2008 Olympics, this “emotional schema” establishes a mental aura, where the emotional
65 G oldstein  and K eohane. "Ideas and Foreign Policy: A n A nalytical Framework," 9.
66 G uobin Y ang, "Emotional E vents and the Transformation o f  C o llective  A ction: The C hinese Student 
M ovem ent," in E m otions a n d  S o c ia l M ovem en ts , ed. H elena Flam and Debra K ing (London. UK:
R oudedge, 2 0 0 5 ) . 80 -81 .
stale o f the individual members is resonated within a larger collectivity and is transcribed' 
into a habitus, specifying the “meanings, motivations, and recipes for [a certain] social 
action.”67 In the context o f  the Chinese state, the purposive (dement o f the national 
identity driving the social action o f  securing a deserved international status works as an 
affective conveyor. With this emotional bond, the messages concerning the connoted •• 
meanings of the resented actor’s infringement on the state’s self-esteem and the actions 
needed to restore its depreciated role status are subtly transmitted to those in-group 
members who ate not on the scene o f foreign slight or did not experience the national 
trauma in the modern history o f the country. In the eye o f a typical member o f the 
Chinese state, the Tibetan protest was not simply an attack on the Chinese government, 
but a violation o f the norms constituting what it means to be Chinese. The relay o f the 
Olympic flame was rich in symbolic meanings; at least it signified the “quintessentially 
Chinese idea” that it had sprung forth onto the world stage as a great nation it once had 
been. Any offense or contempt targeting this potent symbol could be interpreted as an 
egregious affront to the in-group and called for overt retribution. As seen by a large 
relevant audience, militant attacks o f the indignant counterdemonstrators against the 
Tibetan exiles and their supporters impeding the torch relay aligned with the emotional 
overtone prevalent in the antagonistic intergroup interaction, and were thus accepted as a 
legitimate response on the part o f the Chinese in-group.
The ‘emotional schema” informing the above-mentioned public anger is 
concomitant with the affective bias inherent in the social understanding o f the in-group 
members in their unpleasant experience vis-a-vis the out-group entity. In the view of
67 W illiam  H. Jr. S ew ell, "Historical Events as Transformations o f  Structures: Inventing R evolution at the 
Bastille," Theory a n d  S ocie ty  25. no. 6  (1996): 842.
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some constructivist theorists, emotions are learned and malleable, in that they are 
‘‘context-sensitive shared expectations prescribed by social groups for specific social 
situations.”68 The relational ties between a post-colonial state and the past transgressors 
o f its sovereignty and territory are invariably colored by the persistent shame revolving
around the former’s woeful memory. The perennial concern with historical redress and
the reinstatement o f the lost dignity in the intergroup relations are thus the embodied
meanings o f the post-traumatic “emotional schema” that are often employed by the
Chinese citizens to unscramble the implication o f the out-group behavior. In the
cognitive process o f the Chinese in-group members, the information incongruent with
such “affective tags” that are intimately attached to the social data stored in the traumatic
memory can be readily screened out,69 while those messages that bolster the preexisting
beliefs concerning the culprits o f  hurtful experience tend to homogenize the in-group , I
mernoers' negative perception o f  the intergroup adversary . For a nation-state that is 4
instinctively hardwired to detect the illegitimate motives o f the former wrongdoer, the i
siege o f  the Olympic torch in a sacred journey, in which the historical agony suffered by 1
the in-group was vigorously redressed, is a prototypical case where a predicted pattern of
“causal regularity” 70 featuring the subjective judgment o f its members can be applied.
Given the propensity o f threat perception, the stereotypical discourse— that the farce was 
actually a scheme by, or hidden agenda o f  the Western powers to besmirch China’s 
national honor and sabotage the progress o f realizing its century-old Olympic dream—
68 N eta C. Crawford, "The Passion o f  W orld Politics: Propositions on Em otion and Em otional 
Relationship," In ternationaI Security  24. no. 4 (2000): 129.
6S Eric G roenendyk, "Current Em otion Research in Political Science: H ow  Em otions Help D em ocracy  
O vercom e Its C ollective A ction Problem," Em otion R eview  3, no. 4 (2011): 458.
70 Andrew s, "Social R ules and the State as a Social Actor," 527.
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was viewed as a most appropriate interpretation o f  the provocative act*: ;hat would ‘ 
naturally incite- outright hatred o f  the out-group members
In the formation o f collective emotion, group identifcitior: is ako  an antecedent' 
to the operation o f threat perception. It has been observed by seme social identity 
theorists that people tend to have preference toward their own group while showing bias 
against out-group m em bers.'1 In-group favoritism, however, is not a sufficient condition 
for out-group discrimination, which requires certain exogenous “social structural and 
motivational conditions ”72 A case in point o f this sort o f  external stimulant in the run up 
to the Beijing Olympics is the pro-Tibet demonstrations in several cities outside China, 
which intruded on the torch relay when the state was ready to realize its Olympic dream. 
The intolerable breach o f the conventional norms underpinning the concerted effort o f the
i Chinese nation-state animated the “antagonistic identity constructions” in a particularly
* visible manner,’3 wherein the adversarial identities were engaged in intractable conflicts.
» As a manifestation o f the tendency o f ‘'automatic prejudice” observed by some social
• psychologists,74 the anti-Olympic protestors and those relevant actors were strongly 
discriminated against by the Chinese state members. A powerful indicator o f the 
antipathetic collective emotion under such circumstances, which sharpens the 
demarcation o f conflicting groups, is the resentful actor’s active denigration o f the moral
E.g., M ichael A. H ogg and John C. Turner, "Interpersonal Attraction, Social Identification and 
Psychological Group Formation." E uropean  Journal o f  In ternational R elations  15, no. 1 (1985). W illiam  J. 
McGuire and A lice  Padawer-Singer, ’Trail Salience in the Spontaneous Self-C oncept, J o u r n a l  o f  
Experim ental S ocia l P sych o logy  33, no. 6 (1976).
72 M arilynn B. Brewer, "In-Group Identification and Inter- Croup Conflict," hi S ocia l Identity a n d  Inter- 
G roup C onflict Reduction, ed. Richard A shm ore, Lee Jussim, and David W ilder (Oxford: Oxford 
U niversity press, 2001), 19.
W olf, ’’Respect and D isrespect in International Politics: The Significance o fS tatu s Recognition," 101 -11. 
74 See David D eSteno et al., "Prejudice from Thin Air: The E ffect c f  Em otion on Automatic Intergroup 
Attitudes," P sych olog ica l Science  15, no. 5 (2004).
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status o f  its resented foe, 5 whose motives are also construed in an extremely negative 
way. In the wake o f the Tibetan riots, for instance, Daiai Lama, the paramount out-group 
leader o f the exiled Tibetan government, was vilified by the then head o f  the CCP in the 
Tibet Autonomous Region as “a w olf wrapped in a monk’s robe” and “a monster' with a 
human face, but the heart o f a beast.”76 Seen through the emotional lens, both the Dalai 
clique and the indigenous protestors were portrayed by the Chinese media as puppets o f 
Western forces that contrived to negate China's global status. With the reinforcement o f 
group differentiation, for the Chinese audience o f the Western media coverage on the 
journey o f Olympic torch, their attention was fixed on a fray in which their state was 
demeaned in public, rather than the oppressed Tibetans seeking a redress o f grievances. 
Since the state members had converged on a highly unified “emotional schema,” their 
judgment o f the out-group behavior was framed in a cognitive pattern that had 
significantly raised the likelihood o f  threat perception directed toward the foreign out­
group.
Along with its representation in the verbal and cognitive dimensions, the 
collective emotion animated by the Chinese identity predicament can augment the 
tendency o f radical behavior by the frustrated in-group. In the dramaturgical sense, the 
acute categorization o f conflicting identities has the promise o f escalating emotional 
venting beyond a rational level, so much so that the targeted opponents are embarrassed 
or shamed by the emotional performers who resort to the “dramatic techniques.” 7' For
L' Reinhard W olf, "Resentm ent in International Relations" (paper presented at the The Annua! Convention  
o f  the Internationa! Studies A ssociation , San Francisco, C A, 2 0 1 3 ).
7,1 Q uoted in O rville Schell, "China: H um iliation & the O lym p ics,” The New York R eview  o f  R oot': 55, no.
13 (2008).
77 See Robert D . Benford and-Scott A. Hunt. "Dramaturgy and Social M ovem ents: The Social Construction  
and C om m unication o f  P ow er.” S ocia l Inquiry  2, no. 1 (1995)
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example., because o f their coverage o f the Tibetan riots and the ensuing crackdown by 
Chinese security forces, some Beijing-based foreign correspondents received sensational- 
assaults and even death threats that were credible enough to prompt them to move 
offices.7* Iconic figures in the precipitating events o f antagonistic in tergroup relations, in 
which the identity categorization is particularly salient and may even be oversimplified, 
can be branded as either national “heroes” or “traitors,” as part o f  the “dramatic 
techniques” to propagate the negative perception o f resented political objects. In the 
unruly reception o f the Olympic torch in Paris, Jin Jing, a torchbearer and Paralympic 
fencer, earned herself such honorifics as “the wheelchair angel” for protecting the torch 
from the pro-Tibet protesters. Jin 's fans even issued a “global Chinese attest warrant” 
for the protester who attempted to snatch the torch from her When she questioned the 
rationality o f the nationalist call for the boycott o f the French retail chain Carrefour, Jin 
j- found herself subjected to a torrent o f  abuse on the Internet.79 The original “hero,” whose
\ private grievance intersected with collective acrimony against the out-group and hence
• induced an emotional arousal, was dramatically turned into the internal target o f  the in­
group emotion Two days after Jin’s encounter with the pro Tibet protesters, Grace 
Wang, a Chinese freshman student who had tried to mediate a skirmish between the pro- 
China and the pro-Tibet demonstrators at Duke University, quickly became another 
object o f  public loathing. Wang’s photo, labeled “traitor to her country,” was posted on 
the Internet, and a video of Wang, titled ‘The Ugliest Overseas Student,” appeared on
78 Sim on Elegant, "Why China's Burning Mad," Time April 24. 2008 .
79 EastSouthW estNorth, "The O lym pic Torch Tour as Public R elations D isaster,” 
http://zonaeuropa.com /20080410 1 .htm. (accessed  on  May 1, 2013).
China Central Television's website.80 In the chaotic progress leading up to the Beijing 
Olympics, the putative rejection o f China’s craving for the dutiful recognition o f the self- 
righteous status elicited the convergence o f the emotions of the participants and audience 
who were involved in the state’s purposive action. The virulent behavior vis-a-vis the
out-group entity by those who stage emotional scenes in such symbolic moments can be 
so dominant that some other behaviors by the in-group members are gravely inhibited.
As a testament tc the fever pitch o f  collective emotion, the mere acts o f  moderating the 
animosity in the communication o f intergroup interaction, just as what Jin and Wang tried 
to do in their cases, can arouse the strong dissent o f their peers and are thus equated with 
disloyalty to the in-group.
A significant factor influencing the constraining effect o f collective emotion is the 
domestic normative environment. Given that emotion is cuiturally-specinc and identity- 
related, the working o f collective emotion cannot be properly understood without 
simultaneously focusing on its normative elements ingrained in the national identity and 
the political culture where it has evolved. The more attached an in-group is to the 
collectivist norms predominating in the domestic society, the more intense the collective 
emotion will be. and correspondingly, the more likely it is that the group-based emotion 
prevents those behaviors or foreign policy choices that are deemed incompatible to the 
consensual norms.81
As analyzed above, the resolute defense o f state sovereignty and national 
territories, as well as the loyal efforts in upholding national dignity, has instilled as the
80 Grace W ang. "Caught in the M iddle, Called a Traitor," The W ashington P o st April 20 . 2008. Shaila 
D ew an, "Chinese Student in U .S . Is Caught in Confrontation," The N ew  York Times April 17, 2008.
81 Reinhard W olf, "Prickly States? R ecogn ition  and D isrespect B ew een  Persons and Peoples," in The 
In tern ational P o litics  o f  R ecogn ition , ed. Thom as Lindem ann and Erik Ringmar (Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 
2 0 )2 ) , 49 -50 .
normative substance o f the Chinese national identity and the mora*. -: d<. _ #ii81; Jaiirig the4 
behavior o f  the state members in the intergroup in^raotioos in a society suffused with e 
'■'culture o f p a in ” these mem ory-encoded neons a u  i.enuai to A c ' 'er.iohonai schema” in' 
the flashpoint events that can leadily induce the antagonistic inter-group relations.8’ In 
those cases where the “motivational conditions” hark back to past indignities o f the post­
colonial state, collective memory activates the group identification ana emotional 
convergence o f  the in-group members, and the emotional work o f the Chinese state 
members ;s thus intertwined with the cognitive operation o f historical analogy. The 
codified causal pattern provided by this sort o f mental shortcut tends to steer the public 
perception in the adversarial intergroup relations and shape the decision-making o f the
state leaders, who also succumb to the cognitive tendency o f “rush to memory.” J As ihe 
immediate trigger o f the ongoing Senkalcu/Diaoyu standoff, for example, Japan's 
intension to nationalize the islets is intimately connected to its annexation o f the territory 
in the Chinese maritime sphere. The poignant symbol o f Japanese invasion is employed 
as a "preemptive metaphor,”84 which associates the current diplomatic conflicts with 
those in the traumatic history when the Chinese nation-state was victimized by the 
Western and Japanese “other.” The fixation o f the Chinese domestic audience on the 
alleged moral deficiency o f the out-group entity  has led them to identity a certain pattern 
o f foreign policy as legitimate.
In such an emotional event that is directly germane to the issue of historical 
redress, as will be illustrated in Chapter 5, collective memory is a  cats?! ideational factor
82 See David B. M o m s, The C ulture o f  Pain  (Berkeley, CA: University o f  California Press, 1993).
83 Jenny Edkins, Trauma a n d  the M em ory o f  P o litics  (Cambridge arid N ew  Yo*k: Cam bridge University 
Press, 2003), 73-91.
84 Jercm e Bruner, On K n ow ing: E ssays fo r  the Left H an d  (Cambridge, M A: Cam bridge University Press. 
1962). 13-14.
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that helps define the nature o f the diplomatic situation and evaluate the stakes o f the 
Chinese state and the moral justification o f its behavior. Guided by the “logic o f 
appropi iateness” inherent in the historical institution, decision-makers have to “act upon 
the emotional domestic complaints”85 as warranted by the normative requirements o f the 
Chinese political culture. As the rationality o f the C CP's foreign policy choice is 
significantly bounded by the historical institution o f memory-encoded norms, the- cost- 
efficient trade-offs in Beijing’s diplomatic calculation that may be in the interest o f the 
state in the material sense can be ruled out in the emotional and cognitive practice o f  the 
domestic audience o f the state’s diplomacy.
85 W olf, "Respect and D isrespect in International Politics: T he S ignificance o f  Status R ecognition."  120; 
March and O lsen, R ed isco verin g  Institutions: The O rg a n iza tio n a l B asts o f  P o litic s , 160-66.
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C H A P T E R  V
M O BILIZATIO N V E R SU S CONTESTATION'. C O N ST R A IN T S OF 
N A T IO N A L ISM  O N  BEIJIN G ’S FOREIGN PO LICY M A K IN G
In regard to China-Japan relations, reaction among 
youths, especially students, are strong. I f  difficult 
problems were to appear still further, it will become 
impossible to explain them to the people. It will 
become impossible to control them. I  want you to 
understand this position which we are in.
—Deng Xiaoping1
Cadres and the Masses must believe in the Party 
and the government's ability to properly handle all 
issues linked to Sino-Japanese relations.
—Li Zhaoxing, form er Chinese Foreign M inister2
Following the examination o f the formation and institutionalization o f  collective
memory and national identity in Chapter 4, this dissertation moves to the third stage o f its
research program, focusing on the way that the historical-institutional elements in
Chinese nationalism affect the political behavior o f both the Chinese state and societal
forces in the domestic-foreign-policy interaction. Since collective memory and national
identity do not shape the policy outcome on their own, Chinese foreign policy ideas
shaped by these historical institutions become causally important only by influencing
their human hosts— the actor o f and the audience for the PRC’s diplomacy. To build
convincing arguments on the causal effects of the social norms that are encoded in the
’ This is a lem ark m ade by D eng X iaoping m ade he spoke to senior Japanese officials on  June 28 , 1987. 
Quoted in W hiting China Eyes Japan , 164.
" Quoted in L i's speech made at a m eeting o f  the Com m unist Party s propaganda department on April 15, 
2005 , when anti-Japan dem onstrations rocked B eijing, Shanghai, and other C hinese cities. Joseph Kahn, 
"Chinese O fficial Orders End to A nti-Japanese Demonstrations," N ew  York T im es. April 1 9 ,2 0 0 5 .
traumatic remembrance o f  the Chinese public and are thus constitutive o f the national 
identity, this chapter explores how these ideational variables condition the rationality o f 
the CCP’s diplomatic decision-making and enable the political claim-making o f Chinese
societal forces in contending with the authoritarian state.
As analyzed in the previous chapters, an important reason why the symbolic 
enhancement o f the Chinese state legitimation in the Post-Tiananmen era obtains wide 
political resonance is that the role identity o f  the CCP regime and the moral justification 
o f the PRC’s international status are enmeshed in the inter-subjective understandings of 
the Chinese populace, which are conventionalized as the social norms embedded in the 
Chinese collective memory and national identity. These historical institutions, while they 
are effective in mobilizing visceral nationalist sentiment toward the foreign “other.’ also 
supply the context that render political actors’ policy practice and claim-making socially 
intelligible. Thus, the ideational variables c f  Chinese foreign policy serve as the “road 
maps” that guide the popular cognition in the assessment o f the state’s action on the 
diplomatic stage.3 The drama of China’s diplomacy, it is worth noting, can also be 
related to the C CP’s performance on the domestic front. When the popular discontent 
over the state’s conduct o f  diplomatic affairs is transposed to the resentment toward the 
poorly-handled domestic sociopolitical problems, historical institutions can enable the 
deliberation o f societal forces in their contestation with the authoritarian state in a 
legitimate narrative framework. In light o f the belligerent popular response to diplomatic 
disputes that are related to controversial historical issues, the memory-based legitimacy
3 For the elaboration o f  ides as "road m aps” in foreign policy , see , am ong others, G oldstein and K eohane, 
"Ideas and Foreign Policy: A n A nalytical Framework," 13 -17.
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o f the regime has backed the CCP leadership into a dilemma m the der-vstlc'foreign 
policy interaction. ’ • •
To illustrate these major arguments, this chapter proceeds as •V iLws. The first 
part of the chapter delves into Sirio- Japanese relations, one of the area: mat allow less 
room for the CCP’s rational diplomacy than other bilateral relations By examining the 
way that Beijing’s decision-making is hemmed in by historical institutions, this part 
answers the question o f why the CCP leadership is unable to “switch o f f ’ the traumas 
Japan inflicted upon China 4 Beijing’s quandary is further captured in the second part, 
which investigates the rhetoric transaction between the propaganda state and societal 
forces in the foreign policy marketplace. In China’s transfcimed communicative
environment, market-oriented media offers the domestic audience o f for eign affairs 
- coverage the autonomy in choosing a narrative frame that is congruent with the
normative paradigm decided by historical institutions. It is under this legitimate banner, 
f  as discussed in the third part o f  the chapter, that the counter-narratives projected by the
r Chinese societal articulate them dissent at the manipulator o f the collective memory.
TRAUMATIC COLLECTIVE MEMORY: ALWAYS READY ON-DEMAND?5
As noted in Chapter 3, the CCP's representativeness propagated in the master 
historical account appeals to the normative and purposive elements o f the Chinese ■ 
national identity that are derived from the collective memory o f national trauma. Along 
this logic, the memory-based legitimacy o f the regime is premised on its embrace o f the 
historical institutions that are widely shared in the national community, in accord with
4 Kishore Mahbubarii, "Results Matter: Pragmatism Prev ails in Asia," G lo b a l A sia  5, no. i (2010).
5 This section  contains materials in N in g  Liao, "Presentist or Cultural M emory: Chinese N ationalism  ss  
Constraint on B eijing’s Foreign Policy  Making," A sian Poiiiics & P olicy  5. no. 4 (2013): 554-59.
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Elkins and Simeon’s proposition, such "propel modes o f conduct” ingrained in political 
culture are the normative caliber for the populace to judge whether the actions o f  the 
political actor are legitimate.6 Given the woeful experience o f dismemberment and 
subjugation o f  the Chinese nation-state by foreign aggression and intrusion— a mythic 
symbol highlighted in the master historical account, the preservation, o f  national 
territories and state sovereignty, as well as the upholding o f national dignity, has been 
ingrained in the ethical agenda o f Chinese foreign policy making. Only a social practice 
living up to these consensual norms and aligning with the normative substance o f the 
nationhood can be seen as supporting the moral justification o f  the policy option and 
therefore deserves the recognition o f  the members o f the nation-state.
A metaphor o f the normative principles underscoring the principles o f sovereignty, 
territoriality, and dignity is to liken these historical institutions to the “scripts” that the «|
state actor must follow on the performance stage o f China’s diplomacy.7 The formulation -» {
and execution o f China’s foreign policy must uphold these socially-held beliefs, as they ' (
provide the ethical criteria for the domestic audience to assess the legitimacy o f  state .... (
action. It is thus not difficult to understand that authoritarian regimes are not given a free 
hand in devising foreign policies. Historical institutions, which have been settled as 
domestic convention regulating the state’s diplomatic behavior, impart a higher 
normative content to Beijing’s foreign affairs than does the foreign policy that is 
primarily informed by realist calculations. Insofar as the collective convention has
6 Elkins and S im eon, "A Cause in Search o f  Its Effect, or What D o es Political Culture Explain?." 127-28 .
7 For the conception  o f  such “scripts” in political com m unication , see  Jeffrey C. A lexander, "Cultural 
Pragmatics: Socia l Perform ance betw een Ritual and Strategy," in  S o c ia l Perform ance. S ym bolic  A ction.
C u ltu ra l P ragm atics, an d  R itual, ed. Jeffrey C. A lexander, Bernhard G iesen , and Jason L. Mast 
(Cam bridge, UIC: C am bridge U niversity Press, 2 006). 58-64; OTuathail, "Theorizing Practical G eopolitical 
R easoning: The C ase o f  the United States R esponse to the W'ar in B o sn ia " 619-20 .
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constructed a normative structure that shape the CCP’s diplomatic agenda,'onl> those 
policy opii.ons delimited within the “scripted” frame o f reference can be socially 
intelligible and accepted by the audience for the PRC’s diplomacy On the symbolic 
stage o f diplomatic performance, the CCP regime that is expected to consistently play to 
the pre-existing role o f  national savior is largely legitimized through its commitment to ••• 
the diffuse social norms and its fulfillment o f the symbolic role narrated in the master 
narrative account.
The way that historical institutions condition the diplomatic behavior o f the 
Chinese state can be inteipreted within the realm o f identity politics. The victimhood 
identity engraved on the collective memory in the traumatized community has become a 
“symbolic marker7’ in Chinese political culture.8 Through the socialization o f patriotic 
education, the memory-encoded norms that are communicated in the master historical 
narratives have accumulated what Michael Schudson calls the “self-perpetuating 
rhetorical power” in the popular imagination.9 In this sense, the victimhood identity 
instantiated in the state-crafted historical accounts is all the more likely to predispose the 
public perceptions toward the perceived culprits o f the national humiliation.
A typical manifestation o f such post-traumatic emotion is the cognitive effect o f 
“time collapse,” which is defined by Vamik Volkan ac “the fears, expectations, fantasies 
and defenses associated with a chosen trauma that reappear when both conscious and 
unconscious connections are made between the mental representation o f  the past trauma
8 A s Gerard Delanty and Chris Runtford po:r.l out, the veiationsnip be'w eer. the s e l f  and the other, on the 
basis o f  w hich co llective  identification is formed, is '‘considered n sym bolic markers.” See Delanty and
Rumbord, R ethinking Europe: S ocia l Theory a n d  the Im plication? o f  E uropeanization  ,5 1  
* Schudson, "The Present in the Past V ersus the Past in the Present." 109.
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and a contemporary threat."10 Due to the intimate relation o f the past agony o f the 
Chinese nation-state in the hands o f  Japanese mi litary imperialism to the current action of 
the resented object, the mere thought o f  this pol itical actor can stimulate "antagonistic
identity construction” in the bilateral relations.11 Operationalized in the collective 
memory, the evoked set underpins the visceral antagonism within the Chinese community 
toward Japan’s stance on “revisionist” history, a primary issue that has been plaguing the 
bilateral relationship.
The operation o f the cognitive template in the Chinese historical institutions is 
particularly salient during the flare-up between China and Japan in late 2012. As the fuse 
in the current round o f the Sino-Japanese dispute over Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the 
announcement made by the Japanese government in 2012 to nationalize the disputed 
islands is intimately connected to its annexation o f the Chinese territory in the maritime 
sphere— a symbol signifying the onset o f  Japanese imperialist invasion. The motion 
proposed by the Japanese government is deemed as a fundamental breach o f  the 
normative principle o f sovereign whole that is ingrained in the Chinese national identity. 
Following the diplomatic “scripts,” the Chinese government reacted stridently. The 
official stance is stated in the commentary' o f Xinhua News Agency. “ In history. Japan 
stole the so-called administrative rights’ o f  the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands through unjust 
means.” 12 To attest to China’s determination to protest Japan’s action, the official 
commentary sternly announced: “Long gone are the days when the Chinese nation was
10 V olkan, "Transgenerationa! T ransm issions and Chosen Traumas: An A spect o f  Large-Group Identity."
89.
h W olf, "Respect and D isrespect in International Politics: The Significance o f  Status Recognition." 109.
L: Lim ing Wu. "Commentary: China's Determ ination to Safeguard Sovereignty Unshakable,"  
English.xinhuanet.com , h ttp://new s.x inhuanet.eom /english /indepth /2012-09/l 1/c 131842996.htm .
(accessed  on June 1. 2013).
shared sense of the Chinese populace based on die common psst o f fhe conttnuaft}, as 
Jerez Jsdlicki argues, to “burden the preserve conflic  with ;.t;or.g rssento-.o.nts-'and make it 
appear to be either a historical repetition, or a historical redress ” i4
On the side o f the Chinese victim state , the traumatic symbol o f national 
humiliation under the aggression o f  Japanese imperialism is employed as a “preemptive 
metaphor” in the popular conception,15 which readily magnifies the negative image o f the 
out-group and calls for overt retribution for its flagrant breach o f the identity-constitutive 
norms. Because the regime has styled itself as the paramount patriotic force capable o f
leading the Chinese nation to undo foreign subjugation, the CCP is obliged to meet the
warranted expectation to prevent historical repetition. In this sense, collective memory, 
while Serving as a foreground to valorize the regime’s legitimacy in domestic and 
international politics, has given ground to the “logic o f appropriateness” as the morai 
foundation o f the diplomatic “scripts.” 16
With reference to Beijing’s rational thinking in dealing with Sino-Japanese 
relations, in fact, the CCP leadership is aware that overly anti-Japanese nationalism does 
not make rational sense in that it would deteriorate the mutually negative perception and 
thus fray the already fragile bilateral relations. In the 2012 annual survey jointly 
conducted by the Genron NPO and the China Daily o f public opinion in the two countries, 
while 64.5 percent o f the Chinese polled held an unfavorable opinion o f Japan, 84.5 of 
the Japanese respondents expressed negative attitudes o f China, six. points higher than
11 Jerez jed licki. Historical M em ory as a Source o f  C onflicts in Eastern Ei-rope," C om m unist a n d  P o st - 
Com m unist S tudies 32, no. 3 (1999): 226.
15 Bruner, On Knov/ing: E ssays for the Left H and, 13-14.
16 March and Olsen, R ediscoverin g  Institutions: The O rgan isa tional B asis o f  P o litic s , 160-66.
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that registered in the previous year’s survey and the highest negative since it was initiated 
in 2005.17 As some Chinese scholars observe, the two nations have seen each other as the 
“unforgettable other.”18 With the reminiscence o f  historicai conflicts, the interaction 
between the two countries is always implicated in the cross-reference relations based on 
adversarial nationalisms.'9 Not only does China instinctively view Japan as the 
“victimizing other.” given fanatical Chinese nationalism and the critical role played by 
the PRC in regional and world affairs, China is also perceived by Japan as a major threat 
containing its grand diplomacy as a political power.
Despite Beijing’s rebuttal o f  the “China threat” thesis in the official diplomatic 
rhetoric, to be sure, the inveterate animosity o f  the Chinese populace toward Japan has 
instigated a vicious interaction between the two sides and the threat reputation attributed 
to China. Significantly influenced by domestic opinion that the government must scrap \
its postwar constitutional restrictions on its military expansions and achieve military 1
normalization, Tokyo is often pushed closer to Washington in its security activism. - f
Apparently, the strengthening o f the U.S.-Japan alliance in the Pacific Asia does not bode (
well for China's security environment, since it can impede the implementation o f 
Beijing’s regional diplomacy and complicate the prolonged Taiwan issue.20 While 
American officials have publicly said the United States does not take sides on the 
Sertkukii/Diaoyu rows, they also have confirmed that the Japan-U.S defense treaty covers
i; "Half o f  C hinese Foresee M ilitary D ispute with Japan. Oenron N p o O pinion Poll Shows," Genron N PO , 
http://w w w .genron-
npo.net/eng lish/index.php?option-com _content& . vie w -artic le& id -4  3:japanchinapoll8& catid 1 :advocacy 
& ltem id=3. (accessed  on June 1S, 2013)
18 Li and Liang, V/enming Shijiao  X ia D e Z hongri G uanxi [the  S ino-Japanese R ela tions in a  C iv iliza tion a i 
P e rsp e c tiv e ] . 259.
19 Y unxiang Liang, "Zhongri M inztizhuyi B ijiao  Y anjiu  [the Com parative Studies o f  C hinese and Japanese 
Nationalism s!," G uoji zhengzh i ya n jiu  [ In ternational P o iitis  S tu d ies]  1(2009): 89-92.
20 See. e.g ., Rex Li, A R ising C hina a n d  Secu rity  in E ast Asia: Identity C onstruction  a n d  S ecu rity  D iscourse  
(N ew  V ork, N Y : R outledge, 2009).
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the, Islands.2! Chinese military coral *ct with Japan would invoke the defense treaty! " 
ihe>eby obligating the li.S  to assist Japan Ir« defending the islands Moreover, the deep 
scats o f wartime memory notwithstanding, the grow hg econotr.fc interdependence 
between China and Japan has proved the ptofiabi.'Hy of the bilateral economic . 
partnership, which has been evidenced in the continued tension o f “ccol politics and hot 
economics” (zhenglengjingre) in the bilateral relations.27
Inasmuch as the risk c f  a hardline diplomacy may offset China’s interests in the 
regional security configuration. Beijing does wish to tone down the bilateral issues. 
However, in light o f the longstanding animus o f  the Chinese general populace toward the 
militarist invasion o f Japanese imperialism, when high-profile events, especially those 
evoking emotionally-charged controversies come to the stage, the sense of “post-colonial
• 23consciousness” embedded in the Chinese collective memory is likely to be activated. In
 ̂ such instances, the domestic audience, whose attention is overwhelm ingly framed by
t historical institutions as consensual social norms, tends to identify a certain pattern of
i
; foreign policy, and correspondingly, the range c f  alternative policy options that are
deemed legitimate is significantly reduced.
Here, one can see that the rationality o f the political actor in the policy making is 
“bounded” by the collective memory as a sort c f  historical institution. The cost-efficient 
trades-off in Beijing’s diplomatic calculation that may be in the interests o f the state can 
be relentlessly ailed cut, as they are heresy to the “scripts” underlining the state’s 
diplomatic; behavior Take Beijing’s policies on the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue in the 1990s
21 "Paneita T e lls  China Thai Senkakus under Japan-U S. Security Treaty," The A ia h i Shim  bun, 
hitp://ajw .asahi.com /article/asia/china/A J20120921006!. (accessed on June t ,  2013).
22 R eilly , "China's History A ctivism  and Sino Japanese Relations," 216.
23 W ang, "Never Forget National Humiliation- Postcolonial C onsciousness and China's Rise."
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as an example. After China restated its claims to the island in the 1992 Territorial Law, 
Beijing opted for joint development and shelving the dispute.24 During the escalated 
tension in 1996, which was initiated by Hong Kong civilian groups committed to
maintaining Chinese sovereignty over the islets (baodiao), the Chinese government 
constrained the upsurge o f public sentiment. This moderate stance was attacked by the 
popular nationalists, particularly those baodiao activists who were furious at the
25government’s inability o f preempting Japan’s “effective control” over the island.
In the 2010 Senkaku'Diaoyu crisis, starting from the detainment o f a Chinese 
captain whose fishing boat rammed a Japanese Coast Guard vessel near the disputed 
islands, large-scale anti-Japanese protests swept across many Chinese cities. With the 
outpouring o f  nationalist sentiments, the crisis continued after the release o f the Chinese 
captain. The pressure o f  public opinion played a significant role in pushing the Chinese 
government to demand Japan’s official apology and com pensation/0 More recently, 
soon after Japan’s government made the decision to purchase Senkaku/Diaoyu in 
September 2 0 12, the baodiao groups landed on the island to display Chinese 
determination to defend its sovereignty. In its thinly veiled critique, an editorial 
published in Global Times (Huanqiu shibao), a national newspaper devoted to 
international news and an offshoot o f the People’s Daily (Renmin ribao), stated, “The 
Chinese public is wondering why the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, a part of China’s territory,
24 Y oung C. Kim, "Japanese P olicy  Towards China: P olitics o f th e  Imperial V isit to China in 1992," Pacific  
Affairs {2001): 225-42 .
25 James R eilly , "The P.ebirth o fM in jia n  W aijiau : China's Popular D ip lom acy toward Japan," (Japan Policy  
Research Institute (W orking Paper N o. 115), the University o f  San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim , 
2009).
26 Y ves T iberghien. "The D iaoyu  C risis o f  2010: D om estic G am es and D iplom atic Conflict," H a rva rd  
Asia Q u arterly  12, no. 3 /4 (2 0 1 0 ): 75.
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is occupied by Japan and why the PLA rieesn’v send ships to e;.cort a c tiv e s . The 
Chinese government is thought o f  as being ‘w eak'.’*7
Ir. the current Sino-Japanese stand-off m Genk;kv/ru ioy-< Ir.iar.di Xi Jiaping. 
appointed as the head o f the “Office o f Respond x- the Diaoyu Crisis’1 soon after the 
Japanese government announced the purchasing decision, is implementing a step -by-step 
plan to force the Japanese government to acknowledge that the sovereignty o f the islands 
is disputed. The new Chinese top leader, who is consolidating his power base within 
various factions o f the Communist Party, is cognizant o f the necessity o f  winning more 
political support through appeals to nationalism by establishing his credentials as a firm
adherent, o f state sovereignty. Xi’s tough stance— which is evidenced in Beijing actions 
that are intensifying the pressure on Tokyo to change its current position, in an attempt to 
undermine Japan’s de-facto control o f the islands— indicates that the new leadership wiil 
not. and actually has little room to, make concessions in the issues o f territorial disputes. 
Given that the out-group affront has steamed up the sensitive victimhood o f the in-gioup 
members, Chinese leaders “who sense they have the emotional consensus and support 
from citizens,” to bonow Brent Sasley’s words, “will feel ... strengthened to pursue a 
given course o f  action.”28 Under such circumstances, the normative “scripts” inherent in 
historical institutions that have shaped the popular perception toward the self other 
interaction become most salient when foreign afftonts steam up the Chinese sense o f 
victimhood signified from the traumatic memory.
Adam Winter. ''Barren Islands Bring China io a Boil," (A ugust 20 , 2012;, 
hltp://vvw w .bloom bergxom /new 3/20i 2-08-20,''barren-islands-bring-china-to-a-boi) htrrd. (.accessed on  May 
’. ,2 0 1 3 ) .
2> Sasley,."Theorizing Slates’ Em otions/' 468.
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The constraint of'domestic nationalist public opinion on Beijing’s “satisficing” 
diplomatic decision-making corroborates James Fearon’s formalization o f international 
crisis in a nondemocratic setting. According to Fearon’s model, the state’s decisions to 
attack, back down, or escalate the interstate conflicts are all constrained by the domestic
audience costs. In its negotiation with Tokyo over history-related issues, Beijing’s 
acquiescence to popular mobilization does signal the vulnerability o f the authoritarian 
regime to domestic nationalist protests, which strengthens its bargaining leverage in 
negotiating with Tokyo.30 However, this does not mean that the historical institutions 
underlying the swell o f  nationalist sentiments can be dismissed as a result o f the top- 
down manipulation o f  the CCP in its attempt to achieve diplomatic gains.
The Chinese government has to walk a tightrope between allowing the nationalist 
venting and losing control o f the popular protests that wili turn against the state itself. ,
When Japan was alleged to have “staged the farce” of nationalizing the Senkaku/Diaoyu 4
Islands, nationalists protests flared in Chinese cities. The irate protesters, besides calling • i
for the boycott o f Japanese products, vented their indignation against their erstwhile ,
colonial overlord with violent actions, such as vandalizing Japanese property and looting 
Japanese-invested businesses. Such bigotry is not completely orchestrated, although 
tacitly sanctioned, by the Chinese government.31 Despite the temptation to beat the anti •
Japanese nationalist drum, Beijing is acutely aware that the bitter memory o f Japanese 
invasion and the resultant historical grudge harbored by the general populace can make
29 Fearon, "D om estic Political A udiences and the Escalation o f  International D isp u tes,1' 577-92 .
30 See W eiss, "Autocratic S ignaling. M ass A udiences and N ationalist Protest in China," 1-35; Pow erful 
P n l’ iols: N ation alist P ro tes t in C hina  s  Foreign R elations
31 For the state-m anipulated v iew  o f  nationalist protesters, see, e.g ., Rodger Baker. ” Understanding the 
China-Japan Island Conflict," Stratfor G lobal Intelligence, http://w w w .stratfor.com /w eekly/understanding- 
china-japan-island-conflict. (accessed  on  M ay 1 ,2 0 1 3 ) .
domestic public opinion highly mobilized around a fiashpniiii issue such as the 
SmkahuDiaoyv. rows, in these instances, it is costly for thcXCP to tok* policy steps in 
contradiction to articulatea public sentiments As Susan Sin.k argves, authoritarian 
Chinese leaders, unlike democratically elected leaders, are not ,'oncerr.ec! with the 
opinion o f the ‘ media voter,” but only with the opinions of  the few who are willing to 
organize a protest and upset the political status quo.32 Nationalist protests, even though • 
they are staged by the “loud minority,” will snowball into a broader movement that could 
build a coalition against the regime For this reason, as Alistair Iain Johnston notes, 
“There is considerable evidence that the [CCP leadership] focuses on more extremist 
attitudes . presumably because these views are a barometer o f  the kinds o f emotions 
that would get protesters into the streets.”33 Given the risk to tegime stability
outweighing the diplomatic gains from making a credible signal to the foreign “other,” 
nationalist protests over a foreign relations issue.threaten to simulate the impulse o f 
domestic social riots. The likelihood that Beijing’s diplomatic decision makers will fail 
to meet domestic expectations, as Jessica Weiss acknowledges, has “^dded mere 
unpredictability . . for China’s government and for outside observers trying to discern 
Beijing’s political objectives.”34
Viewed in this iight, nationalist mobilization cannot be fully manipulated by the 
CCP to achieve its rational purposes. If the anti-Japanese protests mentioned above were 
under the foil control o f Chinese foreign policy decision-makers, then traumatic memory.
Susac L. Shirk, "Changing M edia, Changing Foreign Policy in China." Japan ese  Jou rn al o f  P o litica l 
Science 8, no. 1 (.7.007): 60. .
3' A lastah  ;ai.i Johnston, "China M iddle C last A ltitudes toward Internal'.one.! Affairs," The China  
Q uarterly  179(2004): 626.
54 Quoted in Julie M akinen, "Anti-Japan Protests in China Spread to M ore Cities." Lor, A ngeles Times 
September 1 6 ,2 0 1 2 .
as some Western scholars have claimed, could be seen as an on-demand “sutured wound” 
that the Chinese authoritarian state can “tear open and let bleed when expedient” and “stir 
up against lest [it] risk control."36 This point o f  view is actually a counterargument that 
problematizes the independent impact o f  historical institutions on Beijing’s foreign policy 
making. One way to test the validity o f  this argument is to see whether collective 
memory and national identity can only be exploited to externalize internal conflicts, 
without any possibility o f  threatening the internal legitimacy o f the regime.
As analyzed in Chapter 3, the master historical account harping on the collective 
memory o f  national humiliation is effective in legitimizing Chinese authoritarian regime. 
As a symbolic element communicated in the state-centric strategic narrative, national 
trauma does redirect the domestic grievance, emanating from internal tensions arising in 
post-Mao reform, to external entities, which are perceived as perpetrators violating the 
normative and purposive norms embedded in the Chinese national identity. However, the 
instrumental function o f collective memory and national identity does not preclude the 
independent impact o f  historical institutions on the Chinese foreign policy making. As 
Jack Levy points out in his critique o f the diversionary theory o f war, scapegoating is not 
just a process o f one-way diversion.36 One o f the preconditions for transferring domestic 
tension to external entities is, according to Mayers and Coser, the preexisting level o f 
internal cohesion. In other words, domestic constituencies have to perceive themselves
3' Peter W ynn Kirby, ''China W ould B e W ise to A ccept Japan’s O live Branch over the Senkaku islands," 
The Guardian, http://\vw vv.guardian.co.uk/com rnentisfree/2012/oct/14/china-japan-5snkaku-islands, 
(accessed  on July 1 ,2 0 1 3 ) .
36 Jack S. l e v y . " The D iversionary Theory' o f  War: A  Critique," in H andbook o f  W ar S tu d ies  ed. M anus I. 
M idlarsky (B ostom , M A: U nw in  Hymari, 1989). 267.
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‘ at: a group and the preservation o f the group as worthwhile/' and bet-'-ve that "the 
external threat menaces the in-group as a whole aid not jjs> one p .jf  of it.”37
In a transitional society like China, as pointed out in Chftpie* 7, the 
socioeconomic transformation has biought abcas glaring disparity betvVten the “winners” 
and “losers” o f  the reform. To the extent that the. Chinese society is iroreasingly 
pluralistic and complex, internal cohesion cannot be guaranteed. If a new crisis were to 
take place in the socioeconomic sphere wherein the government falls short o f the social 
expectations engendered by its ill governance, the populace could readily blame the 
government for the economic woes Actually, the erosion o f the “utilitarian justification” 
o f the Communist regime has heightened the constraint o f  domestic public opinion in 
foreign affairs. To shore up its legitimacy, the CCP has to rely on the “original 
justification” to corroborate its moral character and glean the diffuse support o f the 
Chinese populace.
On the foreign relations front, the source o f such popular support o f  the 
authoritarian regime lies in the normative scripts o f  the PRC’s diplomacy, which denotes 
the “logic o f appropriateness” inherent in the historical institutions. In the case o f 
emotionally-charged diplomatic issues involving traumatic collective memory, any 
response perceived as too soft on the part of the state government could be conceived as 
the regime’s lack o f commitment to fulfilling domestic social convention determined by 
the memory-encoded and identity-constitutive norms. On the other hand, even though 
the confident vein o f Chinese nationalism is taking shape along with the increase of 
China’s prowess, the nationalist aspiration o f  achieving the “Chinese dream” {zhongguo
37 ” The Diversionary Theory o f  War: A  Critique," in H andbook o f  War S tu d ies  ed. M anus I. M idlarsky 
(B ostom . M A: U nw in Hyman, 1989), 261.
meng)-—the purposive element ingrained in the national identity— has deep roots 
stretching back to the indignities foisted on China in the “century o f national 
humiliation." This has been evidenced in the near-pathological Chinese yearning for
national dignity and its zero tolerance for foreign provocation in issues concerning 
sovereignty and territoriality. As the sources of these motivational elements o f the state’s 
diplomatic behavior, historical institutions are the endogenous variable o f the regime’s 
policy making. Failure to follow the institutionalist “scripts" o f China’s diplomatic 
drama can be transposed to the realm o f the CCP’s internal legitimation. Chinese foreign 
policy making, therefore, is not the function o f a monolithic Party-state unilaterally 
formulating the decisions about what the best plan o f action is.
STATE-CENTRIC OR SOCIETY-DRIVEN. INTERACTIVITY IN THE CONTESTED 
ARENA OF MEDIA ENVIRONMENT
Nowhere is the CCP’s diplomatic decision-making dilemma, most notably its 
Japan policy, better illustrated than in contemporary China’s media ecology, in which the 
formation and projection o f foreign policy information and the state’s diplomatic 
formulation can be seen as an ever-negotiated product o f  the interaction between the 
propaganda state and the Chinese public. As a primary trader o f  information pertinent to 
foreign affairs, mass media are an intervening variable indispensable to the rhetoric 
transaction between elites and masses. Understanding how this discrete actor facilitates 
the disruption o f state-driven strategic narratives and the mediation o f counter-narratives 
at the popular level is the key to unlocking the discursive dimension o f Beijing’s foreign 
policy making. In such a dynamic process, the authoritarian state has demonstrated
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increasing n sponsiveness to, and or. some occasions is. ever; hijacked by, bfel!igerent 
public opinions enabled by the historical institutions ir. Chinese nationalism. • '*?
tr> pre-reform China, the projection of foreign policy intormatior.' was typically a 
top down, process, so that the state’s consensus building v ras achieved at the expense of 
the autonomy o f the public audience in voicing any heterodox social discourse-.' The 
distribution o f foreign-policy information was predominantly controlled by political elites 
whose conduct o f diplomacy w as unfettered by domestic audience cost. Given the 
informational disadvantage o f the populace vis-a-vis the leadership and the penal power 
o f the vast coercive propaganda apparatus imposed from above, there was no need for the
decision-makers to be responsive to domestic public opinion. With regard to the Chinese 
media in the circulation o f information, its role as the “throaf and tongue” (houshe) o f the 
state government was comparable to what some Western scholars view as an 
accommodating linkage in the political communication system, simply transmitting elite 
rhetoric to the passive recipients,38 who were unable to wield significant influence on 
Beijing’s foreign policy making.
Due to structural changes in China’s media sector since the 1990s onward, the 
communication environment of Beijing’s diplomacy has been qualitatively transformed, 
with mass media engaged in a tug-of-war between the supply and demand sides of
58 See, e.g., Yaeli B loch Elkon and Sam Lchm an-W ilzig. "Ar. Exploratory M ode! o f  M edia-G ovem m ent 
Relations," in M edia a n d  Conflict: F ram ing Issues. M aking Policy, Shaping O pinions, ed. Eytan G ilboa  
(N ew  York, N Y : Transnational, 2002). Richard A. Brody, A ssessing the President. The M ediae E lite  
Opinion, a n d  Public S u pport (Stanford, VA: Stanford University Press, 1991). W , Lance Bennett, 
"Toward a Theory o f  Press-State Relations in the United States," Journal o f  Com m unications 40 , no. 2 
(1990). W. Lance Bennett, R egina G. Lawrence, and Steven Livingston, 'N on e Dave C alf It Torture: 
Indexing and the Lim its o f  Press Independence in the Abu Ghraib Scandal," ibid.56, no. 3 (2006). Bruce 
W. Jentleson, "The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post Vietnam Amcr'can Opinion or. the U se o f  Military 
Force," In ternational Studies Q uarterly  35, no. 1 (1992) John Zalier and Dennis Chiu, "Government's 
Little Helper: U .S. Press C overage o f  Foreign P olicy  Crist;.', 1946-1999 ,’’ in D ecisionm aking in a G lass  
H ouse' M ass M edia, Public Opinion, an d  A m erican  an d  E uropean Foreign F oiicy In the 2 1 s t Century, ed. 
Brigitte L. N acos, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Pierangele Isernia (N ew  York, N Y : Rowm an and Littlefield, 
2000).
commodified information. Just as Baum and Potter illustrate in their model depicting the 
interaction among three interdependent actors in such a discursive arena, media serve as a 
critical middleman in the information flow between the leadership and the public and 
thus has its agency in shifting the foreign policy marketplace equilibrium favoring either 
the elites or the masses.39 Despite the social engineering o f  the Party-state in molding 
uniform public thinking., the low discursive power o f  the Chinese public does not mean a 
lack o f demand for information. While being fed up with the large-dose propaganda 
inculcation, the mass public is dissatisfied with the meager fare obtained from the state 
controlled media. The Chinese populace'today stops short o f taking credence in leaders’ 
perorations that are rife with vacuous platitude and the editorials glutted with stale 
sloganeering. Assuming that the state-crafted narratives are inevitably slanted and are in 
one way or another colored by the intention o f “political thought work" (sixiang zhengzhi 
zangguo), the audience is actively seeking additional sources for unffamed and objective 
reporting on China and the outside world.
On the part o f  the former provider o f  monopolized information, the Party-state is 
desperate for an innovative, professional, and empathetic media to enhance the 
persuasive power o f official discourse. In the grave transformation to a globalized 
economy, China's media, which were immune to any form o f competition in the 
centralized, planned economy, are new harnessed by the economic logic o f  profit 
maximization. Whereas the siatc does not abdicate its control in this sector, various 
media outlets, including subsidiaries o f the propaganda press, have evolved from being 
solely the mouthpiece o f the Party-state to economic entities operating on a competitive
39 M atthew  A . Baum and Philip B. K.. Potter, "The Relationship betw een M ass M edia. Public O pinion, and 
Foreign Policy: Toward a T heoretical Synthesis," A nnual R eview  o f  P o litic a l Science  11(2008).
ac.ceU-.imor for the mass media to meet the p<: average., by
reporting those flashpoint issues in China’s foreign affafo t; engender
strong emotional response from the public.
A lifting o f the strict restrictions on the informational flow ir. crucial fct the state’s 
engagement with an. increasingly pluralistic and incompliant public Such “liberalized 
authoritarianism,” as noted by O ’Donnell ana Schmitter, is expected to “relieve various 
pressures and obtain needed information and support [for the authoritarian state] without 
altering the structure o f authority.”41 The discursive sphere o f Chinese nationalism under 
the mantle o f patriotism, in which the CCP’s regime legitimacy is instituted, has been 
opened up for interest articulation and political claim-making by the general populace, 
which is closely monitored by the authoritarian state. While the agenda o f  official 
nationalism remains chiefly in the custody o f the regime and its ideologues, 
nongovernmental actors, particularly commercialized media, have joined the state in 
whipping up the subject o f patriotism. As Geremie Barme observes, “Patriotic sentiment 
is no longer the sole province o f the Party and its propagandists. .. [Nationalism] is 
functioning as a form o f consensus beyond the bounds o f official culture ”4''
In Chinese foreign affairs, such a consensus is roost likely to reach over the spars 
over Japan’s historical behavior, which tends to stand out front the repertoire o f  the
40 E.g., Shirk, "Changing M edia, C hanging Foreign Policy  in China." Chengju Huang, "Trace the Stones in 
Crossing the River: M edia Structural C hanges in Post W io China," The In ternational C om m unication  
G azette  69 , no. 5 (2007).
41 G uillerm o O 'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Part F e e .  Tentative C onclusions A bout Uncertain 
Dem ocracies," in T ransitions f ro m  A uthoritarian  Rule P rospects f o r  D em ocracy, id . G uillerm o O 'D onnell, 
Philippe C. Scb.Tiitcei, and Laurence W hitehead (Baltim ore and L oad er: The John H opkins U niversity  
Press, i 9 8 6 ), 9. Em phasis added.
42 Gerem ie R. Barme, "To Screw  Foreigners Is Patriotic:, China's A vant -Garde Nationalist," The China  
Journal, no. 34 (1995): 211-12 .
source materials for media coverage. Externa! affronts evincing Japan’s attitude toward 
its imperial colonialism are prone to be perceived as violating the Chinese memory-
encoded norm, thus providing market-driven media with the meat and potatoes to win a
large readership. By activating the collective emotion in the Chinese community, media 
coverage of such focal issues satisfies the ravenous hunger o f the populace for 
“trustworthy and credible information.” 43 while conveying the state’s policy commitment 
on the diplomatic stage to consumers o f foreign-policy information. In the cut-throat 
competition, radicalizing the flashpoint diplomatic events that are most likely to catalyze 
the historical analogy function o f the national-trauma symbol has become a common 
market strategy for the commercialized media to make their products distinguishable in 
the state-defined orbit.
China’s communicative environment featuring “liberalized authoritarianism” does 
not rule out the state’s continued grip on managing public opinion. Given the intention of 
decision-making elites to ease constraints o f  their policymaking, foreign-policy 
information flowing from the official source “usually comes prepackaged in a frame that 
leaders would prefer that the media retain.” 44 As an element o f  the CCP’s diplomatic 
decision-making environment, the anti-Japanese enmity always requires the elite framing 
in the official media coverage., so as to shape the opinion o f consumers o f  foreign -policy 
information and legitimize the policy shift. Since the Sino-Japanese relationship sank to 
a historical nadir in 2005, the state propaganda has been seeking a turnaround in the
41 Ithiel de Sola  P ool, "Communication in Totalitarian S o c ie tie s ,” in H andbook o f  C om m unication  ed. lthiel 
de Sola  Pool, et al. (C hicago, IL: Rand M cN ally, 1973), 463.
44 Baum and Potter, "The Relationship betw een M ass M edia, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy: Toward a 
Theoretical Synthesis," 50.
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r?.preseni3tior; of-Japan, which is tailoied to syneigizc with the mcmentom o f public 
diplomacy in an attempt to restore the s tian td  tie;.4j
As part o fthe effort in curtailing ami Japanese activism, Bc-ijmg goes out o f its 
way to temper media coverage o f the troubled relationship, vary o f presenting an overly 
negative out-group image that would stir up antagonistic public opinion. In October 2006, 
after a five-year hiatus in forma! summits, Japan's Prime Minister Abe Shinzo selected 
China as the destination o f his first state visit when he came to power. Without obtaining 
Abe’s promise o f not paying homage to Yasukuni— a sensitive issue where the harsh 
stance o f his predecessor, Junichiro Koizumi, had soured the bilateral relations, Beijing
treated this “ice-breaking trip” as a real treasure to restore the festered relations with 
Tokyo. In reporting Abe’s inaugural speech to the Diet, while highlighting his stated 
goodwill in rebuilding a ‘‘forward looking’" relationship with China and South Korea, 
official Xinhua News Agency glossed over his pledge to propel Japan’s bid for 
permanent membership o f the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the disputed 
call for more “patriotism” in Japan’s history education.46 Considering the critical 
position Beijing normally took toward Japanese conservatives, the anodyne coverage of 
the right-wing Prime Minister, alongside the propaganda blitz o f the state-run media 
augmenting a friendly aura for then-Premier Wen Jiabo’s “ ice-melting visit” to Japan m 
April 2007, was conceivably the CCP’s strategy designed to reciprocate the olive branch 
extended by the new Japanese government.
45 Janies Reilly "Remember H istory, Not Hatred: C ollective Kemer:.b'anct o f  China;:; War o f  Resistance tc 
Japan," M odern Asian Studies 45, no. 2 (2 0 1 1 /  i 4-23.
46 Christopher R H ughes, "Japan in the Politics o f  Chinese Leadership Legitim acy: P.ecent D evelopm ents 
in Historical Perspective," Japan Forum  2 0 ,1 10 . 2 (2008): 259.
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Having said this, the positive spin on Japan in line with Beijing’s diplomatic 
outreach is not without a limit. Once the high-profile events involving “hot” history 
issues come to the fore, the sanitized reportage o f  the bilateral issues deliberately woven 
in the elite-preferred frame tends to disconfirm the preexisting beliefs o f  the Chinese 
audience concerning the out-group culprit as engrained in the collective memory. Such 
cognitive discord indicates that the state-driven narratives have overstretched what Baum 
and Potter term the “elasticity o f  reality,”47 thereby prompting the public demand for a 
“realpolitik account” that is congruent with the “schemata” o f the audience.48
In the aggressive exploitation o f a commercial goldmine, market-oriented media 
may not be a pro-regime ally, but a significant non-state actor, which, by stereotyping 
nationalist opponents as irremediably threatening and worthy o f vigilant attack, is able to 
distort the narrative maneuvering o f the elites in inculcating a “prepackaged” version o f 
foreign affairs. To the extent that their professional pendulum tends to swing more 
toward the “commercial bottom line” than the “Party line,”49 commercialized media have 
incentive to run prominent stories in a narrative frame contrary to the one retained in the 
official reportage. In a controversial remark made in March 2007, Abe boldly cast doubt 
on the coercion o f the sexual service provided by Asian “comfort women” during the 
War World II. In response to A be’s comment on this sensitive history issue, the flood of 
indignation outpoured in the coverage o f Chinese tabloids was in stark contrast to the
47 Baum and Potter, "The R elationship betw een M ass M edia. Public O pinion, and Foreign Policy: Toward a 
Theoretical Synthesis," 56-57.
4S Cao. "Confucian V ision  o f  a N e w  W orld Order? Culturalist D iscourse. Foreign Policy and the Press in
C ontemporary China," 443 .
44 David Sham baugh, "China's Propaganda System : Institutions, P rocesses and Efficacy," The C hina
J ou rn al, no, 57 (2007).
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restrained approach adopted by the mainstream msdis..50 T hc. con testes ion between the 
propaganda-oriented media and their commercialized oov-nkrpar5-—'-vith the former 
attempting to placate jingoistic public opinion by selimg what the riom i/oo audience is 
supposed to buy while the latter trying to appeal to the oat-una'iei tasto with sensationalist 
m essages--has offered the Chinese public competing frames o f tbreigu affairs. The 
autonomy of the domestic audience in the processing o f the foreign-policy information 
has dramatically increased with the expansion o f its discursive capacity.
A significant force contributing to the shift of the equilibrium on the foreign 
policy marketplace in a direction favoring the Chinese populace is the new information 
and communication technologies (ICTs). The increased reach and availability o f ICTs, 
while rendering the market-driven media less dependent on the state-sanctioned messages, 
have brought growing transnational information flows onto the scene. In the situations 
where Party-controlled press has spun the foreign affairs beyond the “elasticity o f 
reality/ ’ which leads to popular distrust o f  official media accounts, the alternative news 
sources introduce information transparency to the landscape o f Chinese mass 
communication. In spring 2005, at the initial stage o f the popular protests against Japan’s 
quest for a permanent seat in the UNSC. although Chinese media were not allowed to run 
incendiary reports, news coverage that were prohibited in domestic public access and 
traditional media were available from transnational sources. After comparing the Xinhua ■ 
version of reporting Japan’s bid with those released from foreign media., some Chinese 
netizens participating in the discussion on the China-Japan forum—an online bulletin 
board under the Strong Nation Forum {qiangguo iantan) affiliated with People’s Daily—
50 R eilly, "Remember History, N o t Hatred: C o llective  R em em brance o f  China's War o f  Resistance to 
Japan," 24-25 . >
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expressed their resentment by questioning “why the Chinese media still pretended to be 
deaf and dumb.’'5. As evidenced ip the online contestation, the multiplication o f news 
suppliers enabled by ICTs, which m akes the total control o f  inform ation flow
increasingly difficult on the part o f  the authoritarian state, has engendered what Steven 
Livingston calls the “imposed transparency” on the cyberspace platform,52 where the 
networked crowd can vigorously exchange news items obtained from external sources c f  
foreign affairs coverage, thereby forcing the government to respond to and account for 
the queries and debates aroused in the virtual public sphere.
Since the discursive power o f  the CCP leadership is gradually evened out in the 
restructured pattern o f information distribution, Beijing’s foreign policymakers often find 
themselves unable to keep contentious issues off the public agenda. As the transmission 
o f  dramatic events has been broadened by the boom o f  ICTs, under the conditions where )
public opinions are highly mobilized around an emotionally-charged issue, traditional <j
location-based nationalist protests can be replaced by transnational modes o f  digital j
contention. In the protest against Japan’s bid for UNSC membership, the online petition |
initiated by a U.S.-based overseas Chinese civilian group in March 2005 was 
immediately followed by similar actions on domestic popular news portals such as 
sina.com, urging the Chinese government to block Japan’s attempt.53 Insofar as the 
Internet-based mass mobilization has sped up cross-national coalition building, 
transnational information flows also bring in “systematic transparency’’ by publicizing 
flashpoint diplomatic issues and coordinating collective actions on a large populace
51 Shih-D ing Liu, "China's Popuolar N ationalism  o n th e  Internet: Report on the 2005  Anti-Japan Network  
Struggles," Inter Asia C u ltu ra l S tudies 7, no. ! (2006): 146.
52 Steven L ivingston. "Transparency and the N e w s Media," in P ow er a n d  C on flic t in the A ge o f  
Transparency, ed. Bernard 1. Finel and Kristin M. Lord (N ew  York, N Y: Pal grave, 2002). 257.
5' Zhang, "The Influence o f  C hinese N ationalism  or. S ino-Japanesc Relations," 24-25.
i t e  signature campaign sw iftly  formed a ‘'shai'cri.synribclic system” in the c yberspace..5?' • 
As individuals m this virtual community ware w a re  that ihef pzers ill received the 
mobilizing message, information transparency caused by the s tf rr .if  onalized news flow 
reinforced the collective identity o f the Chinese In group and thus btcught its members • 
into action
In such a crisis situation where inflammatory nationalist sentiments are incited, 
the marriage o f ICTs with political advocacy not only dissipates the spatial constraints for 
the horizontal linkage between the Chinese diaspora and its domestic compatriot, but
connects the nationalist ire expressed online with offline protests as well. In spring 2005, 
when the scale and intensity o f nationalist uproar toward Japan reached a new zenith, 
even though the Chinese government did not hesitate to twist arms in banning the 
coverage of anti-Japanese demonstrations in an effort to tamp down popular wrath, 
Chinese cyberspace was buzzing with detailed information visualizing anti-Japanese 
rows. The shrilling attack or; Japan inflated on the virtual emotional scene soon spilled 
over into the street. Thanks to digital communication devices, which accelerated the. 
dissemination o f logistical information in the run-up to physical protests, the 
government’s attempt to dissuade young students from attending the demonstrations was 
defied.56 In April 2005, when mass protest was mobilized in Shanghai, just as New York 
Times reporter Jim Yardley wrote, “An underground conversation was raging via email, 
text messages and instant online messaging that inflamed public opinion and served as an
51 Livingston, "Transparency and the N ew s Media." 257.
55 See M ichael Side-Young C hw e, R ation a l Ritual: Culture. C oordincdoK . a n d  Com m on K n ow ledge  
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2 0 0 9 ), 7-8.
50 Qiao X iang, "Control M echanism  Cracked in the Face o f  Technology," Asian WaU S treet Jo u rn a l , April 
27 2005.
organizing loo! for protesters.”' 7 Given that the multiplier effect o f ICTs in spreading the 
“common knowledge” for collective actions has made it a daunting task for the
, , . -  »58
government to hait popular nationalist contention in “a web o f transparency,” public 
opinions have made their way to the decision-making circle affecting Beijing’s stance 
toward Japan.
Therefore, given the decentralized and technology-facilitated nature o f Chinese 
popular nationalism, the roles o f the CCP leadership and the public as the communicator 
and audience in the foreign policy marketplace have proved to be interchangeable in the 
Chinese foreign policy marketplace. In reconfiguring the way in which foreign-policy 
information is framed, collected, and circulated, mass media have constituted an integral 
part o f an “information loop,” through which the leadership can receive the feedback o f 
public opinion or. the state’s diplomatic behavior and the diplomatic position taken by the 
state can also shift accordingly.39
With regard to Japan’s bid for the IJNSC permanent membership, given its 
reluctance to see a global power on par with itself in East Asia, Beijing did not show 
enthusiasm for the proposal o f  UN reform aimed at involving more countries in the 
decision-making process. However, until early 2005, Chinese foreign policy elites did 
not flatly oppose Japan’s quest and even refrained from claiming that Beijing did not 
support Tokyo on this issue.60 With much at stake in the bilateral relations, the 
government chose to “take a backseat” by allowing other states to express a position that
57 Jim Yardley, "A Hundred C ellphones B loom , and C hinese Take to the Streets," N ew York Times, April 
25 2005 .
18 L ivingston, "Transparency and the N e w s M edia ,” 258.
5V Shirk, "Changing M edia. C hanging Foreign Policy  in China," 57.
60 M ing W an. S in o-Japan ese R e la tion s: Interaction. Logic, a n d  Transform ation  (W ashington, D.C. & 
Stanford, CA: W oodrow  W ilson  Center Press & Stanford U niversity Press, 2006), 125-26.
it shared. 1 As the unprecedented wave o f massive prett si' spun out \<f';.v>r*trol, Beijing's 
nonsupport position became move explicit, which wac: signaled in the comment made by 
the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman a*, r. pres: briefing i:t Mar.?- that the online 
petition campaign, rather than a venting o f ‘'anti-Japanese ser.; 7ocrV ’ - as a '‘responsible 
act” causing Japan to reflect upon its historical wrongs.62 Two week: after the explosion 
o f anti-Japanese protests, this remark was confirmed in a public statement made by Wen 
Jiabao’s in his state visit to’ India, which was the first announcement o f a top Chinese 
leader making clear Beijing s disapproval o f Japan’s candidacy. In the two-way 
informational flow between the leadership and the public, Chinese mass media are no 
longer a passive conduit parroting official accounts, bu tan  indispensable channel sending 
nationalist voice at the popular level back to Zhongnanhai, the leadership compound in 
Beijing. Among other circumstantial evidence manifested in the trajectory o f Beijing’s 
response to Japan's bid, it was conceivable that the staggering 46 million digital 
signatures collected in the internet campaigns prompted the Chinese government to 
preempt a firestorm o f  popular complaints o f  its inaction on this sensitive issue. The 
articulated public sentiment catalyzed Beijing’s departure from the initial low-keep 
approach to explicit opposition to public rejection— a dynamic process in which the 
government’s foreign policy agenda was reconstructed under the pressure o f  nationalist 
opinion communicated through the media-enabled ‘information b o p  ” ■ ' '
61 Peter H ays Cries, "Chinese Nationalism : C hallenging the State?," Current H istory  i 04, no. 683 (2005): 
254
62 Waii. Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, a n d  Transform ation, 390.
‘LOGIC OF CONTENTION": THE SUBVERSIVE DIMENSION OF TRAUMATIC 
MEMORY
As evidenced in the inter activity between the propaganda state and Chinese
societal forces in the media environment, the most sensitive issue areas in China’s 
diplomacy, in which the CCP leadership is obliged to accommodate the public opinion, 
are those that touch upon nationalist sentiments. The reason for Beijing’s receptivity to 
the opinion o f its domestic audience in this arena is that emotionally-charged diplomatic 
events can readily evoke public agitation and make pronounced the social norms 
ingrained in the collective memory and national identity, thereby rendering the CCP’s 
diplomatic performance susceptible to the assessment o f the Chinese populace. If viewed 
in the domain o f memory politics, the drama o f the PRC’s diplomacy involves the 
interaction o f three types o f factors, according to W ulf Kansteiner ’s conceptualization- 
the political culture in which public remembrance is embedded, the “memory makers’' 
who capitalize on the culture repertoire to formulate commemorative narratives, and the 
“memory consumers" who “use, ignore, or transform" these narratives in their own 
interests.63 While the role identity o f the CCP fits nicely into the mindsets of “memory 
consumers,” ;n the social consumption o f traumatic memory, the latter has its agency in 
putting forth their contentious claims by referencing the historical narratives that 
eulogizes the regime’s representativeness. As such, the construction and consumption o f 
collective memory is not a one-way process. The public recollection.can be resistant to 
the present interests o f  the “memory makers” in a way that transcends the volition o f the 
fbrmulator o f historical narratives.
63 W ulf Kansteiner, "Finding M eaning in M emory: A M ethodological Critique o f  C ollective M em ory 
Studies." H istory a n d  Theory  41 . no. 2 (2002): 180.
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Aiong this line o f  reasoning, the “logic, of appropriateness” inherent in the' 
Historical institutions of  Chinese nationalism has dutd roles On the ohe hand, iv provides 
the “logic o f legitimation” for the symbolic, roprev.ntsuor. of the CCP’ ; regime 
legitimacy On the other hand, if the regime ;: :-s; 'tnn&nce goes againtt the “proper 
modes o f conduct’' widely accepted in the Chinese political culture, historical institutions 
provide the “logic o f contention, ’ the basic grammar underlying popular discourse in the 
contestation with the authoritarian state. In Chinese history, the impressive record of 
popular resistance and rebellion is exemplary o f tne rich tradition o f toppling illegitimate 
regimes.64 As the origin o f  the Chinese nationalist movement, the May Fourth
Movement in 1919,, emerging horn the popular outrage against the Versailles Treaty that 
transferred Germany’s China concession to Japan, was a symbol o f popular contention 
aimed at overthrowing an authoritarian regime, which failed to protect the national
\ interest by surrendering Chinese territories and sovereignty to foreign demands. In a
, >
I similar way, in the contemporary era, sovereignty and territoriality— the normative
• principles encoded in the scripts” of the PRC’s diplomacy—inspire challenges to the
CCP’s memory based 'legitimacy by the popular assessment o f  the state’s behavior. As
James Scott explains,
[The] very process o f attempting to legitimate a social order by idealizing 
it ... provides its subjects with the means, the symbolic tools, the very 
ideas for a critique. ... For most purposes, then, it Is not at all necessary' 
for subordinate classes to set foot outside the confines o f the ruling ideals 
in order to formulate a critique o f power.”65
6" Elizabeth ). Perry and Mark Seden, eds., Chinese S o c k ty :  Change, C onflict a n d  R esistance, 2nd cd. 
(N ew  York, N Y : R outledge, 2003), 8; Elizabeth 3. Perry, "Challenging th; Mandate o f  H eaven. Popular 
Protest in M odem  China,'' C ritica l A sian  Studies 33, no. 2 ;2CC1). 163.
65 lam es Scott, W eapons o f  the Weak- E eryday F orm s o f  P easan t R esistance  (N ew  H eaven, C T : Yale 
University Press, 1985), 338.
In the linkage politics o f Chinese foreign affairs, the “symbolic tools” that ailow 
the Chinese populace to articulate their opinion in opposition to a repressive regime are 
the collective memory and national identity in the enterprise o f  nationalism, in issues 
where the audience for the China’s diplomatic drama perceives the actor as “too soft,” or 
in the foreign provocations where the audience feels that humiliation o f  the Chinese 
nation is not undone, historical institutions shaping Beijing's foreign policy making
provide an effective issue frame to mobilize the emotion and opinion of the "memory 
consumers” and express their discontent with the performance and hence the legitimacy 
o f the “memory makers.” In this regard, the interaction between “memory makers” and 
“memory consumers” actually reflects the relationship between the principal (nation) 
and the agency (state/regime) in the state legitimation project. Inasmuch as the virtual 
rule o f the CCP is legitimized in the indissoluble linkage between the state agency and 
the national principal, the “ruling ideals” narrated in the official nationalist discourse 
endow' the “national subjects” with “an inalienable political right to appeal directly to the 
principal.”66 As long as the master historical account highlighting the regime’s memory- 
based legitimacy fails to ring true on the foreign relations front, the accusing finger that 
the Chinese populace points to the nation’s putative enemy can be turned inward.
In the age o f  multimedia communication, as elucidated in the second part o f this 
chapter, the proliferation o f I d s  has provided an effective platform where anti-foreign 
nationalist fervor can forcefully mutate into discontent with the state-centric strategic 
narratives that are aimed at justifying the government’s actions. In the virtual public 
space, Chinese netizens can project counter-narratives to express their discontent with 
the leviathan state. As the audience o f the PRC’s diplomacy, they are entitled to the
66 St:o, "Nationalism  and the Problem o f  Political L egitim acy in China," 143.
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right to the “principal” o f the Chinese nation and a'.iicuia>; ihf.k' own • iewpomts in the 
assessment o f the state agency’s commitment to the fo^ign policy ''‘scripts/’ During 
April 2005, when anti-Japanese demonstrators cocked dozcrn : f C h in es  cities. 
Liberalization Daily (Jiefang ribao). a propaganda -fee.o n -5 media ’v c  by Shanghai 
municipal government, editorialized a forma! warping that the large -scale protests were 
part o f  a conspiracy that was designed to sabotage the state government. Along with 
calling for a hardline approach to Japan, online activists launched a bitter diatribe 
against the blackout o f  the media coverage and the deliberate attempt to rein in mass 
protests67 As the resentment toward the state-run media and the government’s action 
erupted in the cyberspace community, some participants on the Strong Nation Forum 
deplored the state’s performance in the thinly veiled critique o f the Liberalization 
Daily's editorial. One dissenter forcefully pointed out the mistakes o f the state-run 
media:
First, it did not report the protest from beginning ... as a result the whole
news report on the protest was dominated by foreign media. Second, the
news leport was serious biased. It did not pay attention to any positive
side o f the protest; instead o f report on the patriotic passion o f the majority
o f the part icipants, the media deliberately exaggerated the vandalism
committed by a few mobs. The report just echoed with the foreign media
and misguided the international society. It has produced a very negative
influence. Third, [the media and the government] did not encourage the
young students’ enthusiastic patriotism and lead them to a more rational
way, but rather accused them o f damaging the stability o f overall situation
* 68 * and committing street politics.
As the bearer o f state sovereignty, the domestic audience can highlight the - 
historical institutions o f Chinese foreign policy ideas by invoking the moral claims to the 
national principal. In an attempt to halt anti-Japanese demonstrations in April 2005,
0 Liu, ''China’s Popuolar Nationalism  on the Internet: Report or. the 2005 Anti-Japan N etw ork Struggles,'' 
147-48.
68 "China's Popuolar Nationalism  on the Internet: Report on the 2005  Anti-Japan N etw ork Straggles," 148
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P eople’s Daily also called for young people to “act calmly and reasonably” in an
editorial entitled “Sustaining Stability through the construction o f a Harmonious
Society" on the front page of the April 17 issue.6Q In the laging criticism with the
government-inspired article, collective memory o f  national humiliation and the related
notion o f  national interests, which denotes the normative elements o f Chinese foreign
policy ideas, were used by some netizens as a comparison device to refute the official
discourse and justify their discontent with the government:
Should a “harmonious society” that is being assaulted and bullied still be 
called “harmonious? W e’d rather not have such a “harmonious 
society. ... Concentration on the development is just a utopian self­
fantasy. The real situation would not evolve according to your own 
imagination. Foreign antagonistic forces would never give up their 
ambition. ... [They] would never allow you to develop ... peacefully and 
stably. .. This is a just self-deceiving slogan fooling ordinary people! .
Be watchful o f  the collusion that takes the construction o f harmonious 
society as an excuse but surrenders and betrays the national interest!70
In the battleground where the negotiation and contestation o f the propaganda state
and societal forces are unfolded, the authoritarian regime could not stifle the above
counter-narratives at will. Just as the irate demonstrators chanted in the anti-Japanese
protests, “patriotism is sacred” (aiguo wuzui) is a legitimate pretext for the Chinese
audience to express their dissent views on the state’s performance. With such a “logic
o f contention” appropriated from official discourse, the criticism o f the government was
framed in a bulwark, where the historical institutions o f Chinese foreign policy ideas
serve as what Caroline Humphery calls an “evocative transcript,” a text intended to
1,9 Jam es R eilly , "Harmonious World and Public O pinion in China's Japan Policy," in "H arm onious W orld" 
a n d  Chian's N ew  F oreign  P o lic y , ed. Suijian G uo and Jean-M arc F. Blanchard (Lanham, M D: L exington  
B ooks, 2 0 0 8 ), 209.
70 Liu, "China's Popuolar Nationalism  on the Internet: Report on the 200 5  Anti-Japan N etw ork Struggles," 
146.
evoke popular invective on die government's misconduct o' China’;, diplomacy.7- •'
W ithout" setting foct outside the confines-' o f :b f propaganda state, such discursive “ ' •
resistance operating in full vie' / o: hegemon*--; authoritsc. has become a coded way of 
directing popular dissent at the authoritarian -egijne, w ide effectively weeding out the 
official narratives that are deemed unconvincing by the domestic audience
Further, given the emotional dimension o f historical institutions and their wide 
acceptance in the Chinese political culture, the narrative frame employed in the 
assessment o f  the Chinese public concerning the CCP’s handling o f memory-related 
diplomatic issues is an effective means o f coalition building. The affective mobilization 
o f such a form o f popular contention, as Shirk argues, can meld various discontented 
social groups into a revolutionary' movement.’ " On an emotional platform constituted 
in the interaction o f the actor and audience for the PRC’s diplomatic drama, pressur es 
from the audience are placed on the actor on the diplomatic stage to resolve flashpoint 
issues in a way that satisfies the social needs inherent in the national identity.
Jn this process, the counter-framing endeavor enabled by historical institutions is
capable o f  disrupting the political agenda defined by the CCP leadership. As an 
encapsulation o f the inalienable right o f the Chinese populace to the “principal” o f the 
nation., the counter-narratives projected in the domestic foreign-policy interaction can 
fink the state’s failure to adhere to the normative ‘scripts” o f diplomatic drama to a 
broader ciitique o f  the state’s performance in the domestic, aisna. Such, issue linkages, 
cloaked under the banner o f patriotism, are an adaptive strategy o f the Chinese
71 Caroline Humphrey, '’Rem em bering an "Enemy": The B egti Khaar* in Tv/entiefli-Century Mongolia." in - -
M em ory, H istory, a n d  O pposition  under Stare Socialism  , ed: Ruble S. Wauon (Santa i c, N M : Schou! o f  
A m erican Research Press, 1994), 23.
77 Shirk, China, F rag ile  Superpow er: H ow  C hinu ‘s  In ternal P o litic s  C o u ld  D e ra il Its P eacefu l R ise  64.
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nationalist activists in their initiatives, which span the politically permissible boundary 
In their contestation with the repressive regime while garnering the support o f receptive 
national members o f their claim s.'3
In the attempt o f  political dissents to nibble away at the boundaries o f hegemonic
state control, according to David Snow and his colleagues, what reaily matters is “not
merely the presence or absence o f grievance, but the manner in which grievances are 
interpreted and the generation and diffusion o f those interpretations.”74 In the case o f 
China, the indissoluble linkage between the national principal and state agency, which is 
incessantly propagated in the state legitimation, serves as the “metonymic frame” for 
social movement, which, as Patricia Thornton argues, “ [contributes] to the formation of 
a sociai consensus .. by clearly defining and assigning blame for a particular problem to 
an agent ... and then offering solutions.”75 In the domestic audience’s interpretation of 
emotionally-charged diplomatic issues, the popular blame may not always be assigned to 
the putative foreign enemy, but to the state government that is held accountable for 
being too “soft” in dealing with the crises. As such, popular dissatisfaction with the 
state’s performance in foreign affairs can further morph into resentment toward domestic 
socioeconomic pains. In suggesting possible courses, nationalist activists can frame 
popular imagination outside the parameter endorsed by the state For instance, while , 
identifying the government against Western powers, popular nationalists have suggested
74 See Kevin J. O'Brien, "Neither Transgressive nor Contained: Boundary-Spanning Contention in China," 
in S ta te  a n d  S ocie ty  in 21st-C en tu ry  Chino: Crisis, C ontention, a n d  L egitim ation , ed. Peter 1 lays Gries and 
Stanley R osen (N ew  York and London: R outledge, 2 0 0 4 ), 105-22.
74 Snow  et al., "Frame A lignm ent P rocesses, M icrom obilization, and M ovem ent Participation.” 465-66 .
75 Patricia M Thornton, "Framing D issent in Contemporary China: Irony, A m biguity and M etonomy." The 
C hina Q u arterly  171(2002): 661. <>3.
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the. asked ioi '‘people’s diplomacy In proposing thtii riva! clsons, they shift the ire* 
stemming from the original events to the current issue o f domestic polit'cs. When. Wang •• 
Xiaodong, a leading liberal nationalist expressed bis diss^ttsfaetioo v ifb  the 
government’s news blackout over the $2.87 ml 11:on corapeitsaft&i* pay-nero to the United 
States for the damage caused to the U.S. diplomatic property in C bira after the anti 
American demonstrators protesting the NATO bombing o f the American embassy in 
Beijing, he demanded populai participation in China’s foreign policy making. Only in 
this way, he believed, would the government be held accountable to the Chinese public 
for safeguarding national interests.77
In the anti -Japanese demonstrations that dared in a range o f Chinese cities in 
2017, moving beyond the protest against Japan’s motion o f purchasing the
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, popular disgruntlemenc with the C'CP’s regime’s diplomatic 
performance was connected to its domestic governance. One photo circulated on weibo, 
China’s most popular micro-blog, tweeted a demonstrator wearing a shirt reading, “I am 
willing to feed the corrupted officials and become a housing slave, but I will never give 
up on the Diaoyu Islands.”78 In their political claim -making, not only do nationalists 
activists assign the blame o f domestic sociopolitical pains to the CCP— the “agent” of the 
Chinese nation, they also press for a libera! national condition, as a “solution” to the 
internal and external crises. When deploring that the protesting landing on the 
'Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands was initiated by the baodiac activists in Hong Kong but nor
76 Peter Hays Cries, "Popular N ationalism  and State Legitim ation in China," in Slate a n d  S ocie ty  in 21st- 
C entury C hina: Crisis, Contention, a n d  le g itim a tio n , ed. Pete.- H ays Cries and Stanley Rosen (N ew  York 
and London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2 0 0 4 ). 186. A lso  see, e g. Song Q iang et as.. ed. Zhongguo H aish i N eng  
Shuobu [C h ina  Can S till Say N o ]  (Beijing: Zhongguo vjenH an.chuhansht, 19S6).
:1 Zhao, "China's Pragmatic N ationalism . Is It M anageable?" 138; Susan V. Lawrence, China— the Say N o  
Club," Car Eastern E conom ic R eview . January !3 , 200U,
78 M akinen, "Anti-Japan Protests in China Spread to M ore C'ties." .
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mainlanders, some popular nationalists have boldly related the ability to defend Chinese
sovereignty to the democratic freedom and political participation on Sina Weibo,
In a place where patriotism and protest require approval, it’s all but 
inevitable that the pursuit o f  the national interest will be impaired ... [This] 
is a lesson the Hong Kong people have taught the mainland people. So 
how can we protest the national interest, and the best interest o f  the 
community? We need the freedom o f association, speech and press Only 
a free man can keep his country in his heart.79
Indeed, casting liberal ideas within the framework o f  Chinese foreign policy ideas 
has become an effective channel for popular nationalists to advance their political agenda 
while expressing their dissent toward the incumbent regime. For an authoritarian regime 
that resorts to nationalism to revamp legitimating ideology, the CCP regime has to 
depend on its nationalist credential to rule. Given that the historical institutions within 
the enterprise o f Chinese nationalism provide a viable means for the authoritarian state to 
engage with the pluralistic society, clamping down nationalist protests, as Shawn Breslin 
and Simon Shen argue, “runs the risk o f not only making the Party look out o f  step with 
patriotic public opinion, but also o f removing the one political sphere that has emerged as 
a legitimate medium for interest articulation and thus could decrease rather than reinforce 
regime legitimacy."80 In the yiew o f the dual role o f historical institutions, if the 
performance o f the CCP falls short o f  the social expectation o f the audience for the 
PRC’s diplomatic drama, Beijing’s foreign policy making always carries with it the risk 
o f the internalization o f external conflicts. The CCP has to walk a fine line between 
emerging external conflicts and staggering internal challenges.
79 Minter. "Barren Islands Bring China to a Boil". ,
80 Shawn Breslin and S im on Shen, "Online C hinese N ationalism (s): C om parisons and Findings," in Online  
C hinese N ation alism  a n d  China's B ila tera l R ela tions, ed. S im on Shen and Shawn Breslin (I.anham , M D: 
Lexington B ooks, 2012), 275.
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CH A PT ER  VI 
C O NC LU SIO N : N A T IO N A L  T R A U M A , VjC i M H O O O  IDENTITY', " 
A N D  C H IN ESE FOREIGN POL,ICY ID EA S
History L indeed an argument without end.
—Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.
History> can begin again, anew, on its old  
foundation but facing a new future. As it does so, it 
will transform national and international issues and 
decision-making structures.
— Gerrit W. Gong2
China’s meteoric rise is hardly controversial in today’s world politics. The global 
giant has transformed itself from an impoverished, repressive state into an economic and 
political powerhouse; yet conflicting impressions o f the country and its leadership 
abound. Besides its economic take-off that alarms the West, the ascending oriental 
power is indisputably in a state of universal changes— political, diplomatic and cultural—  
and the signs o f its startling rise have generated both enthusiasm and trepidation in the 
international community. In the West, especially in the arena o f foreign policy making 
and the academic circle o f international relations, what remains a contentious topic is 
whether China is a status quo state or a revisionist power in world politics.3
The polarized nature o f the continuing debate is, to a large extent, associated with 
China’s dualistic diplomatic profile observed from outside. One facet of Beijing’s
1 A ithurM . Schlesinger, The C ycles o f  im er .c a n  H istory  ;Ro:tc.r% M A: Houghton M ifflin, 1999), 164.
2 Gerrit .W. G ong, "Preface," in M em ory a n d  H istory in b a s t  a n d  Southeast A sia , ed G ,r io t W . G ong . 
(W ashington, DC: CS1S Press, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2 001),
3 A m ong others, see Alastair Iain Johnston, "Is China a Statue Quo Power?," Internationa! Security  27, no.
4  (2003): 5-56.
diplomatic image is related to its grand-power diplomacy, which is motivated by its 
ambition o f acquiring global recognition o f its rightful status in the world order through 
nurturing a cooperative relationship with Western powers and peripheral states. Once
viewed as an aloof and recalcitrant actor in world politics, China has become more 
disciplined and is making sustained efforts to project a benign great-power image.4 
While taking a close look at Beijing’s exercise o f  soft power, however, the international 
society is often taken aback by China’s hardline diplomacy. When embroiled in 
interstate conflicts involving historical legacies, cases wherein China’s fundamental 
national interests are perceived to be threatened, Beijing tends to adopt a muscular 
position. As such, Beijing’s diplomacy features the coexistence o f its conciliatory stance 
evinced by the “responsible great power” and its “emotional face” expressed toward 
perceived foreign provocations.
For an in-depth understanding of the mercurial profile o f China’s international 
conduct, this dissertation disentangles the PRC's diplomatic “inside-out.” With an 
analytic focus on the relationship between the Chinese state and society in domestic- 
foreign-policy interaction, this study explores the impact o f Chinese popular 
nationalism— a domestic factor causing the PRC’s dualistic diplomatic image—on 
Beijing’s foreign policy making. In the wake o f the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, 
nationalism is revamped as an official ideology to shore up the legitimacy o f an 
authoritarian regime. The legitimation o f the CCP’s regime is intertwined with the 
production and consumption o f the collective memory o f  national humiliation, which 
have given rise to the normative and purposive elements o f national identity. It is these 
historical institutions, collective memory and national identity, that shape the conception
4 For exam ple, see  Kurjantzick, Charm O ffensive: H ow China's.Soft P ow er Is Transform ing the W orld.
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of the state’s interests and the goals o f  national foreign polio* A; (he key variables i f  
the linkage politic? o f  Chinese foreign affairs., these kkM ivfiil ‘acto.-'.i.ofv.'titute a belief 
system upon which Chinese foreign policy Ukas &■:<• formed and the d»pion<avir: 
behavioi is reasoned.
In the field o f memory study, 5 dominant approach is the presrtitlst perspective, 
which holds that collective memory is fashioned in its “use value” for the solution o f the 
present preoccupations.5 In the legitimation o f the Chinese authoritarian state, this 
viewpoint conforms to the analytic approach o f rational choice. As an ideational resource 
constructed by the rational political actor in the ideological education, public recollection
o f the. traumatic experience o f the Chinese nation m its modem history is 
instrumentaiized in the legitimacy enhancement o f the CCP regime. The victim hood 
identity o f  the nation, as instantiated in the traumatic memory, is also instrumental in 
asserting the moral justification o f the PRC’s persistent quest for the legitimate great 
power status on die international stage.
Howevpr, rational choice insight is inadequate to explain China’s dualistic image 
on the world stage. In the normative environment o f China’s diplomacy, collective 
memory and national identity are the independent variables shaping the decision-making 
o f the CCP. The normative elements ingrained in these ideational factors have been 
institutionalized as the “scripts” o f the China’s diplomatic drama. Tethered to the ethical 
standard o f Chinese foreign policy making and the assessment o f the domestic, audience, 
China's diplomatic behavior does not always follow the rational thinking o f the CCP 
leadership. In cases where the normative and emotional aspects o f historical institutions 
are animated in the antagonistic inter- group relations. Beijing is often compelled to adopt
J Halbwachs, On C ollective M em ory, 30, 224.
an uncompromising stance, which might otherwise have been averted by more temperate 
responses in view' o f its preference to act with more prudence. In this sense, China’s 
paradoxical external conduct can be attributed to the inconsistency between the CCP’s 
preference for a pragmatic diplomacy and the constraint o f  historical institutions that are 
highly related to the state’s internal and externa! legitimacy.
COLLECTIVE MEMORY: AN EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT OF REGIME 
LEGITIMACY ENHANCEMENT6
Corresponding to the ' ’democratic peace” proposition that peace is empirically 
evident only within democracies, some Western observers, especially those who espouse 
the “China threat” thesis, argue that the rise o f the illiberal Comrriunist regime will 
inevitably challenge the status quo o f the libera) world order.7 Although evaluating this 
argument is beyond the scope o f this concluding chapter, an important line o f reasoning 
underlying such a viewpoint can be identified in the linkage politics o f Chinese foreign 
relations; that is, so long as the CCP remains a non-democratic regime, the international 
apprehension over Beijing’s intentions and commitments in its diplomacy will not 
dissipate.
Along this line o f reasoning, a sound interpretation o f the C CP's conduct of 
Chinese foreign relations can only start from the analysis o f  domestic politics. In the 
internal-external linkage o f a state’s foreign affairs, as Richard Rosecrance argues,
6 This section  contains m aterials in Liao, "Presentist or Cultural M emory: Chinese N ationalism  as 
Constraint on B e ijin g 's Foreign P olicy  M aking,” 545-50 .
7 See, e.g ., D oyle, "Kant, Liberal L egacies, and Foreign A ffairs, Part 1," 205-35; James Lee Ray, "Does 
D em ocracy Cause Peace?," A m erican  R eview  o f  P o litic a l Scien ce  1(1998): 27-46; Fareed Zakaria, "The 
R ise o f  Illiberal Dem ocracy," F oreign Affairs 76(1997): 22-43; B ill Gertz, The C hina Threat: H ow  the 
P eople's R epublic T argets A m erica  (W ashington, DC: R egency, 2000).
199
'■‘domestic stability and interna! peace [are] the- vehicle o f interrauonal stability and 
external peace.,s Internal political h  acocrd P.oserrarict’s argument, is
one of the prerequisites o f China’s peLc-eft*! rise. However, domestic stability is a 
necessary bat aol a sufficient, condition fcv a state ’s paci;',r bt-havbs on the global stage. 
China’s political stability, and hence the state beha vior on the international arena, 
according to Baogang Guo’s research cn the relationship between these two mutually 
constitutive factors, depends first and foremost on the legitimacy o f the regime . China’s 
peaceful rise on the global stage primarily hinges on the endurance o f the CCP’s regime 
legitimacy, and ‘a failure to continue to rebuild and strengthen its bases o f political 
legitimacy at home,” in Guo’s account, may “compromise its stability, and consequently 
undermine the peaceful nature o f its development.”9
How, then, does the CCP maintain its regime legitimacy? After the 1989
Tiananmen crisis, the anticipation prevalent in the West was the speedy downfall o f the
Chinese Communist regime.10 In the new millennium, the erroneous predictions o f a 
“coming collapse” o f  the CCP legime has not disappeared from the Western discourse o f 
Chinese politics. A primary fallacy in such propositions is their underestimation o f the 
CCP’s capability o f mobilizing popular support, which is manifested In public opinion 
toward the non-democratic regime. For an authoritarian regime lacking established 
. procedural legitimacy, the political authority o f the Party-state has to rely on the 
performance of its governance and some ideational factors to muster popular trust o f  the 
Party-state. With regard to the latter, legitimacy can be conceived an a moral property o f
* Richard R osecrance, A ction a n d  R eaction  in W orld Politics: In ternational S ystem s In P ersp ec tive  
(Boston, M A: Little Brown, 1963), 306.
9 Guo, "China's Peaceful D evelopm ent, R egim e Stability and Political Legitim acy,'1 40 .
10 A m ong others, see Chang, The C om ing C o llapse  o f  China.
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the regime that leads the ruled to “believe that it is appropriate, ptroper and just.” 11 
Within the enterprise o f Chinese nationalism, a prototypical example o f this moral
property is the national feeling derived from the collective memory of national
humiliation. This cultural resource is constructed in the ideological framework o f 
nationalism to endow the incumbent regime with moral value and thus to legitimize its 
monopolistic rule.
In .the political communication system, the official nationalist discourse is 
communicated through the symbolic representation o f national history. At the critical 
moment when the moral standing o f the CCP was at an all-time low in the aftermath of 
the Tiananmen crackdown, the most pressing task o f the regime w'as to “sustain and 
legitimize existing relations o f  power,” through the transformative reproduction o f the 
impoverished official discourse that was incompatible with the fluid nature o f the 
Chinese society.12 For an authoritarian state facing a severe legitimacy crisis in the wake 
o f social disruption, the endemic memory o f national victimization in the “century of 
humiliation” provides a “symbolic reserve” for the reconstruction o f the CCP’s 
legitimating ideology in the form o f official nationalist discourse.13
Hinging upon this traumatic symbol, the state-centric patriotic education adroitly 
links China’s past (the specter o f national humiliation in its modern history), present (the 
reconstruction o f a powerful state on the international scene), and the future (national
" Tom  R. Tyler, "Psychological Perspectives on Legitim acy and Legitim ation ,” Annual R eview  o f  
P sych o logy  57, no. 1 (2006): 375.
12 A ccording lo Norman Fairclough’s conceptualization o f  the mutual constitutive relationship between  
discourse and social structure, the dynam ics o f  social change are interrelated to the conservative arid 
transformative reproduction o f discourse. W ith the loss o f  appeal o f  the orthodox ideology o f  M arxism, 
Leninism , and M aoism , the CCP could on ly  resort to transformative reproduction o f  nationalist d iscourse to 
legitim ate the authoritarian regim e. See Fairclough, L anguage an d  P o w e r , 37-40.
13 Liu and Atsum i, "Flistorical Conflict and R esolution betw een Japan and China: D evelop ing and A.pplying 
a Narrative Theory o f  History and Identity," 330.
rejuvenation.) o f  the Chinese nation-state. Within this m.al/jstay narr&ive'structure, the 
decisive role that the Communist reg-me has played along the •r-depcndercc, liberation, 
and modem development o f  the Chinese nation validate; the and competency
of the CCP leadership. The representativeness of the regime in the rt-.coastruclior; o f a 
modem Chinese state— a persistent dynamic in the Chinese idenrity politics, fits into the. 
ongoing purposive action o f the Chinese nation in recovering great-power status in the 
international community.
Inferred from the traumatic experience o f national humiliation, the absolutist 
notions o f sovereignty and territoriality and the social need o f safeguarding the national
identity have been valorized in the Chinese political culture as the ‘-‘constitutive norms” 
o f national identity.14 The CCP’s historical agency in restoring the national unity has 
reified the inseparable linkage between the Party-state— as the indefatigable defender of 
China’s territoriality and sovereignty— and the nation, whose need o f redeeming national 
humiliation can be fulfilled by the incumbent regime By relating the irreplaceable status 
o f the Communist regime along China’s historical trajectory to the purposive and 
constitutive elements o f the national identity, the official nationalist discourse 
ingeniously captures the popular remembrance and meshes with the Chinese political 
culture in which the collective memory is embedded.
In terms o f its narrative power, the overriding theme o f the patriotic education—  
the incessant articulation o f the CCP’s role identity as the sole savior and guardian o f the 
Chinese nation and its credentials to an entitled grip on political power -has effectively 
fostered the public perception identifying the Patty- state with the nation. Such ‘true" 
discourse flowing from the collective memory bestow's legitimate mo»al value upon the
M Abdelal et a)., "Identity as a Variable," 697.
CCP by symbolically enhancing the “original justification’' of the regime as a “divine 
being,” whose governance is based on the will o f the people.15 Communicated via the 
connoted meanings o f the traumatic symbol that has been projected into the collective 
memory, this protagonist in the master historical account— narrated as the paramount 
patriotic force capable of protecting the nation from foreign intrusion and leading it to 
modernization— has been portrayed as a “regime o f truth” represented in the national 
history that is mythologized by the propaganda state.16 Correspondingly, the CCP’s role 
identity has been transformed into the official “truth” knowledge institutionalized in the 
patriotic education. Insofar as the Party-state is legitimized through its appeals to the 
consensual assumptions inherent in the Chinese political culture, the populace has been 
exhorted Jo rally around the Communist state on the basis o f  the instructed motto that the 
love o f nation is indistinguishable from support o f the state. In instituting the memory- 
based legitimacy o f  the CCP regime, nationalism has taken the place o f  the official 
ideology as the coalescing force in the post-Tiananmen era.
Today, more than two decades after the Tiananmen crackdown, nationalism 
remains crucial to the regime legitimacy o f the CCP. While deferring the political threats 
to the authoritarian regime and reducing the pressures on political liberalization, the 
materia! achievements in China’s economic take-off have temporality concealed and 
offset the poor governance by the authoritarian regime. Regime legitimacy based on 
economic performance, however, is not a panacea for tackling perceived challenges to the 
CCP’s political authority. The three-decade-plus surge in economic growth since the 
inception o f its market-oriented internationalization has left the Party-state a multitude o f
15 Guo, "Political L egitim acy and China's Transition," 3.
Foucault, ' Truth and Power," 13 1.
soeiai tensions with fewer resources at the CCP s disposal.1 Farti; aiaily, in the cauldron 
o f the socioeconomic problems that are imperiling the Pariy-statf/s rapacity to gamer ' 
popular support, the CCP is susceptible to the incestuous lelationship between unchecked 
power and illicit wealth, as burgeoning wealth funncke to the political-economic 
elites. The authoritarian state’s dominance over the economy has formed what Minxin 
Pei describes a dangerous mix o f “crony capitalism,” whic h has hoisted many CCP 
cadres into a stratosphere o f opulent wealth at the expense o f distributional equality and 
economic efficiency.18 Thus, behind the facade o f  China’s economic presence, the very 
policies implemented by the state government to sustain the phenomenal growth have 
brought about a series of thorny social and political ills.
As such, the intense tensions and mass alienation induced by the defects o f  the 
socioeconomic system have threatened to erode another aspect o f the CCP’s regime 
legitimacy—the “utilitarian justification,” which lies in the ability o f the state 
government to maximize the wellbeing o f the individuals.19 Indeed, domestic protests in 
recent years have not only increased in number and size, but have become better 
organized as well. With the erosion o f the “utilitarian justification” and the rise o f public 
disgruntiement, as contended by Shirk, the contemporary CCP leadership is more 
vulnerable than ever to impending sociopolitical shocks, which can be conceived of as 
the sword o f  Damocles whose fall will.topple the legime.20 Retaining a persistent sense 
o f insecurity, the CCP has to resort to official ideology, which is synergized with 
economic performance, to mobilize popular support for the regime.
17 Som e w estern observers share such an opinion. See, e g ., Francois M cngin and Jtan-L ouise R a cca  eds.. 
P olitics in China: M oving  F rontiers  (N ew  Y cri, N Y : Plagrav:: M acM illan. 2002).
u M inxin Pei, "The Dark Side o f  China's R ise ,' F oreign  P o l Icy 1 ■53(200-6): 37.
19 Guo, "Political Legitim acy and China's t  ransition," 5-6
20 Shirk, China, F ragile  Superpow er: Flow China's Interna! P o lities C o u ld D e ra ii  Its  P eacefu l R ise
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In today’s China, popular political support, a source o f  popular legitimacy that 
Easton labels "diffuse support,”21 is highly associated with the normative and purposive 
aspects o f national identity that are widely shared in the Chinese community. In the
enactment o f its memory-based legitimacy, the regime’s purported credentials, which are 
founded on the social norms ingrained with the Chinese national identity, sustain the 
“moral bond” between the state and society” and hence the "original justification” as the 
rightful source o f the regime’s political authority. ‘ Despite the dizzying array o f 
socioeconomic problems that are plaguing the CCP’s domestic governance, the moral 
dimension o f the regime legitimacy has played a significant role in shaping people’s 
“supportive attitudes or sentiment” toward the regime.23
In the post-Tiananmen era, one o f  the major instrumental usages o f official 
nationalism lies in its scapegoating function in the process o f socioeconomic <
transformation, which inevitably involves the politicization o f national identity. In this <j
process, the construction o f collective memory— a raw material o f  communal connection |
in forming the metaphorical kinship bond o f  an “extended family”— is shaped by the , (
present focus. While forging the affection for and loyalty toward the in-group, the 
collective memory o f  national trauma has generated a sense o f alienation, mistrust, and 
even antagonism toward the out-group entities that are perceived to pose threats to the 
continued social practice o f the Chinese nation-state in rejuvenating its historical glory.
It is hardly surprising then that the notion o f the “Chinese dream” [zhonggun 
meng) can take hold in the Chinese political imaginary. Since taking over the paramount
21 Easton. A System  A n alysis o f  P o litic a l Life.
"  Tong, "Morality, B enevolence, and R esponsibility: R egim e Legitim acy in China from Past to the 
Present," 152.
23 In his definition o f  political support, Easton designates “supportive actions as overt support and 
supportive attitudes or sentim ents as cover support.” S ee  Easton, A System  A nalysis o f  P o litica l Life. ! 59.
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leadership position o f the Party-state in Nevembtn 20! 2, Xi iinping, fee CCP’s ritv' 
General Secrelaiy, has reinvigorated a heated discussion over (his xaxhohtase in an effort 
to galvanize the populace. Soon after the Standing Committee of the Politburo stepped in, 
in a high-profile visit c fth e  top leadership to the Road lowatd Renewal” ifuxing zhilu) 
exhibition at the National Museum o f China in Beijing highlighting the Opium Wars and 
the subsequent national humiliation, Xi issued a call for action to realize “the cause o f 
national rejuvenation,” which he described as “the greatest dream for the Chinese nation 
in modem history.”24 In defining the group identity o f the Chinese nation-state and 
determining how this collective group behaves in conflict situations, such a symbolic
message is an irresistible ingredient o f the official nationalist discourse with pragmatic 
function. As Mansfield and Snyder posit, a regime equipped with fragile institutions in a 
transitional society tends to utilize nationalistic rhetoric and diversionary conflict to 
remain in power.25 The perpetuating vietimhood mentality stemming from the traumatic 
memory o f  the Chinese nation-state has constituted a revenging m otif o f its identity 
politics: As the country grows strong, it should settle scores with those that had bullied it 
in the “century o f national humiliation.”
This expectation explains the coherence o f the Chinese populace siding with the 
state government in their response to the Western pressures on China concerning issues 
such as human rights, intellectual rights, and trade deficits. When the national pride is at 
stake, foreign pressures often backfire, as the Chinese people do not cheer Western
74 Xinhua N ew s A gency, "Xi P ledges 'Great Reneal o f  Chinese Nation*," .
http://news. xinhuanet. corn/english /ch ina/2012 •
1 l/2 9 /c _ i3 2 (W 8 2 3 l.h ta M m _ so u ix * “ Sinocism+NewsleKfcr&utm_cai75paigir-f$t>d49i786-
The Sinocism  China N ew sletter For 11 30 2 0 1 2& Uim _rnedium -einaii. (accessed  on M ay 1, 2013).
25 Edward D. M ansfield and Jack Snyder, "Domestic Transitions: Institutional Strength, and War," 
In ternational O rganization  56, no. 2 (2002): 297-337 .
criticism o f their state government. Viewed through the lens o f nationalism, the negative 
comments from outside often do not agitate the discontent of the Chinese populace with 
the regime, but rather bolster the cohesion o f the Chinese nation-state. For instance, 
former U.S. President George W. Bush’s public criticism o f Beijing's human rights 
record before the Olympic moment invoked virulent nationalist resentment among the 
Chinese public. To the surprise o f the Western media, they rallied around the state’s 
position that China has made unprecedented progress in improving the people’s living 
standards, and reminded the ungracious speaker that “the internal affairs o f one nation are 
no business o f other nations.”26 In the collective action o f the nation-state in realizing the 
“Chinese dream,” official nationalist discourse harping on the collective memory has 
helped legitimize the authoritarian regime by redirecting domestic grievance emanating 
from the internal tensions to external entities that are perceived as perpetrators violating 
the purposive element o f  the national identity.
DIVERGENCE OF ROLE CONCEPTIONS: THE EXTERNAL LEGITIMATION OF A 
“FRUSTRATED GREAT POWER”27
In the Chinese state legitimation project, the collective memory o f national 
humiliation is also a critical component in shoring up the PRC state’s external legitimacy. 
With the enterprise o f  nationalism, the sense o f  victimhood, the pessimistic dimension of 
the Chinese national identity teaffirmed iri the traumatic collective memory, is exploited 
in Beijing’s foreign affairs to enhance the PRC’s moral character in its pursuit o f  
legitimate great-power status in the international arena.
26 M uhamm ad C ohen, "Why China L oves the O lym pics," The. G u iard ian , A ugust 1 1 ,2 0 0 8 .
27 This section  contains m aterials in Liao, "Presentist or Cultural M em ory- C hinese N ationalism  as 
Constraint on B eijin g ’s  Foreign Policy  M aking," 550-54 .
Nationalism, according to Kcstcranee ii'fundam entally  the creation o f ’we- 
feeiir.g among members o f a nation to the point where national loyalties fake precedence 
ovei most other obligations.”* Rosecranc.e’s '2Ssert»on raises an obvrous question: Ho\v 
is the ‘we-feeling,” or the identity o f  self, formed9 As Jeffey  OJieV and Iver Neumann 
point out, the ‘ se lf’ identity cannot be assumed js  z priori: rather, it only through ■ 
social interaction that the “we-feeling” comes into being. In view o f  the relational 
feature o f collective identities, national identity is constructed in a self-other interaction 
that has both vertical and horizontal dimensions. Collective memory, which infuses 
national identities with connoted meanings, is constitutive o f the formation and 
construction o f the present self o f a nation.
Along this line o f logic, the PRC’s ambition to reposition itself in world politics 
as a powerful state is invariably colored by the collective psyche o f victimhood and 
closely related to the issues o f historical redemption o f the national humiliation inflicted 
in modem Chinese history, which was in stark contrast to the tianxic (all-under heaven) 
system envisioned by the Central Kingdom when the pre-modem China attained its 
cultural superiority. As indicated in the emotional message o f the “Chinese dream” that 
has come to the fore o f the official nationalist discourse, attaining a position o f 
prominence consistent with the self-image that prevailed during the long period prior to 
the ‘century o f humiliation” remains an unfailing dynamic o f the Chinese national 
identity shaping the state’s purposive action on the international stage However, 
although it has to a certain degree regained recognition as a great power with its 
impressive economic piowess arid its critical role played »u global and regional affairs,
28 Richard R osecrance, In ternational R elations: P eace  a n d  W ar (N ew  fo rk , N Y . M cG raw -H ill, 1973), 16.
29 O lick, "C ollective M emory: The T w o Cultures," 343: Iver B. Neum ann, '"Self and Other in International 
Relations," E uropean Jou rn al o f  In ternational R eia tion s'2 , nc. 2 (1996): 139.
208
the PRC's social position in the contemporary international society is not commensurate 
with its grandiose history o f cultural supremacy. Instead.-as noted by Jia Qingguo, China
in
is often attributed “an international pariah status” in the international society. Being
defined as an out-group entity and denied social status equal to that o f  Western powers, 
China often finds itseif surrounded by “victimizing others”— those that marginalize it and 
keep it at the periphery o f  the great power community.31 Therefore, both the horizontal- 
and vertical aspects o f  the national identity associated with the traumatic symbol in the 
collective memory attach the purposive implication to the Chinese nationhood.
According to Rawi Abdelal et al.’s analytical framework o f social identity, the 
PRC's external legitimation is inherent in the “relational comparison” with out-group
32entities. In the Sino -Japanese relations, for instance, the alarming signal that some 
prominent Japanese politicians and public intellectuals refuse to atone for Japanese 
imperialist atrocities committed in the World War II makes Japan a desirable choice as a 
referent country for China to project its moral image o f a “responsible great power” in the 
international scen e /3 The historical grievance o f the past war sufferings associated with 
the victimhood identity creates the ethical foundation for China to develop what 
psychologist Vamik Volkan terms the “entitlement ideology.” 34 The long-term 
irredentist aspiration provides the past victimizing states with a belief system to assert 
what they wish in contemporary international affairs. Given that the collective memory
10 Q ingguo Jia, "Disrespect and Distrust: The External O rigins o f  Contemporary Chinese Nationalism ."  
Jou rn al o f  C on tem porary  China  14, no. 42 (2005): 20.
31 Suzuki, "The Importance of'O thering' in China's National Identity: S ino-Japanese R elations as a Stage o f  
Identity Conflicts," 35.
Abdelal et al., "Identity as a Variable," 699.
33 Suzuki, "The Importance o f'O th erin g’ in China's N ational Identity: S ino-japanese R elations as a Stage o f  
Identity Conflicts," 35-37.
34 Vam ik D . V olkan, "Psychoanalysis and International Relations: Large Group Identity, Traumas at the 
Hand o f  the 'Other,' and Transgenerational Transm ission o f  Trauma," in P sych oan aly tic  P ersp ec tives on a 
Turbulent W orld, ed. Halina Brunning.and M ario Perini (London: Karnac Books, 2 0 1 0 ), 53.
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of national humiliation can substantiate China's undc-saved ueahneni ir. the eun in t 
international society, the CCP leadership does h a v e  rhe i i .m p ta b c T i tv. i c v ^ a g c  the 
polemics over sensitive historical issues ir. Internationa! negotiations. P opular 
nationalism, if  expressed in a moderate manner, is conceive.’ io be- with the 
national interests. In actuality, China’s victimization by colonialist predators and 
imperialist invaders— on the basis o f  which it claims to have a thorough understanding of 
the value o f peace and price o f inequality in the Westphalian institutional context- -is 
often articulated as a compelling “ethical argument,”35 justifying its acquisition o f great- 
power status in the Western-based international system
In a similar vein, some core Chinese foreign policy elites, convinced that their 
state is morally qualified to redefine the international order, have suggested the 
reproduction o f  the social structure derived from the Chinese tianxia concept. Holding 
the belief that the current international system is inadequate with respect to the attainment 
o f the goal o f global peace and equality, some intellectualists in Chinese academia have 
pointed out that the normative principles underscoring the Sino-ceninc tianxia order offer 
a feasible institutional vision o f how international politics might be re -organized.36
However, the legitimation o f the re-envisaged Sino centric system, or the revival 
o f the normative principles underlying the international politics under the tianxia order, 
that was premised on the moral hierarchy between the Middle Kingdom and those
35 Narlikar, "All That Glitters Is N ot Gold: India's R ise to Power," 986.
*  For instance, Van X uetong, a renowned civilian  scholar in C hinese lortugn rciaiiens; drawing on the 
contem poiary relevance o f  the moral and ethical principles proposed by C hineseph ilosopher Xun Zi, 
elucidates a h istorically framed Chinese peispective o f  a norm ative intsrrationrt order. Sea Van Xuefemg, 
'Xun Z i’s Thoughts on  International P olitics and Their Implications," The C hinese J ou rn a l o f  In ternational 
P olitics  2 , no. 1 (2008). J 35-65. For a lively  d iscussion  in this vein, ;%.e, am ong inhere, A llen  Carlsch, 
"M oving Beyond Sovereignty: A  B rie f Consideration o f  R ecent Changes in China's Approach to  
International Order and the Em ergence o f  the Tianxia Concept," Jou rn a l o f  C on tem porary China  20 , no. 68  
(2011): 89-102.
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secondary states on the circumference would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve in 
today’s international system. According to the role theory in international relations, the 
status o f a state on the international stage is not only determined by the ego’s role 
conception, but is also, in Holsti’s account, “influenced or restrained by the international 
counterpart o f the social alter.”37 Along this line of logic, Beijing’s diplomatic behavior 
is, to a large degree, determined by the “preexisting beliefs” o f the in-group members, 
which are framed in different dimensions o f the national identity and are causal in
attributing the out-groups’ motives.3* In terms o f China’s current power base that has 
qualified the PRC as a major actor in the international affairs, the recognition from, and 
near equality with, the West allows China to vanquish its humiliating legacy o f 
victimization and spring forth onto the world stage as the great nation it once was. Given 
that foreign acclamation caters to the need o f  the Chinese nation-state to reconstruct a 
non-humiliating national identity, the warm “preexisting beliefs” that the West is 
conti ibutive to its external legitimation gives ground to  the empathetic; understanding of 
the Chinese “se lf ’ toward the foreign “other.” On the other hand, in the cases where 
China is mired in interstate conflicts triggering the collective memory o f the traumatized 
community, such as the ongoing territorial disputes with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands, the negative “preexisting beliefs” that the out-group references infringe upon the 
Chinese identity-constitutive norms and jeopardize the crusade o f its national renaissance 
will prevail in the inter-group relationship. -With the intuitive desire to rectify the original 
injustice, the in-groups victimhood identity comes to the forefront o f the foreign relations, 
and the assertive streak o f Chinese nationalism is incited.
37 H olsti, "National R ole C onceptions in the Study o f  Foreign Policy," 243.
38 Crawford, "The Passion o f  World Politics: Propositions on Em otion and Em otional Relationship," 134- 
35.
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Apparently, domestic brittle and corifrvntaoonai aai.or^lisir. emerging in the 
Chinese society, which has elicited external apprehension c f & rising. China, does n o t : 
contribute to the alter's role prescription that r> desired by ‘ho FRC if the eye o f the 
West, it is the aatnoritarian legirne that orchestrates the domestic frenzied hatred against 
the foreign ‘ other.” In an international society' where the social h ierachy  is largely 
premised on adherence to the principles o f democratic governance embodied in the 
Westphalian international system rather than the moral high ground that held the key to 
the stability o f the Sino-centric tianxia system, the prevailing social values and legal 
principles, among other sources o f the alter’s perceptions o f China’s role, are not in 
conformity with China's role conception as shaped by its indigenous socioeconomic 
needs and ideological values. Due to the longstanding mismatch between the Chinese 
foreign policy makers’ conceptions as to China’s international status and the role 
prescribed by the ‘democratic cores” to an illiberal political regime,39 the “ethical 
argument” frequently cited by the Chinese state to justify its entitlement to a legitimate 
power status on the world stage does not effectively persuade the international audience, 
especially Western powers. The structural divergence o f the role conceptions between 
China and the reigning Western powers often renders the PRC a “frustrated great power.” 
to borrow Shogo Suzuki’s phrase.40 The recurring distance that opens up between the 
swelling of China’s sociopolitical prowess and th° prestige and esteem it attains in the 
international community has contributed to the state’s persistent sens;, o f insecurity and 
has led to its paradoxical role performance in -the foteign tffiiir:-
3* Suzuki, "Seeking 'Legitimate' Great Pow er Status in Post-C old War International Society," 5 ! .  
40 See "Seeking 'Legitimate' Great Power Status in Post-C old War international Society," 45 -63 .
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China's frustration arising in its pursuit ol great-power status—-accompanied with 
the political trepidation o f a regime facing potential threats from the top-ranking 
democratic states in the hierarchical international system—has been clearly present in 
Beijing’s diplomatic thinking. External disrespect has worsened the regime’s anxiety in 
sustaining its internal legitimacy. In light o f  the mounting socioeconomic challenges in 
domestic politics, which make the Party-state appear fragile in dealing with the popular 
discontent and resentment that have gripped large sections o f the Chinese society, the 
Communist regime is vulnerable to the perceived threats o f  Western constraints. In a 
speech on the historic mission o f the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Hu Jintao, Xi 
Jinping’s predecessor, explicitly pointed out that ‘‘Western hostile forces have not given 
up the wild ambition o f  trying to subjugate us, intensifying the political strategy o f 
Westernizing and dividing up China.”41 This acute sense o f being under-siege is 
concomitant to its uncertainty about the current international order— an institutional 
context that China opines discriminates against newcomers seeking social recognition 
and a corresponding membership in the club o f legitimate great powers. Even though it 
holds the entry card to this social group, China believes that it is still regarded as a 
marginalized “other.”42 Encountering this externally prescribed role conception, the 
state is left to contemplate whether its structural conflicts with the reigning powers o f  the 
current international system— the intended external audience o f China’s performance 
whose recognition o f its membership in the power club enjoys a prominent position in 
influencing the “world opinion” concerning the PRC’s socially conferred status— will
41 Hu Jintao, "Renqing Xinshiji Xinjieduan Wojurt L ish i Shiming [Understanding the N ew  H istoric M ission  
o f  Our M ilitary in the N ew  Period o f  the N e w  Century J,"
h ttp ://g fjy .jxn ew s.com .cn /system /2010 /04 /16 /011353408 .shtm l. (accessed  on July 1 ,2 0 1 2 ) .
42 Suzuki, "The Importance o f'O th erin g’ in China's N ational Identity: S ino-Japanese R elations as a Stage o f  
Identity Conflicts," 24.
sharpen. Even in the post-September 11 era. when the p.'eocc»«patloi» o f  these 
"democratic cores.” sncs: notably the U S., h^s decisively shined z*'V/ from the 
normative issues, such as human rights, to the w.tr on tect-rism, is  still henur-ed 
in by a peculiar sense o f  insecurity.43 in the view o f Fen U n? W«r:g. Twijmg’s 
“beleaguered mentality” stemming from the teghne prcsw. v ition o f  its internal and 
externa! legitimacy has led to the “conservative, reactive, and risk-averse” fashion in the 
praxis o f its diplomacy.44
While the transformation o f the environment o f Chinese diplomacy has prompted 
the debate on the conceptual soundness and the practical applicability o f taoguang 
yanghni (hiding capacities and biding time), a tactic dictum proposed by the late Chinese 
leader Deng Xiaoping, in the exercise o f  China’s diplomacy, Beijing still has tc maintain 
a balance between keeping a low profile and proactively “getting something done”
(yousuo zuowei) in foreign affairs 45 Given the constraint o f  “world opinion” on China’s 
international status in its external legitimation, Beijing’s foreign policy makers have to 
heed the aher’s response to the ego’s toughness and assertiveness, which, they believe, 
will energize “anti-China” forces and fortify the negative prescription of the West to 
China’s role on the world stage. As such, China’s contested legitimacy in the 
international society has compelled Beijing to project a pacifist and accommodationist 
image, with the purpose o f avoiding any suspicion or misconception that will undercut
43 Shi Y inhong and Song Deji, "21 Shiji Q ianqi Zhongguo Cuoji Tttidu, tVnijiao Zhixue He Getiben 
Zhaniui Sikao [China's International Attitude, D iplom atic Philosophy, and B asic Strategic Thinking in the 
f ir s t  Part o f  the 21st C entury],’’ Zhanhteyu guahti [Strategy and Management} i ; 2 0 0 ! )  1 0 1 ).
44 Fei-L ing Wang. ’ Preservation, Propserity and Power: W hat Motivate:, China's Foreign Policy,* Journal 
o f  Contemporary China 14, no. 45 (2005): 67 3 , 86.
45 See, e.g ., D m gding Chen and Jianwei W ang, "Lying L ow  N o  M ere?.China's N ew  Thinking on the Tao  
Ciuang Y ang Hui Strategy," China: An International Journal 9, no. 2 (2011). 195-216.
the cultivation o f a positive environment for its domestic environment and abort its quest 
tor the rightful, but once deprived, great-power status.
Meanwhile, the CCP leadership is simultaneously facing a domestic audience, 
who can hold different opinions on Beijing’s rational diplomacy. Given that the
frustration with China’s unfulfilled power status has penetrated the consciousness o f  the 
Chinese populace, nationalist aspiration taking the form o f patriotism has emboldened the 
combative line o f public opinion and heightened expectations for the government to seek 
external respect for the state. The call for an activist approach to Beijing’s diplomacy is 
especially strong in military circles. A growing number o f senior Chinese military 
officers are arguing for an explicit departure from Deng’s admonition “never claim 
leadership” (juebu dangtong), suggesting a more assertive stance in order to push back 
against the Western powers over sensitive issues in China’s foreign affairs. For instance, 
two years before Xi reiterated the “Chinese dream” notion in his gallery speech, Liu 
Mingfii, a senior colonel at the PLA’s National Defense University, advocated China 
abandon its modest foreign policy in a popular nationalist book with the same title.
Given its material capabilities, Liu argues, China should seek global leadership by 
building up its military power and counteracting the dominant position o f  the U.S.'16 
Before the publication o f  Liu’s The China Dream , another popular nationalist piece by 
Colonel Dai Xu also stood out for its audacity amid a chorus o f  nationalist expression, in 
this provocative book, Dai asserts that as China is encircled by hostilities and wariness o f 
countries beholden to the U.S., China should preemptively light a fire in America’s
46 Liu M ingiu, Zhongguo M eng: H ou  M eiguo  Sh idai D e D agu o S iw ei Yu Zhanlue D ingw ei [the China  
D ream : M ajor P o w er Thinking a n d  S tra teg ic  P lann ing in a  P osp A m erica n  E ra ]  (Beijing: Zhongguo youvi 
chubanshe, 2010).
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backyard, in order to avoid the calamity of  a not- too distant w a r47 Whether these " 
outspoken hawks" hard line opinions will be. incorporated into Beijing's foreign policy 
remains to be seen. But it is noteworthy that the appeal for assertive and evert aggressive 
diplomacy does have its market among Chinese pcpvtat nationalists ar.d has formed the 
battling public opinion that the CCP leadership has tc reckon with fo the diplomatic 
decision-making.
ENABLING OR CONSTRAINING; THE DUAL EFFECTS OF TRAUMATIC 
MEMORY
The emerging irredentist demand mentioned above, as the ‘loud minority” in the
public opinion o f Beijing’s foreign policy decision-making, actually reflects a social 
■ expectation that is deeply rooted in the historical institutions in the enterprise o f  Chinese
1 nationalism. As the cognitive and emotional foundation o f Chinese foreign policy ideas
f and hence the state’s diplomatic behavior, the social norms embedded in the collective
f memory and national identity have forged the instrumental,awareness that links the goals
and purposive action o f  the Chinese state on the foreign relations front. In this sense, a 
sober assessment o f the PRC’s diplomacy should start from the formation, 
institutionalization o f these motivational e le m e n t s  upon w h ic h  C h in e s e  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  
ideas are founded and transformed into the state’s diplomatic behavior. Drawing on the 
social-psychological understanding o f the collective memory and national identity, it is 
possible to spell out the way that these ideational factors shape the Chinese state-society 
relationship in the domestic-foreign-policy interaction. ; ;
47 X u D ai, C-X ing B aow ei: N eiyou w aih u an X ia  De Zhongguo T m 'e i[C  S akpe E ncircle: China's 
Breakthrough w ith  the In ternal C oncerns a n d  ex tern a l D an gers]  (B eijing W enhui chubanshe, 2009).
With regard to the origin o f  the historical institutions, in Chinese political culture, 
the dichotomy o f the ' ‘civilized se lf and the “barbarian other’" has been intermingled 
with the primordial sense o f  “Chineseness” in the construction o f national identity. The 
position o f Chinese political actors and their foreign counterparts in the dialectic self- 
other relationship are nor, static. In the pre-modern era, the tianxia (all-under-heaven) 
order, with its emphasis on the moral hierarchy o f  the Sino-centric vision and the 
superiority o f  Chinese civilization, constituted a source o f  the positive dimension o f the 
Chinese national identity. The destruction o f  the Sino-centric system, as a consequence 
o f  the attacks and predatory actions by Western power and Japanese imperialists in 
modern Chinese history, imprinted the Chinese mentality with the trauma o f 
humiliation— a "key part o f  modem Chinese subjectivity"’ that has been instantiated as a 
historically informed and culturally sensitive component o f the Chinese identity 
politics/'3 It is in the context o f  institutional and cultural collision between the tianxia 
order and the Westphalian system that Chinese nationalism came into being and the 
notion o f state sovereignty and national territoriality became sustained in the normative 
institutions o f Chinese foreign policy ideas.
An indispensable component o f the collective memory and national trauma and 
victimhood identity is their affection dimension, which shapes the Chinese in-group’s 
behavior and perception toward the foreign out-groups. With the working o f collective 
emotion that can be prompted in the antagonistic inter-group interaction, the resentment 
felt by the Chinese “se lf ’' in the contemporary international society tends to be analogized 
to the traumatic experience o f the nation. The ontological insecurity o f the “frustrated
W illiam  A . Callahan, "National Insecurities: H um iliation, Salvation, and C hinese Nationalism ."  
Alternatives 2.9, no. 2 (2004): 206.
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great power” in its external legitimation parallels the confide-sicr. of its resurgence on the 
world stage. In this sense, Pye’s contention that China has coping with what he 
viewed as confused” and “ incoherent” nationalism is an nriuorafiu;- or; Its identity 
predicament, which has constituted the character n f Chinese nationhood and statehood.49 
in light o f  this elusive nature, it would be too hasty to conclude, zs some influential China 
scholars have claimed, that Chinese national identity as a victim o f foreign aggression 
arid subjugation has been replaced with a cosmopolitan “great power mentality’ (daguo 
xintai).50 Under the situation where emotion is actualized by the external factor with the 
‘affective tags” attached to the traumatic collective memory,51 the pessimistic and 
insecure ingredients o f the national identity are brought to the forefront o f  Chinese 
foreign relations, which fortifies the causal effect o f  the identity-constitutive norms on 
the emotional practice o f  the state members in performing the national identity.
Thus, viewed from the perspective o f  political sociology , the commemoration and 
remembrance o f the immoral bullying by foreign invasion is less a “background-looking 
ideology or strategy” o f a nation obsessed with national humiliation and historical 
grandeur than an amplifier o f the moral justification o f China’s aspiration for the great 
power status.52 The sociai norms encoded in the collective memory', including 
sovereignty, territoriality, and the national dignity stemming from a deserved 
international status, both enable and constrain the state’s action on the foreign relations 
front. With regard to the state-society relationship, these ''ideational codes,”55 as the
49 See Pye, "China: N ot Your Typical Superpower," 3-16.
50 Evan S. M edeiros and M T aylor Fravel, "China's N ew  Diplomacy," fo r e ig n  Affairs 82 , no. 6 (2003): 32.
A G roenendyk, "Current Em otion Research in Political Science: R o w  Em otions H elp Dem ocracy  
O vercom e its C ollective A ction Problem," 458.
52 Quoted in Guang, "Realpolitik N ationalism : International Sources o f  C hinese Nationalism ." 495.
i3 Elkins and Sim eon, "A Cause in Search o f  Its Effect, or What D o es Political Culture Explain?," 128.
nonnative underpinnings o f  the purposive action o f the Chinese state, have given rise to 
Chinese foreign policy ideas and serve as the “scripts'’ for the PRC’s diplomatic drama 
and the ethical criteria for the domestic audience to assess the legitimacy o f the state’s
behavior on the performance stage.
As summarized in the first section o f this concluding chapter, the collective 
memory o f  foreign aggression and subjugation is instrumental in the state legitimation. 
Just as Barbara Biesecker contends regarding the social pragmatics o f public 
remembrance, “the political entailments of collective memory are an effect o f what and 
how we remember, and the uses to which those memories are put.”54 The traumatic 
symbol in the Chinese collective memory is instrumental in shaping “what and how” the 
Chinese people remember in the state’s historical mythmaking. As a discursive product 
o f  the CCP’s political agenda o f regime legitimacy enhancement, the viclimhood 
discourse representing the mythic symbol o f national trauma has been essentialized as 
official “truth” in the projection of state-centric strategic narratives.
Such a master commemorative account, which enacts the collectivity o f the state 
and the nation in mustering popular support o f  the authoritarian regime, can be construed 
as a hegemonic construct that is inextricably linked to the policy environment o f the 
C CP’s diplomatic decision-making. According to Raymond Williams, hegemony is not a 
fixed state domination, but is “continually resisted, limited, altered, challenged by 
pressures not at all o f its own.”55 Because the narrative schema o f the CCP’s master 
historical account is enmeshed with a series o f  “ ideational codes” embedded in the 
historical institutions o f  Chinese nationalism, it appeals to the patriotic consensus reached
54 Barbara A. B iesecker, "Rem em bering World War l wo: The Rhetoric and P olitics o fN ation a l 
C om m em oration at the Turn o f  the 21st Century," Q u arterly  Jou rn al o f  Speech  88, no. 4 (2002): 406.
5i Raym ond W illiam s, M arxism  a n d  L iterature  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 112.
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in the national community, which helps to institute the CCP’s memory -based legitimacy. 
Historical institutions implicated in the higemcni*'. discourse, however.. h?ve taken ori a" 
li fe o f their own in the Chinese political culture, the;eby constituting a noimative 
fam ew ork o f inter subjective understanding o f the Chinese populace. In cases where 
sociai norms that are encoded in the collective memory and constitut ve o f the national 
identity are reinforced by the sy stemic divergence o f the role prescription o f the Chinese 
“se lf’ and the foreign '‘other,” the domestic, audience for the PRC’s diplomacy tends to 
identity a certain pattern o f foreign policy as legitimate and convincing. If the state’s 
diplomatic stance departs from the presupposed vision o f its action, the legitimacy o f the
regime will be. at stake. Such a case o f “social deviance” exemplifies the regulative and 
constraining effects o f Chinese foreign policy ideas on Beijing’s diplomatic decision ­
making.56
f Viewed in this light, the collective memory o f national humiliation is not
| completely malleable; nor does it conveniently succumb to the presentist manipulation o f
the regime. The inconsistency between Beijing’s diplomatic thinking and domestic 
nationalist demands is a rich case showing how the subversive collective memory is 
directed against the ‘memory makers.” To the extent that the determined meanings of 
the traumatic memory have shaped popular cognition in the ethical judgment o f the 
CCP’s diplomatic performance, China’s foreign policy behavior can be both prescribed 
and proscribed by the normative “scripts” o f the diplomatic drama that are connoted in 
♦he hegemonic discourse o f master historic account In this sense, the strategic narratives 
projected by the Party-state itself have animated the formation c f  what Thomas Rochon
56 Andrews., "Social Ruies and the State as a Social Actor," >32.
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dubs the politically and morally engaged “critical community,” ' 7 in which the social 
norms communicated through the victimhood discourse are institutionalized as the 
“ ideational codes” that the CCP s diplomatic decision-making is obliged to follow.
Indeed, collective memory can be “highly resistant to efforts to make it over.”58 
As a discursive force, it can be employed in the political claim-making o f  both the state 
and societal forces. The state’s mythmaking hmging upon the selected symbol embedded 
in the Chinese collective memory simultaneously engenders the internal dynamism o f 
social resistance, something that the state projector o f strategic narratives does not intend , 
to provoke. With the “connotative property” o f  the mythic symbol o f  national 
humiliation,39 Chinese collective memory has invoked a viscera sense o f entitlement 
among the in-group members toward those foreign “others" that are deemed responsible 
for the national disgrace in its modem history. In the belief system o f  Chinese foreign 
policy ideas, collective memoiy and national identity, while forging social coherence and 
nationalist aspiration, can cause a backlash against Beijing’s rational foreign policy 
making. In light o f their discursive power that has been fortified in the market-oriented 
media, these ideational factors have constituted a societal force that brings high audience 
costs to the CCP’s foreign policy making. So long as the CCP continues to resort to 
nationalism as the memory-based o f its regime legitimacy, the master historical account 
that blows up the public remembrance o f  Chinese wartime sufferings is capable o f 
bounding the rationality o f its diplomatic decision-making.
’7 See T hom as Rochon, Cultlure M oves: Ideas, A c tiv ism  a n d  Changing Values (Princeton, NJ: Princeton  
U niversity Press, 1998), 22-53 .
58 Schudson, "The Present in the Past V ersus the Past in the Present," 107.
59 Dittmer, "Political Culture and Political Sym bolism : Toward a Theoretical Synthesis," 568.
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As such, the. hegemonic discourse projected as due-driven strategic narratives has, 
•e borrow Stanley Hoffman’s words, ‘mobilized believers who will propagate it and d c  
battle for it.”60 This can be seen from the counter-narratives projected by the Chinese 
societal forces in the technology-enabled and commercialized media eec-logy. As a 
convenient way to direct popular dissent with the authortarian regime, the insinuation o f 
the government’s diplomatic performance and the civic discourse, which are justified by 
the normative components o f  Chinese foreign policy making, reveals the interchangeable 
roles o f actor and audience on the performance platform o f the PRC’s diplomacy.
Whereas nationalist discourse is exploited by the CCP leadership to legitimize its foreign 
policy choice, the narrative frame o f the official discourse can also be employed in the 
publicly communicated evaluation o f  the validity o f the positions taken by the state on 
the diplomatic performance stage. As popular discourse is no longer the accessory o f the 
state manipulation but increasingly works with the commercialized media, the 
transformed communicative environment has provided the Chinese public with a 
discursive means to express its loyalty to a national principal that is not in tune with the 
sustainment o f the regime’s legitimacy. Political actors in this increasingly pluralistic 
society can consciously, perhaps even cynically, appropriate the. hegemonic discourse to 
ground their political claim making.
In the realm o f domestic-foreign-policy interaction, the CCP is indeed stuck 
between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, it docs need the historical institutions 
in the political enterprise o f nationalism to substantiate the inseparable. linkage between 
the state and the nation to solidify social cohesion, while oh the other hand nationalist
50 Stanley Hoffm an, "Nationalism and World Order," in N ationalism  an d  In ternationalism  in th e P ost-C o ld  
War Era, ed. Kjsll Goldmarm, U lf  Hannerz, and Charles W estin (London: R outledgc, 2000), 198.
discourse has worked to internalize the external conflicts that cannot be adroitly mitigated 
due to the normative requirement o f Chinese foreign policy ideas. Moreover, facing an 
external audience suspicious of China's rise, Beijing has made strenuous efforts to water
down the aggressive implication o f an aggrieved image projected by a post-colonial state 
on the international scene. However, with the leeway o f conducting a pragmatic 
diplomacy heavily constrained by the emotional needs o f the Chinese public, anything 
less than a forceful move on the part o f a victimhood state, most notably ir. the boisterous 
Sino-Japanese relations, renders Beijing’s foreign policy makers liable to domestic 
castigation. The raging criticism over the government’s diplomatic performance can 
further morph into disgruntlement with domestic sociopolitical pains.
As manifested in the Internet-based discursive resistance thax the propaganda state 
cannot bully into silence, the CCP’s monolithic control o f  nationalist discourse is 
undermined in the increasingly society-driven media ecology. Wtth the emerging social 
resistance to the state’s hegemonic control in the production and circulation o f hegemonic 
discourse, strategic narratives projected in such a legitimate narrative frame has become 
part o f the rhetoric menu o f the Chinese populace to voice their discontent with the 
CCP’s foreign policy and with its domestic governance. In interrogating the discrepancy 
between state’s behavior on the foreign relations front and the moral claim that is 
projected in the official nationalist discourse to depict the regime s role playing, the 
diplomatic “scripts” that are implicated in the Chinese collective memory and national 
identity have significantly empowered popular agency in the contestation with the regime. 
Historical institutions, as Peter Ciries vividly describes, “ [weakened] the hyphen that
22
holds the Chinese Party- notion together As the const,-ucior arid consumer o f 
communicative historical IncMudons, the Chif.osc state tc-o society .rarnor be 
simptisticaUy dichotomized mi the intema! -cxt-irnai linkage of Chir>c;c foreign affairs. 
Just as Joei Migdal posits, the state c-a<*.; be '''hcmr.ted In- indeed tr.i’trxrr-ied”-—by the 
iritemai forces o f a transformed society f?
\
61 Gries, "Chinese Nationalism: Challenging me S ta te? ,' 256.
62 M igdal, "The State in Society," 76. A lso see Slate in Society Studying How Slater, and Societies 
Transform and Constitute One Another.
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